


HISTORY OF ROME

81—31 B.C.



THE MAKING OF THE MONARCHY
A
HISTORY OF ROME
81—31 B.C.

BY

A. H. ALLCROFT, M.A. OXON.

AUTHOR OF "THE TUTORIAL HISTORY OF ROME," "THE EARLY PRINCIPATE"
"EARLY GREEK HISTORY," ETC.

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
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A.—THE JULII AND ANTONII.



B.—THE LEPIDI.

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L. Aemilius Lepidus, cos. 50 B.C.

M. Aemilius Lepidus, Triumvir.

C.—THE POMPEII.

Q. Mucius Scaevola, the Augur

Cn. Pompeius Strabo, cos. 89 B.C.

Sulla.

Q. Pompeius Rufus, cos. 89 B.C.

Mucius—**Cn. Pompeius Magnus.**

Cornelia—Q. Pompeius Rufus.

Cn. Pompeius.

Sextus Pompeius.

Pompeius—**Faustus Sulla.**

d. 46 B.C.

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(*gens Pompeia.*)

Table II., to illustrate Relations between Rome and Egypt, Cyprus, and Cyrene.





Table III., to illustrate the Relations of Rome with Pontus and Armenia.



THE MAKING OF THE MONARCHY :

A HISTORY OF ROME, 81—31 B.C.

INTRODUCTION.

Leading Dates bearing on Period.

509 B.C.	Beginning of Roman Republic.
366.	Licinio-Sextian Rogations.
287.	End of political struggle of patricians and plebeians.
274	Rome supreme in Italy.
264-04.	Punic Wars.
133, 121.	Tribunates of Ti. and C. Gracchus.
91-90.	Social War.
87-84.	Rule of Marius and Cinna.
81.	Dictatorship of Sulla.

§ 1. THE first and last government of ancient Rome was monarchy. From the expulsion of the kings to the year 300 B.C. there was a constant struggle of the masses to win from the classes a proper share in the control of the State. A successful balance was at length effected, and for more than 150 years there was small collision between parties. During these years the parties of plebeians and patricians died out, and were replaced by those of the Senate and of the people : the former by degrees monopolised all the functions and emoluments of government. The popular party found voice in the consulship of C. Flaminius (232 B.C.), in the disputes as to the conduct of the Hannibalic war at its commencement (218-214 B.C.), and in other isolated instances ; but it was not until the middle of the second century (about 146) B.C. that it became an organised

power in the State with a definite programme and prepared to assert its constitutional rights. Then followed a period of ceaseless agitation, riot, and infatuated partisanship, of which Tiberius Gracchus (133 B.C.) was the inaugurator, his brother Gaius, Saturninus and Glaucia, the two Drusi, Marius, Sulla, Sulpicius, and Cinna, the chief exponents. While the parties quarrelled for sovereignty they failed to see until too late that they were only wearing out their strength that they might all become the servants of a new authority, namely of a monarchy found upon military force.

§ 2. Originally every citizen was a soldier, but the king alone was entitled to the supreme command. Growth of the Monarchy from the Constitutional Imperium. When the king was replaced by the two consuls, upon them the people delegated that authority which had formerly been bestowed upon the king; but when need arose, the State might supersede the consuls by a dictator, and so for a few months to all intents and purposes restore the monarchy. As wars multiplied, there was created another office endowed with the *imperium*, the praetorship. To each and all of these offices attached the primary limitations of definite continuance, Its Original Limits. definite sphere, and (saving with the dictatorship) collegiate tenure: no *imperator* could legally retain his command beyond the expiration of one year, or exercise it beyond the limits of the province allotted to him by the State, and any self-seeking was checked by the existence of colleagues possessing powers and authority exactly similar if not superior.

In the year 326 B.C., the exigencies of war demanding Removal of Limit of Time. more officers than were constitutionally available, the *imperium* of the ex-consul Q. Publilius Philo was prolonged for another year. Philo was the first proconsul. Henceforward it became increasingly usual to prolong the *imperium*, whether of consuls or praetors. Thus was destroyed the effective limitation of time.

During the great wars of the first period of foreign Limit of Space. conquest (201-146 B.C.), the power of class was at its height: it was represented by the Senate, with whom rested alike the appointment and tenure of command. It was now that commanders began to ignore

their subordination to the State, and to limitation of space by carrying on unauthorised war beyond the limits of their respective provinces.

Within the next fifty years were violated with ever greater frequency all the rules which had originally safeguarded the possession of the *imperium*. Marius was consul for five successive years; he and Sulla raised and used troops on their own authority, and defied the constitutional maxim that only a state-appointed dictator could wield the *imperium* within the walls of Rome; as sole consuls or as dictators they set themselves above the control of any colleague; rival candidates for command raised legions and resorted to civil war to decide their claims; Sulla made himself dictator for four successive years. By the date of his death (78 B.C.) it had become a prescriptive right of the State to appoint commanders whose *imperium* was arbitrary alike in continuance, in sphere, and in respect of collegiate control.

Again, Marius had abolished the old rule that only men of a certain property could serve in the army. He threw the service open to all indiscriminately, not excepting even slaves and freedmen in time of peril. Already for a century the service had been tending to become a profession, and the troops had come to demand plunder and bribes for their exertions and allegiance. At this date the legions were enrolled mainly from the proletariat—men who had nothing to lose and were ready to sell their services to the commander who should offer them the highest rewards, whether in the shape of the plunder of a conquered foe or assignments of land. The troops no longer fought the battles of their country, but of their leader. In this way had Marius won victories for the party of the people, Sulla for the party of the Senate. The result was that party-leaders now looked for success only in the possession of armed force, and the victory would rest with him whose forces were largest, whose promises of reward were highest, whose *imperium* was widest and least fettered. The man who was so placed was for the time being monarch of the Roman world, and therefore all who aspired to power sought

Limit of
Collegiate
Control.

Rise of Eras
of Personal
Military
Influence and
Professional
Militarism.

Military
Despotism.

to reach it by obtaining such extraordinary *imperium*. Within thirty years Caesar in this way for a brief space realised Empire. Twenty years later Augustus in the same way established Empire finally.

§ 3. The party-programme to which the Gracchi had given shape aimed at three prime objects. The Party-Questions. Firstly, the monopoly of wealth enjoyed by the Senate and equites was to be destroyed: the national wealth was to be more equably distributed, and thereby the hostility between rich and poor was to be removed, the pauperisation of Rome and the depopulation of Italy were to be checked. Secondly, the senatorial monopoly and abuse of justice were to be done away with: in transferring to the equites the administration of justice, the Gracchi believed they were ensuring its purity at home and abroad, and the redemption of those provincials whom the senatorial rule had for a century maltreated and despoiled. Thirdly, the senatorial monopoly of legislation and of government in general was to be overthrown: by erecting the equites as a third party C. Gracchus believed that he had provided for an equitable balance between the powers of the nobles and the aspirations of the people under their tribunes. But the programme failed in every point: wealth remained congested in hands yearly growing fewer and more exclusive; justice continued to be a mere name; the presence of the Sketch of their Course. third party only lent a violence hitherto unknown to the collisions between the two legislative powers in the State; pauperisation and depopulation went on as rapidly as ever. Saturninus and Glaucia aped the example of the Gracchi and were slain. Then a noble, M. Livius Drusus, took up the cry of reform—so far had the teachings of the Gracchi sunk into the minds of their opponents: but he too died, after having further embittered the struggles of the parties by preaching the equality of Romans and Italians. Then followed the three years of the Social war, and then six years of savagery in which now the democrats led by Marius, Cinna, and Carbo, again the nobles led by Sulla, prevailed and marked their victory by confiscations, proscriptions, and murder.

CHAPTER I.

SULLA AND LEPIDUS.

§ 1. The victory of the oligarchy under Sulla.—§ 2. Sulla as Dictator: nature of his Reforms.—§ 3. His Legislation in detail: partisan Reforms.—§ 4. Permanent and useful Reforms.—§ 5. Lepidus: his Career: he Restores the Corn-doles.—§ 6. The Democratic Programme, 78 B.C.: Designs of Lepidus.—§ 7. The Civil War.—§ 8. Causes of the Failure of Lepidus: Attitude of the Democrats: Further Attacks on the Senate.—§ 9. The Senatorial Administration.

§ 1. By the autumn of 82 B.C. Sulla had almost stamped out the resistance of the democrats. On The victory of the Colline Gate. November 1st the Samnites and Lucanians, joined by the remnant of the army of Carbo, marched upon Rome. Sulla hastened to defend the city, and annihilated the enemy at the Colline Gate. Italy was now in the hands of Sulla, though Norba and Volaterrae held out till 79 B.C. Spain, Sicily, and Africa were still held by the democrats, but soon fell into the power of the Sullan generals. Sulla then set himself to the task of breaking down the influence of the middle-class party and re-establishing the oligarchical constitution. The means he employed were assassination and confiscation, followed by legislation in favour of the Senate.

Lists of those who could be killed with impunity were posted up in the Forum. The men whose The names. names were on these lists were said to be "proscribed" and the lists themselves were called "proscriptions" (*proscriptiones*). The word *pro-*

scriptio had hitherto meant merely a "public notice of sale," but from this time it was used also in the sense of "outlawry."

By a *Lex Cornelia de proscriptione*, which was a *lex data* or magisterial ordinance, and was not brought before the people, the proscribed were declared to be enemies of the state, their children and grandchildren were excluded from office and from a place in the Senate, their property was confiscated, and a reward of 12,000 *denarii* was offered to anyone who killed an "outlaw." Among the proscribed were 90 Senators and 2,600 knights; for the equestrian order was held to be an especial menace to the power of a re-constituted oligarchy. Many others from all parts of Italy swelled the total to about 5,000. The proscriptions began to be used even by men of good position as a means of enriching themselves or of glutting private vengeance.

Colonisation and assignment of lands to veterans followed on an unprecedented scale. About
Sullan Colonies.
 150,000 soldiers were settled in Samnium, Campania, and Etruria. By this means the loss of men caused by the Italian wars was made good, and the Latinisation of the Oscans and Etruscans accelerated; whereby Sulla furthered the national union of Italy.

§ 2. At the end of 82 B.C. Sulla, having thus overcome all resistance, began the great work of reconstruction. Both the consuls were dead:
Sulla Dictator.
 so that it was necessary for the Senate to appoint an *interrex*. Their choice fell on L. Valerius Flaccus; and he nominated Sulla as "dictator for the making of laws and the regulating of the State" (*dictator legibus faciendis reipublicae constituendae*). The nomination was ratified by a law of the *Comitia* (the *Lex Valeria*, which also gave legal validity to the proscriptions). Since the office was limited neither by time nor appeal, it was practically a new magistracy, and resembled the old dictatorship (Introd., § 2) only in name. The government was *de facto* an unlimited monarchy.

Throughout the years 81-80 B.C. Sulla displayed comprehensive legislative activity. His main aims were the restoration of the power of the Senate, and the suppression of his political opponents. Such measures as were merely in the interests of his party were foredoomed to failure, for the Senate had, in forwarding the development of the empire, done all the work it was competent to do. It was now hopelessly corrupt and obsolete, and in monarchy alone could the state find its salvation. Hence the merely partisan laws of Sulla were soon repealed. But in seeking to carry out his main purpose he effected some needful and long-desired administrative and judicial reforms. These were no doubt intended by the legislator merely to further the cause he had at heart; but owing to their useful and practical character they long survived the directly constitutional measures.

§ 3. Far-reaching changes were made in the position of the magistrates. Before the time of the Gracchi (Introd., § 1) the tribunes, originally the champions of the people, had become the servants of the Senate; but the democrat reformers had given them back their old rôle. They were forbidden by a law of Sulla to propose *plebiscita* (resolutions) to the plebeian assembly without first obtaining the sanction of the Senate. Moreover they were no longer allowed to veto a decree of the Senate or to stop a vote of the Assembly of the People (*comitia centuriata*). Another law closed to tribunes admission to the higher magistracies. The number of quaestors was increased from eight to twenty; and since these, on the expiration of their year of office, became senators, the duty of filling gaps in the Senate, hitherto performed by the censors, was rendered superfluous. By a *Lex Annalis* two years were to elapse between the holding of the offices of quaestor, praetor, and consul.

The Senate was increased by the admission of 300 new members, chosen by the people from the equestrian order; it controlled the popular and plebeian assemblies, and thus obtained legislative power.

The judges for the criminal courts were drawn from it instead of from the knights (as had been the case since 123). But as both the quaestors and the new members were chosen by the people, the Senate was to some extent a representative body, based on popular choice.

Since *plebiscita* could not be proposed without the sanction of the Senate, and as the plebeian assembly had by this time become the main organ of legislation, the powers of the people were greatly curtailed. The Assembly of the people (*comitia centuriata*) continued to pass laws, but these seem to have been mere ratifications of the Senate's decrees. It is true that the people, by electing the quaestors, indirectly chose the senators; but their freedom of choice was probably controlled or, at least, hampered by the Senate.

§ 4. Sulla effected useful and lasting reforms in the administrative and judicial departments. He increased the number of praetors from six to eight, and gave legal sanction to the custom by which consuls and praetors remained in Rome during their year of office, and discharged the civil functions appertaining to the *imperium domi*, or "home-command." The consuls were restricted to a general control; the city and peregrine praetors were to have charge of the procedure of civil law, while the six other praetors were to act as presidents of the standing commissioners. On the expiration of their year of office these ten magistrates were to exercise the *imperium militiae* or "military command," and each govern a province as proconsul and proprætor respectively. There were as yet only nine provinces, but a tenth was now formed by the annexation of Cisalpine Gaul, which, though not included in Italy, had been under the general control of the consuls. The civil was thus separated from the military authority, and the control of the Senate over civil magistrates was extended to cover the whole of Italy.

The great task of organising the judicial system was first undertaken by Sulla. His method was to group together crimes which resembled one another, and to appoint separate permanent commissions

The People.

Permanent
and Useful

(1) Administrative.

(2) Judicial.

(*quaestiones perpetuae*), each established by a corresponding *Lex Cornelia*, for the trial of each group. There was already in existence a *quaestio perpetua de pecuniis repetundis*, for the trial of extortion on the part of provincial governors. Six *leges Corneliae* were passed by Sulla, establishing six new *quaestiones*—*lex de maiestate* (treason), *lex de peculatu* (embezzlement), *lex de ambitu* (bribery), *lex de sicariis et veneficiis* (assassination, poisoning, arson, parricide), *lex de falsis* (fraud, including forgery of wills and coining), *lex de vi* (seditious riot). The jurymen (*iudices*) were taken from the Senate instead of from the knights. At the beginning of each year a list (*album iudicum*) of the senators who could serve in the courts was drawn up by the city praetor, and the *iudices* in each list were divided into sections called *decursus*. The permanent commissions acted as delegates of the people, and there was no appeal from them to the people. Since the six praetors, who were the ordinary presidents of the courts, were not sufficient, additional presidents had to be appointed. These were called *quaestores*. This reform of Sulla "was," as a modern historian has said, "the beginning of a clear distinction between civil and criminal jurisprudence, a first attempt to codify criminal law and procedure."

Sulla acted as consul for 80 B.C., holding the Dictatorship in reserve. His object was to examine the working of his new constitution. He seems to have been satisfied; for he had new consuls elected for 79, and early in that year he resigned the Dictatorship. He still possessed a great influence, supported as he was by his party in the Senate, his veterans, and his 10,000 *Cornelii* (freedmen who acted as a bodyguard).

To Sulla it seemed that his work was built upon a rock. He forgot three things: first, that it was wrought and protected by the sword, and must fall when that sword passed into an enemy's grasp; secondly, that though he could write down the articles of a new constitution, he could not call into life the men who should maintain it; thirdly, that he had removed no single grievance, and that every cause which had

Reignation
of Sulla.

Cause of Sulla's
Failure.

rendered his interference a necessity was still present and active in the political organism.

Indeed there was none to succeed to Sulla's place. The nobles were a clique of incapables, a few of them well-meaning, most of them as corrupt as they were incapable. Of the better men amongst them were Q. Lutatius Catulus, Q. Metellus Pius, L. Licinius Lucullus, and L. Philippus. Catulus, son of him who conquered the Cimbri at Vercellae, was a man of honour. So was Metellus, and he was also a safe officer who owed more to caution than to ability—"an old woman," Sertorius called him. Lucullus also turned out a brilliant officer, thanks less to his talent than his good fortune; and Philippus was more famous as an orator and a trimmer than as a politician. In fine none of the four was a born general, and there was not amongst the whole political circle of Rome as yet a born statesman; what talent there was had not as yet made itself a name.

§ 5. At the consular elections for 78 B.C. were returned Q. Lutatius Catulus and M. Aemilius Lepidus. Shortly after their entry upon office Sulla died.

Of Catulus' character we have already spoken. His colleague Lepidus was a man of no principle and small ability who had found his profit in playing the optimate while Sulla was paramount, and had made himself wealthy by purchasing the goods of the proscribed. In 81 B.C. he had been praetor with Sicily as his province, and his extortions there had been flagrant enough to bring upon him an impeachment, probably early in 79 B.C. The prosecutors were Metellus Nepos and Metellus Celer, members of a *gens* which had long been the hereditary *patroni* of the Sicilians and was optimate to the core; from which it would seem that Lepidus had already made himself distasteful to the senatorial party. He was probably suspected of democratic leanings. The democrats were at the time a party without a head, only waiting for a leader round whom they might rally. Lepidus, to baffle his prosecutors, openly espoused the democratic cause, and proclaimed his intention by marrying Appuleia, daughter of the revolutionary tribune of 100 B.C. The manoeuvre was successful: the prosecution

was abandoned, and Lepidus found himself strong enough to win the consulship for 78 B.C. He was thus the avowed and accepted head of the democrats when the death of Sulla removed the only terror which kept their party inactive. He was one of the supreme magistrates of the State, and he must now set about rewarding his supporters for their aid. Without doubt he posed as a democrat only to serve his own end, and this end was his own establishment in the room of Sulla.

Sulla had abolished the corn-dole first made statutory by
 His Measures: C. Gracchus (123 B.C.) and subsequently used
 Corn-doles. as a party-bribe by every popular champion.

How the thousands of the proletariat had contrived to exist since its abolition we cannot say, but inasmuch as we are not told of any alternative measures of relief, we must conclude that the starving poor had no option but to attach themselves as clients to the wealthy nobles and equites, a course which would at least secure them the pittance of the *sportula*, while it would be favourably viewed by the ruling class as lending a further dignity and authority to their position. It was however only natural that, if they were to be fed at all, the mob should prefer the old system of public relief which carried with it no duties, rather than that of clientship which involved personal attendance upon some proud and envied aristocrat. Accordingly Lepidus, in whose brain there was room for nothing original, found no difficulty in renewing the law of Gracchus and compelling the State again to provide corn at a cheap rate to all who chose to demand it. The immediate result was to put at his beck the entire mass of the discontented, who saw with delight this easy but momentous victory over the constitution which Sulla had been at such pains to build up and fortify.

§ 6 In a moment all Italy was astir with political agitation. While in Rome itself the democrats clamoured for the restoration of the old powers of the tribunate, and the repeal of the law excluding the tribune from other offices, the non-urban populace at large demanded their restoration to the lands which had been allotted to Sulla's veterans, and both classes alike cried

The Revolutionary
 Programme.

out for the recall of those whom Sulla had exiled, the restoration of their confiscated property, and the removal of the disabilities attached to the exiles in person and to their descendants.

Lepidus was aware that he could look for no permanent ^{Intentions of} success unless supported by an armed force ^{Lepidus.} sufficient to outweigh that which was at the command of the Senate in the persons of Sulla's disbanded legionaries, and that he must seek the materials of such a force amongst the Italians and the exiles. Had he been a man of capacity he would have recognised the futility of forcibly assailing the interests of the Sullan veterans and would have sought to win them over by diplomacy. He probably had not the ability, and his followers gave him no time. It was in Etruria that Sulla had carried out his measures of spoliation with the greatest rigour and settled his veterans in the largest numbers: in Etruria therefore the discontent of the evicted possessors first broke out. The people of Faesulae (*Fiesole*) attacked and expelled the legionaries there settled, and looked to Lepidus to support their premature aggressions.

Lepidus is said to have been pressed by the urban demo-
^{Question of} crats to carry at once the necessary laws for ^{the Tribunate.} rehabilitating the tribunate. To have done so would have established in the city an organised opposition sufficient to paralyse the senatorial government, but Lepidus declined to do so for the present. He may have had two reasons: either he was afraid to set up a power which might rival his own, or he may have felt that it was better to leave the tribunate in its present powerless condition, rather than to be obliged, when he had made himself master of the State, to repress that office as Sulla had done.

He left his party without a leader and entered Etruria
^{The Consuls} with his colleague. The Senate exacted an oath ^{from the two} from the two that they would not attack each other, and commissioned each to raise troops for the defence of the Sullan constitution. If any comment were needed upon such a piece of blind folly as voluntarily to provide the declared champion of democracy with the means of raising the troops without which he was powerless, it may be found

in Lepidus' remark that his oath only bound him while consul, and would therefore cease to be valid at the expiry of the year. Both consuls commenced to recruit: to Catulus flocked the legionaries of Sulla; to Lepidus, the old Etrurian population, the exiles, and the destitute.

§ 7. At the close of the year 78 B.C. Lepidus should have withdrawn to the province of Narbonese Gaul, allotted to him in due legal course before his entry upon office. He declined to do so unless the Senate would concede the rehabilitation of the Sullan exiles, the restitution of their lands to the ejected Italians, the restoration of the tribunate, and his own re-election to a second consulship. In advocating the restoration of the tribunate, he may have been prompted solely by the wish to pick a quarrel with the Senate, knowing that this concession at any rate would never be made without compulsion; but in demanding a second consulship, he showed plainly that he intended to repeat the conduct of Cinna and Carbo. The Senate refused his demands, and on the motion of L. Philippus, he was declared a public enemy. Catulus was commissioned to protect the State, and to Cn. Pompeius, the most brilliant officer in the senatorial ranks,* was entrusted a subordinate command.

Catulus fell back upon Rome, and stationed himself behind the Tiber; Pompeius marched northwards into the valley of the Padus (*Po*), where the praetor M. Junius Brutus, governor of Cisalpine Gaul, was acting for Lepidus. The latter marched after Catulus, intending to occupy Rome forthwith; but Catulus, though he put off fighting until further delay was impossible, repulsed Lepidus' efforts to enter the city, and drove him back into Etruria by a victory at the Mulvian Bridge. This success encouraged Catulus to advance into Etruria, where he again defeated Lepidus at Volsinii (*Bolsena*), while hurrying to the relief of Brutus, whom Cn. Pompeius had already shut up in Mutina (*Modena*). About the same time, Pompeius stormed that town, put Brutus to death, and effected a junction with Catulus. Their combined armies routed Lepidus for a third time at Cosa (*Ansidonia*), and shut him up in the small

* For his early life, see page 17, below.

peninsula of Mons Argentarius (*M. Argentaro*), on the coast of Etruria. Lepidus saw that his position in Italy was hopeless: he sailed to Sardinia, intending to use his forces to blockade Rome from the sea by intercepting the corn-ships making for Ostia; but he was so energetically opposed by the governing praetor that his design came to nothing, and his ill-success combined with the malarious climate to carry him off by fever and chagrin. His subordinate, M. Perperna, conveyed the remnant of his army to Spain, where Sertorius had already gained a secure footing. The last episode of Lepidus' insurrection was the capture and execution of his son, Aemilius Scipio, in the stronghold of Alba Pompeia (*Alba*), amongst the Ligurian mountains (77 B.C.).

§ 8. The attempted revolution had failed so utterly that even the lately conceded corn-doles were probably at once discontinued, but nevertheless it was not without results. It had failed for the double reason that firstly, Lepidus himself, apart from his incapacity and inability to bide his time, had all along showed his selfish motives too clearly to win the confidence and support of the really able men on the democratic side; and secondly, there was no military force capable of offering resistance to the Sullan veterans. There had been no brilliant diplomacy or strategy or insight on the side the Senate: the concession of the corn-doles at the first demand, and the subsequent criminal blunder of arming the revolutionist under the restraint of an oath, prove at once the weakness and stupidity of the ruling party. And the democrats who succeeded to Lepidus' position as leaders of their party, did not fail to lay to heart the lessons taught by his failure. Their policy henceforth was to acquire a military power which should back their demands, and to attack the defences of the senatorial position in detail rather than seek to overthrow all at once.

In the very year of Lepidus' failure C. Julius Caesar impeached Cn. Dolabella for extortion when proconsul in Macedonia in 80 B.C. Dolabella was a notorious Sullan, and he was acquitted, thanks to the fact that the Senate now controlled the jury-courts; but Caesar laid the foundation of his reputation as an orator,

and, what was more notable, publicly declared in this manner his democratic views, for it had for many years past been an accepted doctrine in Rome that every great law-case had a political object at least as deep as its pretended judicial purpose. Caesar followed up his *début* by impeaching another Sullan officer, C. Antonius, for extortion when with Sulla in Greece. In this case again the defendant escaped for the time (76 B.C.), but six years later he was expelled from the Senate.

In fact its enemies gave the senatorial party no rest. In Spain the successes of Sertorius were so decided, the senatorial commanders so incapable, that in this year (76 B.C.) the nobles were compelled, sorely against their will, to give to Cn. Pompeius an extraordinary commission for the reduction of the two Spains, while at home the tribune L. Sicinius so far defied the provisions of Sulla's constitution as to use the old tribunicial right of addressing the people on his own initiative. He paid for his daring with his life, assassinated, it was said, by the consul C. Scribonius Curio; but in 75 B.C. the popular party was able to secure the election of an anti-Sullan Consul, C. Aurelius Cotta, who re-established the distribution of corn, but on a limited scale only. He also tried without success to recover for the tribunes their old rights of addressing the people and of eligibility for other offices; but as one of the tribunes of the year, Opimius, was deposed and fined for trying to carry a plebiscite, the consul was probably intimidated. In the next year (74 B.C.) another tribune, L. Quinctius, took up the same cry, and was bought over by the Senate, so it was said, not however before he had brought to trial and secured the condemnation of a praetor and several other nobles for making sale of justice. Lastly the ability and vigour of L. Licinius Macer, tribune in 73 B.C., who advised the people to refuse military service until their claims were satisfied, compelled the Senate to promise concessions. By this time it had upon its hands wars in every part of the empire—in Spain, in Thrace, in Asia with Mithradates, over the whole Mediterranean with the pirates, and the slave-war of Spartacus broke out before the close of the year. Nor were these by any means the whole of its

difficulties: we have hints of riots in Rome and of mutinies in the legions stirred up by senators. Internally and externally the party of the nobles was divided and paralysed. In desperation they promised that the question of compromise should be submitted to Cn. Pompeius, by his own suggestion, when he should have finally concluded the settlement of Spain. The people would not have long to wait, for Sertorius had fallen at last (72 B.C.) and had no worthy successor.

§ 9. Meanwhile the Senate was faring badly in its dealings beyond the city walls. The insurgent Sertorius had been master of well-nigh the whole of Spain between the years 79 and 75 B.C. The utmost efforts of the best generals of the State failed to reduce him until assassination solved the problem in 72 B.C., and it was not until the next year that the revolt was entirely suppressed upon the death of Perpenna. In the East after several years of menace, during which the State might have put its possessions at least in an efficient condition of defence, but failed to do so, Mithradates had at length declared war, and for a moment threatened the safety of the province of Asia: Lucullus had delivered it from that peril, but his appointment was itself a piece of senatorial jobbery and his success was rather owing to his own unforeseen abilities, and to his enemy's insensate blundering, than to either the goodwill or the hearty support of the government. From the year 79 B.C. onwards the legions were constantly afoot to secure the province of Macedonia from the attacks of the Thracians and other tribes. The city was in perpetual dread of famine, its magistrates insulted or defeated, the commerce of the Mediterranean ruined, by the Cilician pirates. Most disgraceful of all, the whole of Italy was desolated, and Roman legions repeatedly routed by Spartacus and his host of runaway slaves.

Foreign Affairs
under the
Government
of the Senate.

CHAPTER II.

SERTORIUS AND SPARTACUS.

§ 1. Career of Sertorius : Condition of Spain.—§ 2. His Adventures in Africa.—§ 3. He heads the Revolt of Spain : his Alliance with the Pirates.—§ 4. Career of Cn. Pompeius.—§ 5. Pompeius obtains the Command in Spain.—§ 6. Campaigns of 77-75 B.C.—§ 7. Sertorius reduced to the Defensive : his Alliance with Mithradates. § 8. End of Sertorius.—§ 9. Pompeius concludes the War.

§ 10. The Slave Question in Italy.—§ 11. Outbreak of Spartacus : his early Successes and Designs.—§ 12. He overruns Italy and allies himself with the Pirates.—§ 13. Crassus ends the War.

§ 1. Q. SERTORIUS was a Sabine of Nursia (*Norcia*), on the Nar (*Nera*), born probably about 125 B.C. His father died while he was yet young, and with his mother Raia he came early to Rome. He saw his first service in the army of Q. Servilius Caepio at Arausio, when 80,000 Romans were slain by the Cimbri (105 B.C.). Between the years 97-93 B.C. he acted as military tribune in the army of T. Didius in Hispania Citerior, and it was probably during these years that he acquired that intimate knowledge of the peninsula, and that influence over its inhabitants, of which he was later to make such good use. Returning to Rome he shared in the Social war (90-88 B.C.), in the quarrel between Marius and Sulla (88 B.C.), and in the subsequent civil war attending Sulla's return from Asia (83 B.C.). Throughout these struggles Sertorius sided with the democratic party, but his moderation won for him a splendid notoriety amongst the excesses of his companions. His dislike for violence made him indeed distasteful to his partisans, no less than his military capacities made him invaluable to them; and when in 83 B.C. he was despatched by Cinna to act as governor of the Spains, the appoint-

ment was probably equally to the liking of himself and of his party.

The two Spains had remained as a whole peaceful since the conquest of Numantia by Scipio Aemilianus (133 B.C.). The coast was thickly fringed with mercantile towns, and the lowlands generally were occupied by a population in large part purely Roman. In none of the provinces had the process of assimilation to Rome proceeded with such rapidity and thoroughness. Only in the highlands of the central and north-western regions the indomitable Celtiberi (in *Old and New Castile*) and Lusitani (*Portugal and Estremadura*) maintained obstinately their independence. But the Roman government had been little more merciful to this than to other lands, and when Sertorius arrived he found discontent rife and eager for revenge. Representing the anti-senatorial party, Sertorius had an immediate claim upon the sympathies of the natives, and this he proceeded to justify by his conciliatory measures. He remitted a large part of the customary taxes, carefully restrained his troops from pillage and from the old abuse of free-quarter, and set himself to organise an army in the Roman fashion. His address won him ready support from the natives, but for the host of guerilleros thus placed at his command he formed a more solid nucleus by enlisting the Roman settlers, while he used his best efforts to prepare a siege-train and a fleet (82 B.C.).

§ 2. He was busied with these preparations for the anticipated attack of the victorious Sullans, when C. Annius Luscus and C. Valerius Flaccus, respectively named governors of Hispania Ulterior and Citerior, arrived with their forces by way of the coast route at the foot of the Pyrenees. The passes of those mountains were held for Sertorius by his legate Julius Salinator, but the assassination of that officer, and the consequent retreat of his troops, enabled the Sullan governors to enter Spain while Sertorius was as yet unprepared to meet them. He withdrew hastily to New Carthage (*Cartagena*), whence he took ship, with 3000 picked troops, for the opposite coast of Mauretania. The arm of Sulla had not yet reached to Africa, where the governor, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus,

son-in-law of Cinna, still maintained the Marian cause. The petty monarchs of the native kingdoms, Hiempsal of Numidia and Bogud of Mauretania, were both tools of the Senate, and therefore partisans of Sulla ; and Domitius was at this moment actively supporting a pretender named Hiarbas against Hiempsal. Sertorius might here find ample employment for his men, and his position would be immensely strengthened by a union with Domitius. He attempted to land in Tingitanis (*Morocco*), but finding the natives hostile, he turned back towards Spain. On the way he fell in with a squadron of pirates whom he joined in attacking Pityussa (*Iviza*), but the speedy arrival of Annius with a formidable fleet compelled him to evacuate the island and once more make for Africa. This time he was more successful. He found the kingdom of Tingitanis distracted by a disputed succession, and at once took the part of one of the claimants, shutting up his rival in Tingis (*Tangier*) and there besieging him. But in the interim Cn. Pompeius had entered Africa by order of Sulla, had defeated and slain Ahenobarbus and Hiarbas, and restored Hiempsal. The Marians' prospects were therefore ruined in this quarter, but Sertorius did not lose heart. When the Sullan governor of Africa despatched a force under one Pacciaecus to drive him from Mauretania and relieve Tingis, Sertorius gained a complete victory, added to his own ranks the survivors of the defeated army, and stormed Tingis. The news of the exploit quickly reached Spain, and in a few weeks Sertorius received messages inviting him to return thither and lead the Lusitani in a new rising. He accepted the call at once (80 B.C.).

§ 3. The withdrawal of Sertorius in 81 B.C. had been followed by the instant submission of all Spain, so that when Flaccus and Annius handed over their respective governorships to their successors M. Domitius Calvinus and L. Fufidius (80 B.C.), the former could declare the Celtiberi pacified, the latter could say the same of the Lusitani. But the submission of those peoples was, as usual, only apparent. The Lusitani in particular were in active communication with Sertorius and ready to rise whenever he should appear. In the autumn of 80 B.C. he

sailed from Tingis, broke through the much superior fleet wherewith Cotta was waiting to intercept him, and hurried to the Tagus valley. When Fufidius at length overtook him, he had already organised one complete Roman legion, and was able to defeat that governor with the loss of 2000 men. With such an advertisement of his cause he had no difficulty in again raising in arms the whole of Spain.

The new Governor of Hispania Ulterior was Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, the son of the conqueror of Jugurtha, a man of some ability and great experience, but too old to be equal to his task. Before he could arrive, Sertorius had thrown off a division under L. Hirtuleius, which overran Hispania Citerior, slew the propraetor Calvinus, and defeated his army. At the first news of the success of Sertorius L. Manlius, governor of Transalpine Gaul, had crossed the Pyrenees with three legions to aid his colleagues: he too was routed, and prompted by emissaries of Sertorius, the Aquitani rose upon his rear as he returned and captured the whole of his baggage. Metellus endeavoured to reach Sertorius, and pushing into the Tagus valley laid siege to Langobriga, a central stronghold of the Lusitani; but Sertorius compelled him to raise the siege by destroying a column under his legate Aquinus, and shortly afterwards achieved a similar success over a division under Thorius. Metellus lost his head and knew not where to turn. All Hispania Citerior was lost, and of Hispania Ulterior the Senate controlled only the coast towns and the spots immediately occupied by Metellus' defeated legions. Sertorius had roused the tribes beyond the Pyrenees, thereby putting his northern frontier in a state of adequate defence, while by sea he was in league with the pirates who furnished him with whatever supplies he needed and acted as his agents in communicating with Mithradates in the East and with sympathisers—and they were many—in Rome. In Spain itself he stood forward not as a mere guerilla-chief but as the lawful governor appointed by Cinna and the democrats, as opposed to the illegal nominees of Sulla, the tools of senatorial misgovernment. He drilled his army of Spaniards in Roman style, officered it with Roman leaders, but drew to him at the same time all the bravest of the Spanish

warriors, who swore to live and die by his side. With careful foresight he placed the sons of the native chiefs in safe custody at Osca (*Huesca*) where, under plea of training them in Roman arts and letters as in a university, he retained them in fact as hostages. He even formed a senate upon the model of that of Rome, gave it the Roman dress and the title of true senate, and in every way sought to carry out the democratic ideal of which Gracchus was the first exponent—the affiliation of the provincials to their conquerors. It was at this juncture that Sulla died. For eighteen months Sertorius remained practically sovereign in Spain while the attempted revolution of Lepidus engaged the entire energy of the Senate. Lepidus failed, but the remnant of his troops under the command of M. Perpenna helped to swell the ranks of the Sertorian armies.

§ 4. Cn. Pompeius Magnus was an eques. His family's nobility dated from 141 B.C., when one Q. Pompeius had, as consul, campaigned with some success against the Spaniards of Numantia. The father of Pompeius Magnus was one Cn. Pompeius Strabo who had signalised his tenure of command, when acting against the revolted allies in the Social war, by securing the murder of the consul Q. Pompeius Rufus, when the latter came to take over his troops, and by a rapacity and severity which, on his death (or possibly assassination) in the following year, caused his own men to mutilate and abuse his dead body. Born in 106 B.C., Pompeius Magnus was but seventeen years of age when he saw his first service in the Social war. He remained inactive, like others of the senatorial and equestrian parties, during the democratic ascendancy of Marius and Cinna, but on the first news of Sulla's return he raised a troop of cavalry in Picenum and fought his way to meet that general in Southern Italy. His services proved to be so useful that he was despatched in 81 B.C. to drive out of Sicily the remnant of the democrats there collected under Perpenna. This accomplished, he was ordered to Africa, where, as has been stated, he reduced that province to obedience, albeit unable to crush Sertorius. Upon his return to Rome he demanded a triumph, and Sulla conceded the point, despite the facts that Pompeius

had as yet held no legitimate office and that it was contrary to all precedent for a simple eques to triumph (81 B.C.). It was at this date that a casual compliment paid to him by Sulla gave rise to the name of Magnus by which he was ever afterwards known. In 77 B.C. he was again to the front as a staunch Sullan and senatorian, and though in this case also he held no legal command, it was mainly owing to his energy that the revolution of Lepidus was so speedily crushed. In the summer of 77 B.C. he had completed his task in Northern Italy, and returned with his legions to the neighbourhood of the city. In due course he should have disbanded his troops, but he alarmed the Senate by retaining them under arms, and it was very soon recognised that he expected to be appointed to the command against Sertorius, now at the height of his power in Spain.

§ 5. The Senate was in a dilemma. Sertorius must be crushed without delay; besides Pompeius there
Goes to Spain. was no one else who could show either past ability or present eagerness for the perils of Spanish warfare; and Pompeius had thus far shown himself both an able officer, and for the most part a loyal Sullan. Moreover, he held in readiness the needful legions, and his nomination would save considerable delay. But, on the other hand, there were grave reasons against his appointment. His whole career was a series of illegalities: his triumph, not less than his very appearance in the field, was an unauthorised infraction of the constitution of Sulla, and the Senate was quite alive to the fact that the fabric of Sulla's constitution was too unstable to admit of any trifling with its safeguards. Again, if Pompeius were named at all, it must be to another extraordinary command; for as he had as yet not filled even the aedileship, it would be equally illegal to get him elected either as praetor or consul, the only offices which carried with them the right of military command. Moreover it would be an ungracious thing to make this young intruder—he was not yet thirty—the equal, or possibly the superior, of a tried and fairly capable officer like Metellus. Finally the Senate could not but feel that, in so advancing Pompeius in defiance of law, it was possibly creating another authority of the sword such as

had been that of Marius; for it believed with good reason that Pompeius' professions of unswerving loyalty to the established government were not very reliable. Nevertheless, Sertorius must be crushed, and Pompeius had force enough at his command to wring from the Senate the appointment he desired if it were not given voluntarily: he might either espouse the cause of the democrats, carry out the revolution which Lepidus had attempted, rehabilitate the tribunate, and so secure his appointment by virtue of the people's voice; or he might adopt the shorter and more fashionable course of armed compulsion. So the Senate yielded, and named Pompeius to the conduct of the war in Spain with the powers of a proconsul, and for such period as might prove needful; and having thus for the present got rid of him, it doubtless cherished a half-conscious hope that he might meet the fate of Calvinus and never return.

§ 6. In the autumn of 77 B.C., Pompeius crossed the Pyrenees and took up his winter-quarters in the north-eastern corner of Spain, north of the Hiberus (*Ebro*), where he had little difficulty in reducing to submission the Indigetes and Laetani. We are not told whether Sertorius had made any attempt to bar the passes of the Pyrenees. He seems to have been busy consolidating his position in Spain south of the Hiberus, regarding that river as his most defensible frontier. When Pompeius moved southwards in 76 B.C., with a view to effecting a junction with Metellus in Hispania Ulterior, he found the passage of the river barred by M. Perpenna: this officer had, on his first arrival in Spain, claimed equality of command with Sertorius, but the rapid approach of Pompeius caused his troops, who had had experience of his incapacity or ill-fortune, to put themselves under Sertorius' command. He was supported upon the Hiberus by C. Herennius, who occupied Valentia (*Valencia*), while the main army of the insurgents, under Sertorius in person, was busy with the reduction of a few isolated towns about the upper waters of the Ebro. Hirtuleius was instructed to keep Metellus employed in Hispania Ulterior.

Pompeius easily forced his way across the Hiberus, com-

pletely defeated both Perpenna and Herennius, and occupied Valentia. Thereupon several towns of the district declared for him, amongst them Lauron, on the Sucro (*Xucar*), near Valentia. Before he could make good these acquisitions, Sertorius came up and laid siege to Lauron. Pompeius set himself to relieve the place, and was already boasting of his success when he found his position turned, his whole force defeated, and the town stormed by the insurgents. In Hispania Ulterior Metellus routed L. Hirtuleius, recovered most of the lowland country, and forced the Sertorians to withdraw into the mountains of Lusitania. Metellus and Pompeius now went into winter quarters, intending to unite their forces in the following spring.

In the early spring of 75 B.C., Metellus moved eastwards as he had intended. Hirtuleius made an attempt to bar his march, but was utterly routed and himself slain at Italica (near *Seville*); but Pompeius' vanity induced him to give battle to Sertorius, who was anxious to bring him to action, before Metellus could arrive to share the glory of the anticipated victory. Leaving Perpenna to cover his rear and delay Metellus, Sertorius engaged with his enemy on the banks of the Sucro. The battle was obstinate and indecisive: one wing of the Romans was routed, the other was put to flight by Sertorius' own division; but the Sertorian camp was plundered, and when Perpenna failed again to achieve his object, the juncture of Pompeius and Metellus could not be prevented. So disheartened were Sertorius' Spanish troops that for the moment they dispersed.

This discouragement did not last long. A few weeks later Sertorius again appeared with as large a force as ever before Saguntum (*Murviédro*). Pompeius was not now so eager for a battle, but the activity of the enemy's privateers and flying columns, which cut off his supplies by land and sea alike, forced him to give battle on the river Turia (*Guadalquivir*). This second battle was very similar to the first: again Sertorius in person routed the division under Pompeius; again Metellus defeated Perpenna, and even repulsed the subsequent efforts of Sertorius to restore his fortunes on that wing. Once more the Spanish army dispersed, and Sertorius fled to the highlands; and after

driving out Herennius from Valentia, Pompeius and Metellus conjointly moved after Sertorius, and besieged him in Clunia, on the Upper Douro. He contrived however to escape, and the Roman armies were withdrawn. So wasted was the country by constant warfare, that Metellus was compelled to quarter his troops for the winter in Gaul.

Pompeius wintered amongst the Vaccaeï (about *Valladolid*). He had little to be proud of in the result of his two years of fighting, and his despatches to the Senate betrayed, under cover of pressing demands for men and money, his disappointment. However, the Senate had no wish to see him back again in Italy, least of all at a moment when they were required to select a commander to deal with Mithradates, and they sent him a couple of legions.

§ 7. The character of the war now changed, Sertorius felt that he was no match for his enemies in the defensive. open field. His forces, albeit levied amongst some of the bravest warriors of the ancient world, were difficult to keep together, and lacked that ability to meet misfortune which eminently characterised the Romans. Great as his personal ascendancy undoubtedly and deservedly was, he had from the outset been glad to avail himself of the aid of superstition to encourage his native levies, asserting that Diana, as his patron goddess, gave him counsel by the mouth of a white fawn which he kept near his person. An army which needed such inducements to perseverance was not of the stuff which brings ultimate victory. Sertorius henceforth confined himself to the defensive, and to a guerilla warfare such as has always been peculiarly to the taste of Spaniards.

He was confined now to the district between the Hiberus and the Pyrenees, the modern provinces of Arragon and Catalonia, where his central fortresses were Osca, Ilerda (*Lerida*), Calagurris (*Calahorra*), and the seaport of Tarraco (*Tarragona*), which gave him the means of communication with the sea and the pirates. The campaign of 74 B.C. was employed by his antagonists mainly in the completion and securing of the conquests of the preceding year. Metellus in particular, who easily dealt with the incapable Perpenna,

consolidated his control of the Further Province by deporting the whole male population of any towns which still held out for Sertorius. Pompeius made some aggressive movements which were not attended with unalloyed success: marching northward from Valladolid, he attacked Pallantia (*Palencia*) without success; thence striking north-east into the valley of the Ebro he laid siege to Calagurris on the confines of the modern Navarre. Here he was joined by Metellus, but Sertorius was too clever for their combined forces and compelled them to retire (74 B.C.), leaving 3000 dead behind them. Metellus returned to his province; Pompeius wintered in Gaul.

It was about this time that Sertorius received overtures of alliance from Mithradates, against whom L. Lucullus had in the spring of 74 B.C. commenced operations in Asia. By the terms of the treaty, Mithradates was to send a fleet to act with Sertorius on the Spanish coast, and a sum of 3000 talents: Sertorius on the other hand sent officers to drill and command Mithradates' Pontic levies, and undertook to leave to the latter the kingdoms of Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, and Cappadocia. He acted still as if he were the rightful representative of the Roman people, but his day was already past. Mithradates, on this as on most other occasions, had delayed too long. When his promised squadron arrived in Spanish waters, it was too late to be of any service. When Metellus heard of the alliance he offered 100 talents of silver, 20,000 *iugera* of land, and amnesty, to any one who should slay Sertorius.

§ 8. Sertorius' cause depended solely upon himself, and that only so long as he was successful. He had never had a capable officer since Hirtuleius fell: all the rest were men of Perpenna's stamp—vainglorious and conceited, fretting that they were subordinated to any one, and finding in their own ill-success in the field only additional incentives to hatred of their more successful leader. Such Romans as were to be found amongst the rank and file of the Sertorians grew impatient of a war which brought no rewards and only laborious service. As for the native levies, they were by nationality not to be relied upon for prolonged exertion or union. All alike

SERTORIUS.

lacked the initial bond of patriotism; they now began to lack even the weaker bond of success, which often replaces that of patriotism. Desertions became frequent, and the reward offered for Sertorius' head was a constant inducement to treason, which was fanned by men like Perpenna, whose conceit led them to hope that they might take Sertorius' place. They endeavoured also to undermine their leader's influence with the natives, by alleging that his want of success was due to a change in his character and habits—that he was gradually giving way to intemperance and vice. Sertorius on his own part felt that treason was at work, and that he was no longer as successful as of old, and he grew suspicious and fretful. He discovered a plot against his life, and thereupon substituted for his Roman body-guard a picked company of Celtiberians. Another plot came to light, and he punished the conspirators without mercy; but he made a fatal mistake in ordering the massacre of the hostages whom he had placed as students at Osca. Perpenna had been involved in the plots, but he escaped for the moment, and dread of subsequent exposure led him into a last and more successful conspiracy. He invited his commander to a banquet at Osca, and himself gave the signal upon which the other guests fell upon Sertorius and stabbed him to death (72 B.C.).

§ 9. The hero of this exploit, M. Perpenna, had first come into notice as an officer in the Marian armies which opposed Sulla in 83 B.C. When Sulla had made himself master of Italy, Perpenna endeavoured to hold Sicily with the remnant of the democrats, but was speedily driven out by Pompeius (81 B.C.). He was proscribed, but contrived to escape capture, and reappeared in Rome when in 78 B.C. Lepidus took up the democratic programme and guaranteed the security of the Marians. His presence did little to aid Lepidus, and on the latter's death he carried over the remnant of his troops from Sardinia to Spain (77 B.C.), expecting that Sertorius would at once defer to his superior authority. Disappointed in this, his bad generalship led to repeated defeats which nettled his vanity and embittered his chagrin. He became the leader of the malcontent and treasonable party in

Sertorius' ranks, and when at last his treachery proved successful, he expected to take the place of the man whom he had murdered. The Roman troops indeed acknowledged him as their leader, but the natives, whose sole reason for fighting at all had for long been only their love for Sertorius, at once dispersed.

Pompeius and Metellus had been steadily making headway in Arragon during this year. On the news of Sertorius' death Metellus withdrew, leaving his colleague to deal with the man whom they both despised and had both defeated times and again. Perpenna's men had no love for him, and their dangerous attitude forced him to give battle at once. He was utterly defeated, his army destroyed, and himself preferred to fall into the hands of Pompeius rather than into those of his furious soldiery. To purchase his life he sent to his conqueror certain papers of Sertorius, which purported to contain evidence against those in Rome who favoured and supported the insurgents. Pompeius burnt the papers unread (so he said), and put Perpenna to death. Of his nine fellow-conspirators only one escaped a death by violence, and he perished by starvation in a Spanish village. The ending of the war was now an easy matter. The few towns which still held out, such as Uxama (*Osuma*) and Calagurris, were reduced by siege, their defenders flying into Mauretania, or to their late useless allies the pirates, or to Mithradates. The Roman government was restored on the old lines, with little alteration beyond the punishment of isolated towns by loss of independent local government or by increase of their tributes. Pompeius had not lost his life in Spain, as some of his fellow Sullans may have hoped, but he had gained few laurels. He returned to Italy in time to unite with Crassus in stamping out the Slave war, and at the close of 71 B.C. he encamped outside the walls of Rome to await the Senate's permission to triumph. The Senate was grievously annoyed, but it had no means of resistance. Moreover there were signs that Pompeius was now posing as a statesman and party-politician, and it was fain to keep on good terms with the man who wielded the sword of Marius or Sulla—Rome was on tiptoe to learn which of the two it should be,

§ 10. Exhibitions of gladiators had long ago been introduced into Rome from Etruria. To such a pitch had come the popular appetite for these ghastly entertainments that no wealthy man was buried, no important event publicly celebrated, without the slaughter of numbers of gladiators. Men found it a profitable business to purchase and train convicts, captives, or runaway slaves, for the purpose of hiring them out as gladiators, and there was no lack of materials; for while slaves were thrown upon the market in countless thousands after every campaign, there were constantly forthcoming others whom Roman speculators systematically kidnapped without shame or hindrance, and the whole of Italy was filled with desperadoes, whether free or escaped, whose crimes made life and property insecure. State police there was none; there was nothing to check lawlessness, while long years of civil wars and party feuds and violent evictions to find lands for veterans had produced, and were still producing, a prolific crop of evildoers. If within Rome itself the wealthy were in an insignificant minority compared with the mass of paupers, things were still worse in the open country; for the system which gathered huge areas of land into the hands of single owners, replacing free labour by that of slaves, and substituting wide sheep-walks for the old-fashioned small farms of the yeomen, also did away with the honest and conservative middle-class which is the best guarantee of social stability. Things were worse by far in the year 73 B.C. than they had been when Tiberius Gracchus was moved sixty years before to attempt the reform of the same evils. No estimate can be ventured of the number of slaves in Italy, but one could hardly be made which would fall below the mark. There had already been repeated risings of these men against their masters, especially in Sicily; but it was reserved for Spartacus to show how formidable such a rising might be when headed by a man who was inspired by some loftier motive than the mere thirst for revenge.

§ 11. Capua was a prominent seat of the gladiator-trainers. Towards the close of 73 B.C., some seventy of the ruffians who formed the "school" (*ludus*) of one Lentulus broke out and made their escape to

Vesuvius, then a well-nigh inaccessible but inactive volcano. They had armed themselves in a fashion with implements stolen from the kitchens of a Capuan cook, but when C. Claudius Pulcher beset their hiding-place with 3000 men, he looked for easy laurels. Amongst the fugitives were Spartacus, a Thracian, possibly of noble birth, and two Gauls known as Crixus and Oenomaus. Spartacus had the genius of a commander, and readily found himself the accepted leader of the band. Under his guidance they crept down from the crater of Vesuvius, surprised Claudius' force under cover of the night, and gained an easy victory which was all the more valuable as providing them with arms and armour. The news of this success brought to Spartacus' side all the slaves who could make their escape, and all the desperadoes who had reason to dread the law. He was able to defeat successively a second force of Campanian militia under Cossinius, and two full legions despatched from Rome under the praetor P. Varinius. Without waiting to enjoy the fruits of these successes in the garden of Campania, he turned eastward into Apulia and Lucania, regions notorious for their desolation and for the savage lawlessness of the slave-herdsmen who formed almost the sole population. As he had expected, these men flocked to him in a body, and his army could soon be counted by tens of thousands. Turning again, he inflicted a second defeat upon Varinius who ventured to bar his way, re-entered Campania, and routed the quaestor C. Thoranius. Then attacking in detail the wealthy cities of Southern Italy, he sacked Cosentia (*Cosenza*), Thurii and Metapontum (*Torre a Mare*), in Bruttium and Lucania, gathered round his flag all the slaves of those semi-barbarous districts, and returned to winter amidst the ruins of Nola (*Nola*) and Nuceria (*Nocera*).

Spartacus was not misled by his unlooked-for success.

His Designs. He knew that his followers, however carefully he might seek to discipline them, could not hope to cope with the legions when once the government had brought itself to acknowledge the need of firm action. He knew that the ensuing year (72 B.C.) would see large armies in the field against him—armies which could be increased

in numbers and efficiency as time went on; while his own followers, now 100,000 in number, had reached probably their numerical maximum, and would grow less efficient with time. His success had been that which comes of a surprise, and of the paroxysm of courage which animates the long-chained slave upon his first recovery of freedom. The bulk of his men were indeed Gauls and Thracians, the two most warlike of the nations which supplied the Roman slave-marts; but they had too long felt the chains of submission to yield complaisantly to the rule of any fellow-slave like himself. They would grow more unmanageable than they now were if indulged in the looting and luxuries of Italian towns—practically the sole aim of the larger number of them. No Italian town would throw in its fortunes with slaves however successful. Their one chance of safety was to cross the Alps and disperse each to his native country, and it was to effect this that early in 72 B.C., without waiting to be attacked, he drew his forces together and marched northwards into Central Italy. Even at this point the dissensions which he had feared broke out. Crixus and Oenomaus, each now acting as subordinate commanders, demurred against quitting their present comfortable quarters. Crixus led off his own column by a route of his own into Apulia.

§ 12. The consuls for the year were Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus and L. Gellius, each of whom
 He overruns Italy. took the field with a full consular army. Gellius despatched his legatus Q. Arrius into Apulia, where he annihilated Crixus and his whole division of 10,000 men; but meantime Spartacus with the main body had reached the central Apennines. There he routed both Lentulus and Gellius in succession, turned upon Arrius and revenged Crixus' death by a third victory, and pressing upwards towards the Alps, defeated C. Cassius Varus, the propraetor of Cisalpine Gaul, at Mutina (*Modena*), and achieved yet a fifth success over the praetor C. Manlius. By this time all the slave-prisons of Etruria had sent their contingents to swell his ranks, and he was within reach of the passes of the Alps. But, as he had feared, the triumphant slaves were in no mood to relinquish the plunder of Italy.

There would be time enough to escape when need was; at present they might riot as they pleased amongst the villas and riches of their late oppressors. They demanded to be led back at once into Campania, and would not turn aside even to attack Rome. Spartacus foresaw what the issue would be, but he was constrained to acquiesce.

He now formed a new plan. The pirates were absolute masters of all the home waters of Italy and Sicily: they ventured in this year (72 B.C.) even to enter and pillage the harbour of Syracuse under the eyes of the Roman praetor, C. Verres. Spartacus would make these his allies, and so get his men transported into Sicily, where there were many thousands of turbulent slaves ready to join him, and where the country offered better means of defence as well as ample plunder and supplies. But the pirates were less far-sighted than was Spartacus. Their countless vessels, working in concert with the revolted slaves, would have given them a well-nigh impregnable position in Sicily and laid at their mercy the markets, and therewith the power, of Rome. But of this they never thought: they accepted the price which Spartacus offered, and then sailed away. About the same time Spartacus must have learnt of the death of Sertorius and the tardy but assured triumph of Pompeius in Spain; and he would know that in the course of a few months the Spanish army and its redoubtable general would be pitted against him.

§ 13. Meantime the Senate, now thoroughly alarmed, had withdrawn their commissions from the consuls and appointed M. Licinius Crassus, the head of the equites and the wealthiest man in Rome, to conduct operations against the slaves. It was partly because of Crassus' advance that Spartacus had retreated as far as Rhegium, and formed his design of crossing into Sicily. Disappointed by the pirates, he turned once more towards the north, and found that Crassus had almost completed a rampart thirty-seven miles in length, reaching from the Gulf of Vibo (*Gulf of Eufemia*) on the west to that of Scyllacium (*Gulf of Squillace*) on the east, and so shutting off Bruttium from the rest of the peninsula. In the depth of winter (72-71 B.C.), aided by a snowy night,

Spartacus broke through the lines and again entered Lucania. Crassus had met with considerable difficulties: so demoralised were the legions by their recent defeats that only the decimation of a company which had most recently been routed in Picenum induced the remainder to march in the direction of their enemies. The task of constructing the rampart had been one of immense labour, for it had to be carried over the northern ridge of Mount Silarus (*Monte Sillaro*), but Spartacus' escape had rendered it useless. The Senate now appointed Pompeius to a share in the command, but before that general could reach Italy, Crassus took heart of grace and followed the slaves into Lucania. Spartacus' ascendancy was on the wane now, shaken by the very first breath of ill-fortune. His forces split up into a number of divisions, refusing even now to make another attempt to reach the Alps. Crassus found his opportunity in their dissensions: he annihilated successively two columns under Gannicus and Castus, and even ventured to try and prevent Spartacus from moving upon Petelia (*Strongoli*) in Calabria. He sustained a reverse so severe that the slaves refused to retreat further and forced Spartacus again against his better judgment to return towards Lucania. In a second encounter he fell with the bulk of his men (71 B.C.), a few days before the arrival of Pompeius in Italy. Crassus and Pompeius conjointly finished the war, which became a mere slave-hunt, executing their prisoners by thousands. The former received the honour of an ovation for his achievements: the credit of ending the career of Spartacus, and with it the war, was really his, but popular acclaim hailed Pompeius as the State's deliverer.

We have no record of the scenes which must have attended the march of the slaves in the Servile war. We can gather from stray notices something of the manner in which the Roman treated his slaves: by inference we may picture, but only in a feeble way, the worse than barbarian horrors brought upon the fairest lands of Italy by this the last and greatest uprising of the class now standing in the place of that freeborn loyal and honourable yeomanry which had lost its existence in the task of building up Rome's greatness.

CHAPTER III.

MITHRADATES AND LUCULLUS.

§ 1. Early History of Pontus.—§ 2. Its Geography and Condition.—§ 3. Early Career of Mithradates VI.: his Conquests and Schemes.—§ 4. Relations of Mithradates with Rome.—§ 5. First Mithradatic War.—§ 6. Events of 83-78 B.C.—§ 7. Condition of Asia Minor, 78 B.C.—§ 8. Responsibility of the Senatorial Government.—§ 9. Disturbances in Thrace: Annexation of Cyrenaica and Bithynia.—§ 10. Outbreak of the Third Mithradatic War: Lucullus.—§ 11. Campaigns of 74-73 B.C.—§ 12. Conquest of Pontus.—§ 13. Plans of Lucullus: his Independence.—§ 14. Invasion of Armenia: Battle of Tigranocerta.—§ 15. Campaign of 68 B.C. a Failure.—§ 16. Lucullus recalled: Futility of his Campaigns.

§ 1. THE seaboard of the kingdom of Pontus stretches from the extreme south-eastern corner of the Pontus (*i.e.*, the *Black Sea*) as far as the Halys (*Kyzyl-irmák*), which separates it from Paphlagonia. To the east and south it had no naturally determined boundary amongst the labyrinth of mountains and valleys of the Armenian tableland or the more inviting lowlands of Cappadocia. Before the days of Alexander Pontus was treated as a portion of Cappadocia, and the two were distinguished as Great Cappadocia (or Cappadocia by the Taurus), and Cappadocia on the Pontus. After Alexander's death the latter was seized by one Mithradates, who here made for himself a kingdom which he passed on to his sons. Pharnaces I. (190-154 B.C.) succeeded in capturing the Greek town of Sinope (*Sinab*), the most important port upon the Southern Euxine. His son Mithradates V. took the side of the Romans in their dealings with Asia, and was rewarded for his services by the concession of the indefinite district of Phrygia. He had even sent a fleet to assist in the

overthrow of Carthage (149-146 B.C.); and when, upon the death of Attalus, third king of that name and last ruler of Pergamus (*Bergamia*), the kingdom which he had bequeathed to Rome was constituted the province of Asia (133 B.C.), Mithradates won the title of Friend of the Roman People for the aid which he lent in chastising the pretender Aristonicus and securing the province to Rome. He died about twelve years later, by which time Rome felt herself sufficiently established in Asia to dispense with the aid of this powerful neighbour: Mithradates had done his part in protecting the frontiers of the province, and had been rewarded for it; but being no longer required as a counterpoise to other powers, the kingdom of Pontus was now to be reduced to more convenient dimensions. Accordingly Phrygia was (120 B.C.) declared free, and shortly afterwards annexed to the Roman province; while at the same time the inhabitants of Great Cappadocia and of Bithynia, both bordering upon Pontus and both up to this time more or less in the position of subjects of the Pontic kings, were prompted to assert their independence. The new sovereign, Mithradates VI. surnamed Eupator, was but twelve years of age, and he succeeded to a kingdom stripped of all its recent acquisitions, and retaining only that part of Paphlagonia which lay between the Halys and Sinope.

§ 2. A line drawn south from Sinope to the Halys and along the course of that river to the confines of the Galatian canton of the Trocmi; hence in a south-easterly direction for 80 miles, and again in a somewhat more easterly line for 200 miles to the point where the two upper streams of the Euphrates unite as they debouch from between the mountains of Armenia and the range of Anti-Taurus; thence in a northerly direction, partly along the valley of the northern stream, to the Paryadres range (*Mount Barkhal*), and along this eastward again until it sweeps inward to the shore of the Euxine, on the borders of Colchis (*Mingrelia*); will include the normal possession of the Pontic kings. In the east and south-east it is a chaotic mass of mountains, but towards the west and south-west the hills open out into warm and fertile valleys, which rival any in Asia

for luxuriant productiveness. Especially near the sea-coast, in the lower valleys of the Halys, the Iris (*Yeschil-irmák*) and its tributary the Lycus (*Kilkit*), and the Thermodon (*Terme-tschai*), the soil produces abundant crops of grain and fruits of every kind. The mountains, if unsuitable for agriculture, yielded quantities of iron and other metals, timber for ship-building, and inexhaustible supplies of soldiery. The coast was fringed with old-standing Greek colonies, the proof and surety of commercial possibilities. Most of them were colonies from Miletus (*Palatia*), such as Amisus (*Samtûn*), Oenoë (*Unie*), Side (*Bulemán*), Pharnacea (*Kiresûn*), Trapezus (*Trebizond*), and especially Sinope, to which was transferred the royal residence from its original seat at Amasia (*Amasia*) on the Lycus. There were few towns in the interior, and of the few that are mentioned the sites are as a rule uncertain.

§ 3. Mithradates VI. found his position as king endangered by the usual intrigues of an Oriental court, for Pontus was more Oriental than Greek in its tendencies, but neither one nor other wholly. For several years he lived in constant and perhaps justifiable dread of assassination; he spent his time in hunting, traversing the land from end to end, and gaining thereby a physical vigour and a knowledge of his people which were afterwards to stand him in good stead. On foot or on horseback, in war or in the chase, he had no rival in point of endurance, courage, or skill. He combined the bearing of an Alexander with the toughness of a Massinissa; the schemes of a Hannibal with the manners of an Antiochus; an Oriental's cruelty, capacity for intrigue, and power of recuperation, with the Spaniard's inability to own himself beaten and the Celt's contempt of details. He had always a policy, but he lacked the tenacity of purpose and width of view needful to carry it out; his schemes were those of a great man, his acts those of a weak one. He was the only Asiatic who ever endangered Roman supremacy, yet he was formidable not because he was Mithradates, but because he lived in days when Rome was most degraded.

It was about 114 B.C. that he could at last feel himself

secure upon his throne, a security assured by the wholesale murder of all whom he chose to suspect, and these were, as is usually the case with a sultan, especially the members of his own family. The precise sequence of his proceedings it is impossible to recover, but already, when in 99 B.C. Marius paid a visit to Asia, he found Mithradates with his ally Tigranes I. of Armenia in possession of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia up to the borders of Bithynia and the Roman province. He had an army of 80,000 infantry, 10,000 horse, and 600 scythed chariots; and he had conceived an immense scheme for reducing to his sway the whole coast-line of the Euxine. He reduced Dioscurias (*Iskûria*) and the warlike tribes of Iberi and Albani as far as the Caucasus; crossed those Alps of Asia and swept round the northern shores of the Black Sea to the Thracian Chersonese (*Crimea*), the Borysthenes (*Dnieper*), and the Tyras (*Dneister*). At wide intervals along these shores were dotted Greek towns which had come into existence when Miletus commanded the commerce of the Euxine, and when the granaries of the Bosphorus had supplied the marts of Athens. Commerce had made them rich beyond calculation, and they lay too far from the usual scenes of history to have suffered from the pillaging of Asiatic conquerors or Roman governors, but at this date they were harassed by the ceaseless attacks and imposts of the surrounding Scythian tribes, Alani between the Caucasus and the Tanais (*Don*), Roxolani between the Tanais and the Borysthenes, and, most savage and aggressive of all, the Bastarnae, who roamed from the Tyras to the Ister (*Danube*). Mithradates came as the champion of these Greek communities against barbarism. His generals Diophantus and Neoptolemus routed 80,000 Roxolani and rescued the kingdom of Paerisadas of Panticapaeum (*Kertch*) and the neighbouring town of Phanagoria (near *Taman*), and pushed their advance as far as the Ister, only making no conquests in these wild regions because there was nothing to conquer. But throughout all this wide region the name of Mithradates was known and respected. The Greek cities of the Crimea paid to him an annual tribute of 200 talents of gold and 270,000 bushels

of grain; and when Paerisadas died he left his kingdom to his Pontic suzerain, who placed upon its throne his own son Machares. As far as the northern frontiers of the Roman province of Macedonia Mithradates had pushed his influence: the Black Sea was his lake, and the one weak point in his position was the fact that the Hellespont was controlled by the Romans by means of their provinces of Macedonia and Asia, and by help of their client the Prince of Bithynia. He set himself to remedy this weakness. The Romans, in the intervals of calm between the quarrels of parties within Rome, must have seen clearly what was his aim, but they suffered him to lay his plans and make his preparations without hindrance.

§ 4. Mithradates had three lines of action which he developed simultaneously. In Europe he induced ^{Plans of} the Bastarnae and other savage tribes along the ^{Mithradates} frontier of Macedonia to attack that province, and was probably answerable for the appearance of a pretender, named Euphenes, who in 92 B.C. laid claim to the throne of Macedonia, and kept the Roman forces there fully employed; in the Black Sea he equipped a war-fleet of 400 sail, and constructed arsenals and depots of stores along the shores of Pontus; in Asia he came to an understanding with Tigranes I. of Armenia, that they should divide Western Asia between them, Mithradates taking the Roman possessions, and Tigranes occupying the remainder, the fragments of the now ruined kingdom of the Seleucidae of Syria. The allies had already overrun all Cappadocia and Paphlagonia when L. Sulla, legate of the governor of Asia, interfered (92 B.C.), and set upon the throne of Cappadocia one Ariobarzanes as an independent client-prince. In the following year Mithradates drove out Ariobarzanes, and put upon the throne of Bithynia one Socrates Chrestus, brother of the rightful heir Nicomedes III., whose father had just died. The two deposed kings appealed to Rome, and M'. Aquillius, governor of Asia, received instructions to restore them. In the interim Tigranes I. died, and the attention of his successor, Tigranes II., was for a time occupied in securing his own position. In consequence, when Aquillius appeared in 90 B.C., Mithradates offered no resistance to the restoration

of Ariobarzanes and Nicomedes III. The former died at the moment of his return, and thereupon Mithradates placed his own son Ariarathes on the throne. Meantime Aquillius, eager to win wealth and laurels by an active campaign, induced Nicomedes to attack Pontus. Mithradates made no resistance, partly because unsupported by Tigranes, partly perhaps to have a better ground for war with Rome, or because he did not yet feel sufficiently prepared. Aquillius got the plunder which he desired, but the moment that his back was turned Mithradates again set up his own son Ariarathes as king of Cappadocia.

The Senate now resorted to its favourite plan of sending embassies, to all of which Mithradates replied that Cappadocia had belonged to his fathers, and was therefore legally a fief of Pontus. It was at this date that the revolted allies were threatening the very existence of Rome (90 B.C.), and he offered to provide auxiliaries for service in Italy, if he were allowed to retain Cappadocia. Nothing came of the conferences, except that Mithradates lost the most favourable opportunity for executing his schemes: he should have sent aid to the revolted Italians, and seized upon Asia while the Romans were crippled by trouble at home. He wasted time, and only made his attack when the Social war was practically ended, using the interval to seek allies and supporters alike amongst the pirates, Thracians, and Greeks, at the courts of Egypt, Syria, and Numidia, and amongst the inhabitants of Roman Asia, whom long years of brutal oppression had made ready for any deed of desperate vengeance. To Tigranes II. he gave in marriage his daughter Cleopatra, to further cement his alliance with Armenia, and during the course of the year 89 B.C. and subsequently there flocked to him numbers of the vanquished Italians and even Romans of the defeated Marian party. These men furnished with experienced officers of redoubtable courage the 300,000 men whom Mithradates could now put into the field.

§ 5. In 88 B.C., the Senate had leisure to think of its pos-
First Mithra- sessions in the East, and Sulla was named com-
 datio War mander against Mithradates. The attempts of
 Marius' adherents to transfer this duty to him led to the
 first civil war, in which Sulla triumphantly asserted his prior

claims, but it also delayed for a whole year his departure for the East. It was a memorable year for Asia, for the forces of Pontus fell upon the province, welcomed on all hands by the oppressed natives, and in a few weeks put Mithradates in possession of the length and breadth of Western Asia, saving only Lycia, Caria, and Rhodes. His magnificent fleet, allied with the pirates' flotillas, passed from island to island, and swept the whole of the Aegean. Everywhere the King of Pontus was hailed as a deliverer, and by his orders there were massacred on one day all Romans or Italians who could be found, to the number of 80,000. In the next year (87 B.C.) he entered Greece, and was speedily joined by every community of note, not excepting Athens. Only the narrow territory of Macedonia remained to the Romans, and that was threatened on all sides by Mithradates and his Thracian allies. In Asia, too, Tigranes at last bestirred himself: he was invited by the Syrians, distracted by the ceaseless feuds of their own royal house, to annex them to his empire; a request with which he was sufficiently ready to comply, for it put him in communication with the Mediterranean. In the autumn of this year Sulla landed in Greece, and laid siege to Athens. His first aim was to drive Mithradates back to Asia. In 86 B.C. Athens fell, and Sulla achieved a brilliant victory at Chaeronea. Another victory at Orchomenus (85 B.C.) compelled Mithradates to evacuate Greece, while simultaneously the praetor L. Licinius Lucullus, acting as admiral, cleared the Aegean and recovered command of the Hellespont. Sulla spent some months in chastising the tribes of Thrace, and reorganising Macedonia, while envoys passed to and fro between him and his enemy. He was as anxious as Mithradates to sign a peace, for during his absence the parties of Marius and Cinna had recovered their power and were using their best efforts to destroy Sulla and all his works. They had already declared him deposed from his command, and L. Valerius Flaccus, with his legate C. Fimbria, was even now in command of two legions in Asia. Fimbria incited the troops to murder Flaccus, and took up the command on his own account, but on the appearance of Sulla in Asia (84 B.C.) he was forced to commit suicide. By the terms of peace Mithradates surrendered

eighty ships of war, paid 3000 talents as an indemnity, and relinquished all his recent conquests. The settlement of Asia was speedily arranged in a temporary fashion: the provincials had to pay for their revolt, albeit they had soon grown tired of Mithradates' presence, and had done their best to assist in his expulsion. The settlement cost them £24,000,000, and was the main cause of the bankruptcy and misery which henceforth desolated once wealthy Asia. Sulla sailed for Italy in 83 B.C., leaving L. Murena to govern Asia, and C. Scribonius Curio to carry out the details of settlement in regard to Bithynia and Cappadocia. So ended the First Mithradatic war.

§ 6. Murena, with the customary itch for distinction, Further In-
trigues, 83-78 contrived to pick a further quarrel with Mithradates, and invaded Pontus. There he was so badly handled that within the year (83 B.C.) this, the Second Mithradatic war, was ended by the withdrawal of all Roman troops from Cappadocia, the expulsion of Ariobarzanes II., and the voluntary accession of the whole country to the kingdom of Pontus.

Mithradates now resumed his plans. He urged on Tigranes to attack the Parthians, his hereditary rivals, and wrest from them the districts lying south of Armenia between the Euphrates and Mount Choathras (*Zibar*), including Mesopotamia and Adiabene (vilayets of *Aleppo* and *Diarbekr*); and in order to insure Tigranes' active help in future wars with Rome by complicity in aggression, he persuaded him to harry Cappadocia and carry away many thousands of its inhabitants, mostly Greeks, to people the new capital of Tigranocerta, which he had built on the Upper Tigris and called from his own name. He intrigued again amongst the tribes of the Danube, and was doubtless indirectly responsible for the disturbances which employed the praetor C. Cosconius for several years in Dalmatia, where Salona was captured after two years' siege in 78 B.C., and more directly for the outbreak of fresh trouble amongst the Thracians of Rhodope, over whom Cn. Cornelius Dolabella, governor of Macedonia, earned a triumph in 79 B.C. At home he amassed men, vessels, and stores, and held himself in readiness to strike whenever he saw fit.

Meantime the Roman troops in Asia, badly officered, were feebly attempting the reduction of the few Greek towns which had as yet failed to renew their allegiance. In 80 B.C. the governor, M. Minucius Thermus, at length captured Mitylene (*Mitylini*). In the storming of this town C. Julius Caesar first distinguished himself, and won a "civic crown" for saving the life of a Roman soldier. Caesar was in Asia because it was not safe for him to be nearer Sulla, but he made the best of his enforced residence there, and in particular he was a frequent and welcome visitor at the court of Nicomedes III. of Bithynia.

§ 7. At the opening of our period (78 B.C.) the position of affairs in Asia was briefly this: the Roman province comprised the old kingdom of Pergamus (the ancient Mysia), Phrygia, Lydia, and Caria; Cappadocia was a dependency of the Pontico-Armenian alliance; Pisidia retained its independence, thanks to its mountainous character, but it had no inclination to accept Roman domination; on the other hand Rhodes and Lycia were hostile to the King of Pontus. The last named district, together with Cilicia, formed the main stronghold of the pirates, and the inadequate garrisons which had been maintained on the Cilician coast since 102 B.C. were quite unable to restrain those buccaneers. Portions of Eastern Cilicia, together with Commagene and most of Syria, were satrapies of Tigranes II.; while further to the north, Nicomedes III. maintained a precarious royalty in Bithynia, which formed, with the four cantons of the Asiatic Gauls, the advanced guard of the Roman frontier. But the province, if territorially larger now than at its original formation (129 B.C.), was beyond words less happy. For fifty years it had been plundered with incredible and wholly reckless audacity alike by the Roman tax-farmers and by its governors. The inroad of Mithradates, promising better things at first, had soon given place to the inevitable oppression of an oriental government, and Sulla's brief visit had not only drained the country of all available bullion, but had further plunged whole cities and districts into a hopeless insolvency which placed them more than

ever at the mercy of the Roman money-lenders. By the side of this overwhelming burden it was of little moment that war had brought the usual train of disasters—cities desolated, lands wasted, commerce and agriculture alike destroyed: and no one took note of the thousands of natives who had perished in the recent wars, of the deported population of Cappadocia, or of the massacred thousands of Italians who had formed the western leaven amongst a heterogeneous mixture of Asiatics and Greeks. The prestige of the Roman name was well-nigh gone, for though Sulla with five legions had driven out Mithradates with his 300,000 men, yet against this brief triumph had to be set the preceding years of indolence when insult after insult to the Senate's government aroused no further interference than an envoy's expostulations; the disgrace of the alternate occupation and evacuation of Cappadocia, and its final abandonment just now made evident; the injustice which prompted the actions of Aquilius and Murena; the ease wherewith the Pontic forces had overrun all Asia, and more recently overthrown Murena's army in Pontus; the manifest insubordination of the legions which murdered their commanders and looted the property of the provincials with greater greed and valour than that of their enemies; the incompetence of Thermus before the heroic resistance of petty Greek cities; the constant reports of civil wars and proscriptions in Italy and of the successes of renegade Romans like Sertorius in the provinces; and last but not least the acknowledged fact that Rome no longer ventured to dispute with the pirates the mastery of the seas—a fact which further implies the arrest of all productive industry for lack of safe means of export, the decline of that wealth which comes of trade, the more or less overt connivance of maritime towns with the corsairs, and the general insecurity and depopulation of all the shores of Asia Minor. Yet this was the condition of what had once been Rome's most favoured and productive province, even while the dictator Sulla was still alive. From end to end it was ruined and depopulated and its every avenue for recuperation closed, and at its borders was gathered the united power of two great monarchs bound by mutual promises to share it

between them, and only biding their time to hurl upon it all the forces of the East.

§ 8. Of course it was the fault of the government, that is, of the Senate, in the first instance, but it ^{Causes.} was also in a less degree the fault of all classes and parties in Rome. No Roman, it seemed, could as yet rise to the conception that the conqueror has a duty to perform, and that he owes at least protection to his subjects. To the Roman of this date the provincials were but means to his own indulgence: their rights were nil, their duties the finding of taxes for the State, corn for the rabble, presents for the governor and his staff, plunder for the equites, in fine everything that a Roman could ask for, ranging from wild beasts for the amphitheatre to slaves for the household. It has been shown how Senate and equites plundered alike, and how impossible it was for the plunderer to obtain justice: when Senate or equites or democrats lifted up their voices to pious hypocrisy against the villainies of this or that offender, it was not because they pitied the provincials, but because such hypocrisy furnished a convenient party-cry, or a possible road to distinction in the law-courts or in politics. It needed a new system of government to remedy this initial evil. But if the Romans sheared their sheep too closely they ought at least to have protected the flock, instead of which they hung back until a Sertorius or a Mithradates had made himself master of a province, and then interfered only so far as to restore things to their old footing of makeshift security. The whole mechanism of government was rotten: the money which was drained in yearly millions from the provinces disappeared, no one asked how, or went to pay legions who fought with other legions for the mastery of Rome; there was no trusting either legions or commanders to fight the battles for which they were raised, for neither felt any longer the bond of patriotism or heard the call of duty, and few retained even the once universal Roman virtues of ability to obey and to command. In Rome all parties alike suffered from the negation of all government, yet none dared to advocate the decisive and whole-hearted measures which alone could restore the Roman peace on

sea and land; for all remembered how Marius and Sulla had used their legions for the overthrow of right and liberty, and even if they could name a general who had talent enough to perform the duty of restoring law and order, partisan jealousies and fears told them that they could find no one who had the requisite honesty of purpose. To entrust a man with the legions was to put in his hand the very sword wherewith Marius and Sulla had fought each his way to monarchy. What few legions were now on active service were engaged either against Sertorius in Spain, where Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, consul in 80 B.C., was clumsily seeking to make good his footing, or in Macedonia and Dalmatia.

§ 9. Meantime Mithradates lay quiet but watchful. His emissaries kept aflame the turbulence of the Wars in Thrace. Thracian tribes, and Appius Claudius Pulcher, consul of 79 B.C., found more than he could well do in the attempt to pacify the Dardani and other tribes of the central Balkan, west of the Strymon (*Karasû*). He died of combined fatigue and chagrin in the third year of his command (76 B.C.), about the time when his more fortunate colleague in the consulate, P. Servilius Vatia, had at last driven the pirates out of Cilicia, and earned the surname of Isauricus.* To Claudius succeeded the proconsul C. Scribonius Curio, who finally reduced the Dardani and made the Danube the frontier of the Roman power (75-73 B.C.).

In the year 75 B.C. the Cyrenaica was organised as a province. Long a portion of the kingdom of the Ptolemies of Egypt, it had been constituted a separate principality by the Senate in 117 B.C., with the object of weakening Egypt and at the same time finding an opening for Ptolemy Apion,† who was disputing the throne of Egypt with his brother. He died in 96 B.C., and bequeathed his territory to Rome, but it was only at this date that the Senate formally occupied it: it was undesirable to risk its reverting to the Ptolemics, and it might furnish a convenient station for future measures against the pirates.

* See p. 77.

† See Genealogical Table II.

The nephew of Apion, Alexander II., king of Egypt and Cyprus, had died in 81 B.C., and he too bequeathed his kingdom to Rome; but Sulla had been content to disclaim the legacy in consideration of a yearly subsidy. The kingdom was now divided between two brothers, cousins of Alexander, who naturally had no senatorial sympathies. Mithradates saw his way to utilising them, and gave to each of them a daughter in marriage.

In the same year (75 B.C.) died Nicomedes III., the client-prince of Bithynia, leaving the Romans his heirs, and Bithynia was accordingly declared Roman territory. Thereupon Mithradates called out his levies and declared war. He had reasons enough. He was aware that the annexation of Bithynia would be followed by the re-occupation of Cappadocia, and that he would thus find the Roman frontier practically conterminous with his own, a consummation which he had no reason to like. He knew that the Senate was at this moment engaged in a formidable struggle with Sertorius, and he might expect that it would be difficult for Rome to cope with his own forces as well. Policy demanded that he should interfere to stop the destruction in detail of his allies, the Thracians and pirates; should arrest the gradual extension of Roman authority as lately manifested in Cilicia and Lycia, in Cyrene, on the Danube, and in Dalmatia; and should get what benefit he could from Sertorius' activity. The garrison of Asia was small, and Rome's only known general of ability, Pompeius, was fully employed in Spain. Accordingly, he threw down the gauntlet, occupied Bithynia, and despatched envoys to arrange for joint action with Sertorius. The latter was as eager for the alliance as was Mithradates, and an understanding was speedily arranged whereby, in return for the aid of a Pontic fleet, Sertorius undertook to supply his ally with Roman officers, and in the name of the Roman state guaranteed to him the surrender of all the region between the frontiers of Pontus and the Roman province, viz., Paphlagonia, Galatia, Cappadocia, and Bithynia. For the rest, Mithradates renewed his alliance with the pirates, who had reappeared as soon as Servilius had quitted Cilicia. In the spring of 74 B.C. he

advanced through Paphlagonia into Bithynia with 100,000 infantry, and 16,000 horse. His generals were Taxiles and Hermocrates; his admiral Aristonicus moved down the coast with a fleet of 400 sail, with a view to closing the Hellespont against Roman vessels. Eumachus led another column into Phrygia to threaten the province, while Diophantus occupied Cappadocia.

§ 10. The Senate for once grasped the gravity of the situation; more to the purpose, it saw the real cause of its weakness;—viz., its neglect to control the seas. It had seen the designs of Lepidus satisfactorily overthrown (77 B.C.), and it had despatched the general whom most it dreaded, Pompeius, to Spain, so that it might feel the less anxiety as to any immediate danger from Sertorius in that quarter. Moreover, in reluctantly putting Pompeius in control of a great military force it had as it were got the better of its own prejudices and fears: to entrust yet another army to another general needed less effort; and while it might be matter of congratulation that to Pompeius had fallen the arduous and unprofitable task of quieting Spain, rather than the easier and highly lucrative conduct of a war in Asia, the Senate might flatter itself on a politic action in giving opportunity for the development in the East of commanders who should act as a counterpoise to the too powerful Pompeius in the West. L. Licinius Lucullus, consul for 74 B.C., was appointed governor of Asia and Cilicia with five legions. His colleague, M. Aurelius Cotta, was commissioned to act as admiral in the Propontis. That the pirates might be finally put down, Mithradates deprived of his most energetic and powerful allies, and the honour of the Roman marine rehabilitated, M. Antonius, son of the famous orator, received an extraordinary commission to act with *propraetorian* powers by sea. The capacities of all three commanders were quite unknown, but all three were loyal disciples of Sulla and of the senatorial traditions.

L. Lucullus had served in the Social war, had been Sulla's admiral in 85 B.C., and had done good service in clearing the Pontic fleet from the Aegean; had been left behind in Asia by his superior to complete the

settlement of that country; had been curule aedile in 79 B.C., praetor in 77 B.C., and governor of Africa in the year after. A thorough Sullan, he had had no share in the violence and bloodshed which stained his master's career, and his interest in politics was too slight to lead him to any extremist views. He had done good service for his party in 75 B.C. by hushing up democratic agitations of the tribune L. Quinctius, and he was sufficiently at home with the methods of Roman wire-pulling to secure his appointment to the Mithradatic war by the help of Cethegus and his mistress Precia; but he made no pretension to statesmanship, and was perhaps as much surprised as his friends by the unexpected success which attended his arms. He was a very favourable example of what a senatorian of this age could be, for he showed few of his party's vices and all their virtues: he had a keen eye to his own profit, but he dealt kindly with the provincials and was something of a martinet of the old stamp with his troops; he dabbled in authorship, was a patron of literary men, was notorious for his love of the luxury which was dubbed Hellenism, yet showed himself by contrast with most of his class a brilliant strategist. It was perhaps fortunate for him that his opponents in the field were Asiatics.

§ 11. Mithradates' cause suffered from the two defects which seem to have been inherent in the military sovereignties of Western Asia: his allies, with the exception of the pirates, proved useless, and his attack was delayed until it lost half its terrors. By the year 74 B.C. the cause of Sertorius was failing, and even the occupation of Bithynia was delayed until Cotta was already at Calchedon (*Kadikoi*), on the Bosphorus, with a fleet of 60 sail, and Lucullus was already marching upon Pontus by way of Phrygia. The latter general was looking about for an opportunity to force the passage of the Sangarius (*Sakaria*) in the face of Diophantus' column, when he learnt that his colleague Cotta had been defeated by Aristonicus and was now closely besieged at Calchedon by the combined main army and fleet of Pontus. Lucullus' return was delayed by a division under M. Marius, a Sertorian serving under Mithradates, and before he could

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74-73 B.C.

bring relief Mithradates had forced the harbour of Calchedon, destroyed the entire Roman fleet, and leaving a squadron to watch the town, had drawn off his land army to the siege of Cyzicus (*Balkiz*), the most important port and roadstead in the Propontis. The city held out with desperation, despite the immense resources of the enemy, and when at length Lucullus came up and pitched his camp upon a hill in the rear of Mithradates' lines, the besieging force had already begun to run short of supplies. Lucullus' position enabled him to intercept all foraging parties, and while he had at his own command abundance of provisions collected from the surrounding country, he compelled his enemy's huge force to depend entirely upon supplies brought in by sea. The result was inevitable, and Lucullus was content to wait. The end came when, in the depth of winter, Mithradates at last confessed himself outgeneralled, and sent towards Bithynia a large portion of his troops. Lucullus overtook and cut to pieces the fugitives on the Rhyndacus (*Adırnâs-tschai*), capturing 15,000 prisoners. He then resumed his former position. Early in 73 B.C. Mithradates embarked such portion of his infantry as he had room for, and escaped by sea. The remainder, 30,000 in number, endeavouring to reach Lampsacus (*Lapsaki*), were all but annihilated on the Aesepus (*Gonén-tschai*), and only a small remnant escaped to their destination to be at once beleaguered there. The whole campaign had failed disastrously, and even the small successes which had attended Eumachus in his efforts to rouse the Cilicians and Pisidians, were counterbalanced by the defeat of his column on its return at the hands of Deiotarus, a tetrarch of Galatia.

Mithradates still commanded the sea, although his admiral Aristonicus was a prisoner. M. Marius was commissioned to create a diversion by cruising with fifty vessels in the Aegean, while the king in person, after rescuing the troops at Lampsacus, attacked Perinthus (*Eregli*), a port which in size and strategic value occupied upon the European shore of the Propontis a position corresponding to that of Cyzicus on the Asiatic coast. But the command in Macedonia was now vested in M. Lucullus, younger brother of Lucius,

who put the Thracian coast in a position of defence which again foiled the king's attack. Mithradates withdrew to Nicomedia (*Isnikmid*), the capital of Bithynia, a coast-town at the north-eastern extremity of the Propontis. In the meantime L. Lucullus had collected a new fleet. Two squadrons under Valerius Triarius and Voconius Barba, subsequently joined by the incapable Cotta, attacked and reduced the various Bithynian towns on the Propontis, and rapidly approached Nicomedia; the main fleet, commanded by Lucullus in person, went in pursuit of Marius whom it overtook off Lemnos (*Limnos*). Lucullus gained a decisive victory, captured and executed Marius, and destroyed his entire fleet, the pick of Mithradates' navy. On receiving intelligence of this crowning disaster, the king evacuated Nicomedia and made his way by sea to Amisus, narrowly escaping shipwreck. By the close of 73 B.C., Lucullus was master of all Bithynia, and the Pontic fleet, with the exception of small detached squadrons cruising off the coasts of Crete and Spain, was completely destroyed. The pirates were still unchastised, but they were too busy in dealing with M. Antonius in Italian waters to spare either thought or forces for their ally in Pontus.

§ 12. Mithradates was not yet cowed. He at once set himself to raise another army, mainly from the Scythian tribes in the neighbourhood of the kingdom of his son Machares, on the Sea of Azov; and he sent urgent requests for assistance to Tigranes and to Phraates the Parthian. The former ought on every score of policy to have befriended the power which alone kept off the Romans from his own gates, but he was with difficulty prevailed upon to make promises which he perhaps never intended to fulfil. Phraates very naturally declined to interfere, for he had the less reason to object to the advance of Rome towards Armenia as he saw herein means to the ruin of the rival power there. Mithradates had lost by death or desertion all the ablest of the officers sent to him by Sertorius, and he could hope for no further assistance from Spain. In Thrace M. Lucullus was master of the situation. By the summer of 72 B.C. the king, now anxious to maintain only a defensive attitude, found himself con-

strained to look on from his entrenchments at Cabira (Neocaesarea, *Niksar*), on the Lycus, while the Romans overran the length and breadth of Pontus and laid simultaneous siege to the few great maritime towns—Amastris (*Amasra*), Sinope, Heraclea, Amisus, Themiscyra (*Terme*)—which alone offered any resistance. Of all his allies only Seleucus, a private captain, lent him active aid in the defence of Sinope. In this year fell Sertorius: his death dispersed a number of Romans who might have furnished new leaders for the Pontic troops, had the cause of Mithradates been less desperate.

Lucullus was untiring in his activity. Two legions were left with L. Murena on the coast, to continue the blockade of the great towns and to keep open communication with the sea; the fleet was entrusted to Triarius, with orders to retain command of the Hellespont, and there watch for the two Pontic squadrons which might now be expected to return from the Mediterranean; flying columns were ordered to convoy supplies across Cappadocia to the main army of three legions, wherewith Lucullus in person, after arduous marches, took up his position over against Mithradates' army of 40,000 men at Cabira. The king knew that the Romans dared not attack with numbers so much inferior: he attempted to starve out his enemy as he had himself been starved out at Cyzicus, and to this end he despatched the bulk of his cavalry, under Taxiles and Diophantus, to intercept the Roman convoys. An attack upon a convoy in charge of one Soinatius resulted in a disastrous reverse, and only a few days later M. Fabius Hadrianus, while bringing up further supplies, cut to pieces the picked army-corps of Diophantus, and made good his junction with Lucullus. The king lost heart: he attempted to retreat unobserved, but his movements were betrayed by the panic which fell upon his troops, and it was with difficulty that he escaped almost alone from the massacre which followed Lucullus' instant attack. He threw himself on the protection of his son-in-law in Armenia, and was accorded a protection which was little better than captivity. Cabira was of course surrendered at once, but the king saved his harem from the disgrace of capture by having them all put

to death by poison (72 B.C.). Lucullus proceeded to complete the conquest of the open country by reducing the Tibareni and other tribes of the eastern mountains, while the siege of the coast towns went on without interruption. Amisus fell in 71 B.C., Heraclea in 70 B.C., despite the aid rendered by the pirate Connacorex; for the extraordinary command of M. Antonius had resulted in a complete triumph for the pirates and their allies the Cretans, and many of these now returned to do what they could for the cause of Mithradates. About the same time Triarius fell in with the seventy Pontic warships for which he was on the look out. He gave battle off Tenedos (*Tenedos*), and captured or destroyed them all. Last but not least of Mithradates' many disasters, his son Machares made overtures to Rome and concluded an alliance with Lucullus, in earnest whereof he allowed the stores of corn and other supplies, which should have been used in the interest of the beleaguered coast towns, to be put at the disposal of the besieging armies. Seleucus maintained himself in Sinope until 69 B.C. During the two years following the battle of Cabira, Lucullus busied himself with the task of reforming the Roman administration in Asia. It was an honourable endeavour, but it aroused against him the abiding wrath of the equites; and all men remarked that, though his army was markedly well-disciplined and withheld from looting, Lucullus contrived to make the war pay its own expenses and still to put by a fortune for himself.

§ 13. But Lucullus was fully aware that so long as
Design ofMithradates was alive there was no security
Lucullus.for the Roman peace in Asia, least of all if
 Tigranes were left without personal experience of Roman prowess and in the full course of his career of annexation. Armenia would prove to a Roman province of Pontus even more dangerous than Pontus had been to Roman Asia, while the recent aggressions of Tigranes in the direction of Syria and Cilicia made him no less dangerous to Roman interests on the Levant. Policy demanded that he should learn the power of the legions, and the demands of policy coincided with the general's own wishes; for, like every Roman, he regarded these far-away eastern kingdoms as

each a new and unspoiled El Dorado, and he knew how easily laurels were won from Oriental troops who had nothing of terror in them beyond their numbers. Resolved beforehand to attack Armenia, in 70 B.C. he sent as envoy to Tigranes his brother-in-law Appius Claudius, with instructions to demand the surrender of Mithradates; while at the same time he requested Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia to collect upon the Upper Euphrates the vessels needful for crossing that river. He had no expectation, and probably no wish, that Claudius might succeed; but the rejection of the envoy's demands would furnish a convenient excuse for war. He acted entirely at his own discretion: the Senate was too far away to be easily consulted, too much occupied with the democratic campaign of Pompeius and Crassus to give any attention to Armenian politics, and too shortsighted to understand them if it had tried. Moreover, there was already in Rome amongst the equites a strong feeling against Lucullus. To have asked the Senate to decide between attacking Armenia and leaving it unmolested, would, as Lucullus knew, result only in orders which would expressly forbid him to advance beyond the limits of Pontus and the Euphrates. The Senate, it was understood, would usually condone the self-authorised campaigns of its generals if only they were conducted without disaster and without cost to the State; and Lucullus was confident that he could so conduct a war against Armenia. His greatest difficulty was the unwillingness of his troops. He had but five legions—30,000 men—with him. Of these the best were those two legions which had entered Asia with Flaccus in 86 B.C., had slain their leader and put themselves under Fimbria's command, and had finally passed over to Sulla in 84 B.C. Having been sixteen years on service, they were fully entitled to their discharge, but like most of the troops of this era they demanded rather booty than discharge; and Lucullus, while too humane to permit such looting as other commanders encouraged, was also too strict to afford his legions opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their victories. His march into the heart of Asia resembled that of the Ten Thousand under Cyrus in this point also, that each general had to cajole his troops into the enterprise.

§ 14. Tigranes declined to surrender his father-in-law :
Invasion of
Armenia.
 nay more, he set him at liberty, took him into his counsel, and gave him high authority over the troops of Armenia. If Lucullus entered Armenia he must expect to hear that Mithradates had again entered Pontus, and if the gains of previous campaigns were not to be lost, it was imperative that Pontus should be adequately garrisoned. He had no choice but to divide his small force : two legions were left in Pontus under M. Fabius Hadrianus, and with the remaining 15,000 men, including the two Fimbrian legions, Lucullus set out for the conquest of the most powerful kingdom of Western Asia. His plan was to strike at once at the very heart of Southern Armenia—the newly-built city of Tigranocerta. Supported by Ariobarzanes he crossed Cappadocia by way of Melitene (*Malatia*), forded the Euphrates probably at the ordinary ferry on the road between that town and Mazara (*Mezre*), then traversed Sophene, the most westerly province of Armenia proper, in a south-easterly direction to Amida (*Diarbekr*), and, crossing the Tigris, found himself within an easy march of Tigranocerta. Such rapid movements necessitated his leaving in his rear any towns which chose to resist his overtures or threats, but it was characteristic of Lucullus' strategy. With so small a force he could not afford to waste time ; everything depended on rapidity of action.

The result justified his daring. Tigranes had not time to collect what was, in Oriental ideas, a presentable army : he commissioned Mithrobarzanes to cover the approaches to his capital, left a Greek named Mancaeus in command of the garrison there, and himself withdrew into the hill country, sending an urgent message to recall Mithradates who was already actively employed in Pontus with 10,000 cavalry. Mithrobarzanes and his Arab allies were driven back, a small detachment was told off to guard the passes by which Tigranes might be expected to lead his main army down from the hill country to the relief of his capital, and with the remainder of his troops Lucullus at once invested Tigranocerta.

The town was in an excellent condition of defence, and

stored with immense quantities of supplies and treasure: its one weakness was that the bulk of its population, the Greeks deported from Cappadocia, might welcome its capture as a guarantee of their escape to their old homes. But Mancaeus defended it loyally, hoping for the relief which was to come when Tigranes had collected an adequate army. At length the king ventured to descend into the Tigris valley with an army of more than 200,000 men. But Lucullus' confidence did not desert him: rather than raise the siege he left one-third of his forces to continue the blockade, and advanced with the remaining 10,000 against an enemy more than twenty times as numerous. The king could scarcely credit his senses when, from his position above a small stream, he beheld the Romans cross it and advance to the attack. The Armenian army was drawn up along the slope of a range of hills looking towards Tigranocerta, but the actual crest of the ridge was unoccupied. Here Lucullus saw his opportunity. His handful of cavalry, recruited mainly from Thrace and Galatia, was ordered to feign an attack upon the flank of the 55,000 horse of Tigranes, and under cover of the diversion so created, two cohorts of the legions—about 1000 men—were able to make a detour and seize the ridge in the enemy's rear. With their first movement down the hill, the whole Armenian host fell into hopeless panic. Its

^{Battle of} numbers made impossible any definite manœuvre, ^{Tigranocerta.} and without waiting to receive the charge of these Romans, "too few for an army, too many for an embassy," they broke and fled. Lucullus' laurelled despatch asserted that 100,000 were left dead on the field, and with them but five Romans. Stripping the diadem from his brows to escape recognition, Tigranes hurried back to the mountains just in time to meet Mithradates, who had been unable to bring up his cavalry in time for action. The first result of the victory was that the Greeks within Tigranocerta opened the gates to Lucullus, who was thus made master of all its stores and treasure to the value of £2,000,000; but the victory also involved the evacuation by Tigranes of all his recent acquisitions west of the Euphrates. Thither Lucullus turned without delay. He

stormed Samosata (*Samsat*) on the Euphrates, the capital of Commagene, installing one Antiochus as client-king of the country. Another Antiochus was restored to the throne of Syria. From all parts of Asia on the Levant came envoys offering homage and alliance. The victory of Tigranocerta was won on October 6, 69 B.C., the thirty-sixth anniversary of the battle wherein Caepio fell with 80,000 Roman troops in battle against the Cimbri at Arausio (*Orange*). Lucullus went into winter quarters at Tigranocerta.

§ 15. Had Tigranes followed his first and natural impulse, he would have at once made peace with his victors, especially as his rival Phraates was already in active correspondence with the Romans. Mithradates, on the contrary, who could lose nothing, and might even regain his throne by further efforts, dissuaded his son-in-law from such a course, pointing out that if Phraates could by reasonable concessions be brought over to the Armenian side, or even induced only to remain neutral, his advancement by Roman aid at the expense of Armenia would at any rate be prevented. Tigranes had sufficient insight to know that it was to his interests, at whatever price, to prevent the alliance of his rival with Rome, and he accordingly endeavoured to purchase Phraates' aid by the offer to surrender to him all the recent conquests between the Euphrates and the Zabatus (*Zab*), considerable portions of which were still maintained by his brother Guras, whose headquarters were at Nisibis (*Nisibin*). But Phraates was as dull-witted now as Tigranes had been in failing to support Mithradates in 74 B.C.: though he could have no more dangerous neighbours or allies than the Romans, he preferred to come to an understanding with Lucullus. It may be remarked that his alliance brought little aid to the latter, but it left him free to deal with Tigranes single-handed. It was the ruin of Asia that her princes could never learn to sink mutual rivalry in concerted action for the safety of all.

Lucullus now resolved on the hazardous enterprise of attacking Artaxata as he had attacked Tigranocerta. It was on all accounts a desperate undertaking, in view of the small force at his disposal, the almost mutinous half-heartedness

of the troops, the unknown and well-nigh impassable nature of the country to be traversed, and the shortness of the season—not more than four months—during which campaigning is possible in the highlands of Central Armenia. Nevertheless, he was right in wishing to break utterly the power of Tigranes while he had the opportunity. Following for many miles the course pursued by Xenophon with the Ten Thousand, he marched in a north-easterly direction up the valley of the Upper Tigris, crossed the watershed on the western shore of Lake Thospitis (*Van*), into the valley of the Teleboas (*Karasu*), and along that river to its junction with the Upper Euphrates, or Arsanias (*Murad-su*). But already the early Armenian winter was at hand, and the murmurs of the legions grew daily louder. Tigranes was encamped with a second host gathered from all the interior some little way further east up the Arsanias. A sharp cavalry skirmish put the king again to rout, but the legions flatly refused to advance further. Artaxata was still far away, probably as much as 150 miles: the site is marked by the ruins of Ardaschar, on the Araxes (*Aras*), beneath the northern slopes of Mount Ararat. Even had he reached it, the siege would have been of doubtful issue, and Lucullus was forced to relinquish his purpose. He turned about, and late in the year he appeared before Nisibis. The town was bravely defended, but it fell at last, and there he spent the winter of 68 B.C.

But meantime both Tigranes and Mithradates were active.

Its Failure. The former, the less formidable enemy, laid instant siege to Tigranocerta, where Lucullus had left L. Fannius with a small garrison; Mithradates reappeared in Pontus at the head of 8000 cavalry, massacred all the Romans whom he could lay hands on, defeated Fabius Hadrianus, and was barely resisted by the other legate, L. Triarius. Lucullus had been compelled to withdraw troops from Pontus to strengthen his weak forces in Armenia, and Mithradates had no difficulty in recovering well-nigh the whole of his kingdom. He passed the winter at the sacred city of Comana (*Gumenek*), not far from Amasia (68 B.C.). His successes more than countervailed the brilliant but useless exploits of Lucullus.

§ 16. It was probably while at Nisibis that Lucullus learnt of the success which had at last attended the hostile attacks of the equites. Offended themselves by his arrangements in the province of Asia, they had made capital out of his unauthorised and seemingly reckless conduct in entering Armenia. Their complaints found an echo both with the Senate, who were annoyed at its general's independent attitude, and also with the democrats, who hated Lucullus as a Sullan. In consequence, the consul Q. Marcius Rex took up the command in Cilicia in 68 B.C., while the province of Asia was given to the praetor L. Quinctius, the democratic tribune of 75 B.C. The command of Lucullus against Mithradates was as yet untouched. A few months later, M'. Acilius Glabrio, who had been elected consul for 67 B.C., was commissioned to act as governor of Bithynia and Pontus, and to take over from Lucullus the conduct of the war with Mithradates. This was by decree of the people. A decree of the Senate of the same date ordered the discharge of the Fimbrian legions.

In the spring of 67 B.C., Lucullus reviewed his position. The greater part of Pontus was lost again; Mithradates was far too well posted for Triarius to be safe, and should the latter fall, with him would fall all that Lucullus had achieved; Fannius was still beleaguered in Tigranocerta; Cilicia and Asia were under the command of governors hostile to Lucullus; and finally, at any moment M'. Acilius Glabrio might arrive to take over the command against Mithradates. Lucullus had no choice: he must evacuate all his conquests east of the Euphrates, and he would be fortunate if he could relieve both Fannius and Triarius before it was too late. If nothing else had been in question, the open mutiny of the two Fimbrian legions would have compelled a retreat.

To relieve Fannius was easy, to cross Cappadocia into Pontus was a longer matter, and before it could be accomplished Lucullus learnt that Triarius, while attempting to prevent the seizure of a military depot at Dadasa, had been surprised and routed at Zela (*Zilleh*), with the enormous loss of 24 tribunes and 7000 rank and file. Mithradates was now master of all Pontus, but Lucullus made one more effort to redeem the loss. He

Recall of
Lucullus.

Results of his
Command.

applied in vain to Marcius Rex for aid, and finding that Mithradates declined to risk a battle, he was forced at last to withdraw entirely by the uncompromising desertion of his entire army. When Glabrio at length arrived, he found himself confined to Bithynia. Cappadocia and Paphlagonia were once more overrun by the Pontic armies, and when Lucullus surrendered his command in 67 B.C., the position of the Romans in Asia was exactly what it had been when he took it up in the early months of 74 B.C.

CHAPTER IV.

HOME POLITICS, 71—66 B.C.

§ 1. The Senate and its Commanders.—§ 2. Character of M. Crassus Dives.—§ 3. Position of Parties, 71 B.C.—§ 4. Coalition of Pompeius and Crassus.—§ 5. The Equestro-Democratic Revolution. the Tribunate, Censorship, and *iudicia*: the Case of Verres.—§ 6. Dissolution of the Coalition: Pompeius retires.—§ 7. The Senate loses Control over Foreign Affairs.—§ 8. M. Porcius Cato.—§ 9. M. Tullius Cicero.—§ 10. C. Julius Caesar.—§ 11. The Three Parties revise their Programmes: Legislation of 67 B.C.—§ 12. The Eastern Question: the Lex Gabinia.—§ 13. The Lex Manilia.

§ 1. THE Senate had sent Pompeius into Spain against its will. Having got rid of him for the time, it did very little to aid him in the difficulties of his war with Sertorius: partly because there were no funds to spend on more troops; partly, because it had no desire to see him back again, and therefore protracted the war by stinting supplies. Pompeius expostulated frequently. He even threatened to throw up his commission in 74 B.C., unless he received further support. Had he done so he might have proceeded to demand the management of the war against Mithradates, while he would have been at least awkward to deal with supposing he had preferred to stay in Rome. Therefore the Senate sent him a few more troops and kept him where he was, while it despatched Lucullus to the East. Pompeius it could not trust; Lucullus it could: and in Lucullus it looked to find a champion who in military glory and military support should counterbalance Pompeius.

In the year after Lucullus' appointment the Slave war broke out. The Senate had no wish to advance any third

person to military power. Therefore it left the war to consuls and praetors who were nullities, and therefore also it was at last compelled to appoint in Crassus yet another extraordinary commander to deal with Spartacus. Even Lucullus' position was bad enough, but he was at any rate loyal and a long way off: Pompeius' position was much worse, for his loyalty was doubtful, and his province uncomfortably near home. A third magnate was now to be created whose province would be Italy itself. The Senate cast about for a man who was loyal, able, and withal not too ambitious; and such a man it found seemingly in M. Crassus.

§ 2. M. Licinius Crassus was by birth a noble, and therefore professedly a Sullan. He had served with distinction under Sulla when fighting for the Dictatorship, and had been rewarded by large grants of confiscated property, upon which foundation he had erected a fortune far surpassing that of any other man in Rome. He has been described as "a personage highly characteristic of the period": he was something more—he was a man of talent. Like other men of his time he mingled in politics because politics were useful in his financial schemes. Like them too he was ambitious and not over scrupulous. But he displayed a vigour, whether physical or mental, which was remarkable in an optimate of his day; and his genius for finance was as many-sided as it was paramount and successful—so successful that he won the *sobriquet* of Dives. He employed his wealth as a means to power: half the nobility was in his debt, and therefore at his command; he was the acknowledged head of the equites and a chief shareholder in all their great syndicates; he won the support of the populace by his lavish generosity, and he used to boast that his wealth was sufficient to enable him to equip and maintain an army; he knew the workings of all the political clubs in Rome and could manage them at will by means of his gold. Yet his ambition was not criminal. He saw the opportunities for fortune-making which attached to high appointments, and sought them for that reason; but he probably never wished to emulate Sulla or Marius. He would leave the violence to others, and might even

invest his gold for the promotion of their ends, but only because he deemed the speculation likely to recoup him with interest. He set an example to some of his fellow-nobles in his frugality and neglect of Hellenic manners and culture; and, in fine, he occupied in the Rome of his day a place very much like that of some modern American millionaires. With such resources he had little difficulty in securing his nomination to the special command against Spartacus. He fulfilled his task with success, if without brilliancy. Pompeius arrived in time to gather some of the laurels which should have been Crassus' own, and accordingly he did not love Pompeius.

§ 3. How ceaselessly the democratic party assailed the
The Senate and Democrats optimates between the death of their champion Lepidus and the year 73 B.C. we have already seen. In that year the Senate had been driven to purchase a respite by promising that Pompeius should, upon his return from Spain, be invited to act as arbitrator between the two parties. Doubtless the Senate never meant to keep its promise, but Pompeius heard of it. When he at last returned he found it a useful handle.

In the summer of 71 B.C. the position of the Sullans was formally very much what it had been on their dictator's death: the people had wrung from it the partial restoration of the corn-doles, but little else. On the other hand, constant aggressions had emboldened the democrats and correspondingly weakened their adversaries; while every year brought fresh evidence of the incapacity of the government. The provinces, and even Italy itself, were harassed with wars and extortion; there was no peace worthy of the name, and no attempt to secure it beyond such isolated and long-delayed appointments as those of Pompeius, Lucullus, and Crassus; most glaring abuse of all, there was no such thing as justice, for the corruption of the Senatorian judges was overt and acknowledged. Both legislature and justice must be reformed; the former by restoring to the people their old share in the making of laws, the latter by destroying the optimates' monopoly of the law courts.

And Equites. These were the democratic party-cries; the latter was also the party-cry of the equites, and their zeal was

whetted by the news that just at this date Lucullus was playing fast and loose with their interests in the province of Asia. They had now in Crassus a leader who added to the power of his gold the yet more convincing argument of force if it were needed, for he still kept together the legions with which he had put down the slaves. Their opportunity was come, if they would but use it. There was but one man who could oppose Crassus with the same arguments, and this was Pompeius with his Spanish legions, for Lucullus was too far away to be a support to the Senate, while Metellus had already disbanded his troops. But all parties knew that Pompeius would throw in his influence with those who most flattered his vanity, and the democrats set themselves to win him over.

§ 4. It was not a difficult game, for the Senate had already shown its hand; every one, Pompeius included, knew that the optimates were bent on giving to Pompeius no further opportunities for advancement. Coalition of Pompeius and Crassus The Senate greeted his arrival with sullen indifference: all the more grateful then was the effusive and studied flattery with which the democrats made a demonstration of welcome. Pompeius demanded a triumph and lands for his soldiers: he did not care so much for the lands as for the triumph. The Senate replied, with perfect truth, that he was not qualified for a triumph for he had held no regular military office. The democrats seized their opportunity: they offered to give him all he asked if he would in turn restore the tribunate. Crassus and the equites looked on at the game, waiting perhaps in the hope that the Senate would purchase their support; but having broken with Pompeius, the nobles proceeded fatuously to break with every one else, while on the other side both Pompeius and the democrats intrigued to win Crassus to their side; Pompeius, because he did not wish to see antagonists so formidable ranged against him; the democrats, both for this reason and also because they hoped to find in Crassus a counterpoise to the power of Pompeius. Before the consular elections for 70 B.C. the parties had come to an understanding: Pompeius was to have his triumph and the lands he requested; Crassus was to enjoy an ovation; both

were to be elected consuls for the ensuing year (70 B.C.), and they were to utilise their office for carrying out the joint democratic and equestrian programme by rehabilitating the tribunate, restoring the censorship, and reforming the administration of justice.

§ 5. Everything went as the allied parties desired.

The Reaction
of 70 B.C.

Pompeius and Crassus entered upon the consulate, 70 B.C., and forthwith they passed the Licinio-Pompeian laws which restored the old tribunate and censorship. The tribune was again declared eligible for any further office, he was again allowed to convene and address the tribes, and he recovered in its full extent his

Tribunes.

old legislative authority. The spokesman of the democrats in this matter was the tribune M. Lollius Palicanus. The restoration of the censorship gave back to the people, as electors, the power to indirectly

Censors.

overawe the Senate; they showed their appreciation of the fact by at once electing the two consuls of 72 B.C. whom the Senate had set aside for their incapacity in dealing with the slaves. In all likelihood there was a large number of senators and nobles who trimmed with facile despatch upon seeing how the tide of power was turning, and set themselves to do the pleasure of the new leaders: many of them indeed had no choice, because they were Crassus' debtors. Of this class were Gellius and Lentulus, who had the further motive of revenge upon the class which had degraded them: they wreaked their spite lavishly, removing no less than 64 members from the senatorial benches, one of whom was that C. Antonius whom Caesar had fruitlessly impeached in 76 B.C. The Sullans had fallen very low, but the climax of their abasement only came when, in the summer of this year, and while the judicial reform which constituted the programme of the equites was as yet only promulgated

Verres.

but not yet submitted to the people, M. Tullius Cicero brought C. Verres to trial. The representative of the equites was the praetor L. Aurelius Cotta, uncle of Julius Caesar, but in demanding the restoration of the *equester ordo* as judges in lieu of the senators, he might expect some obstruction. It was necessary to reveal in all

its infamy once more the venality and corruption of the optimates and their officials, and with this aim, not less than from real sympathy with the oppressed, Cicero made his attack. His opponents, including the greatest orator of the day Q. Hortensius, counsel for the defence, and the noble families of the Metelli and Luculli, did all they could to secure the postponement of the case until the following year (69 B.C.) when Q. Hortensius would himself be consul with Q. Caecilius Metellus (afterwards Creticus), and when the accused would have every facility for securing his acquittal by bribery. But Cicero was too quick-witted. An eques himself, he was bent on seeing restored the "stern justice" of his order. Moreover he was a candidate for the office of curule aedile of 69 B.C., and doubtless his avowed intention of bringing Verres to justice secured him support which he needed. Shelving the ordinary and lengthy preliminaries of the law-courts, he attacked his victim with such vigour that Hortensius threw up his brief without attempting a reply, and Verres went into exile at Massilia (*Marseilles*). In the midst of the excited indignation aroused by Cicero's revelations L. Aurelius Cotta in conjunction with the democrats carried his *lex Aurelia iudiciaria* which ordained that henceforth the jury-lists should comprise equal numbers of senators, equites, and aerarian tribunes.* Considering the circumstances under which it was passed the law was of remarkable moderation, representing as it did all three parties in the State alike.

Lest the equites should think themselves badly treated, Pompeius introduced a bill whereby Lucullus' recent arrangements in Asia were cancelled, and the resources of that province once again put at the mercy of the *publicanus* and *negotiator*. Pompeius was narrow-minded enough to enjoy such an act, for he looked upon Lucullus as a rival, and hated him accordingly.

* In early times the *Tribuni Aerarii* were wealthy members of the various tribes who were entrusted with the levying of the war-tax, and the distribution therefrom of pay to the soldiers. Afterwards this duty was handed over to the quaestors. What was the exact position of the *Tribuni Aerarii* in later times is not known, but it seems probable that they formed a class of men whose property, though not sufficient to rank them among the equites was sufficient to mark them off from the lower classes.

• § 6. Thus, after barely ten years of existence, Sulla's constitution was overthrown, for the few points of Crassus and the Moderates. his contriving which were retained (*e g.*, the new procedure by *quaestiones*), were of no constitutional import. If the democrats had had their way, they would have proceeded to restore the children of Sulla's victims, call in all the lands and goods which he had confiscated, and in every detail aggrandise the dead or impoverished Marians: but neither Pompeius nor Crassus was a democrat by any means, and without their cordial co-operation the people could do nothing. Such measures would have been too revolutionary, for they would have led to disturbances in property, finance, and society at large, as great as those attending Sulla's triumph. Neither Pompeius nor Crassus was likely to abet any attack upon the proceedings which had helped to make the fortunes of each, and while all who had anything to lose supported the consuls, only the extreme democrats urged the furtherance of such a measure. But on other accounts the consuls were already estranged from one another: Pompeius was sulky in the vaguely-felt knowledge that he was but the tool of a party, not leading but led, and he was disappointed in his hope of obtaining the command against Mithradates, for to all seeming the war in the East was now over. As for Crassus, his recent attitude had got for him all that he wished, and he had no further reason to humiliate himself to the part of Pompeius' tolerated comrade. He determined to let well alone, and by adopting a policy of conservation to win for his party a position of real strength, as holding the balance of power between the defeated Senate on the one hand and the victorious democrats on the other.

Indeed, the revolution of 70 B.C. had been almost entirely in favour of the democracy, whose course the Pompeius disarmed. equites, Crassus, and Pompeius, had one and all supported. Had Pompeius chosen to make use of this, his second opportunity, and raise himself by means of the sword into the dictator's place, there was no one to prevent it; but such a *coup*, if not beyond his conception, was far beyond his courage. He paraded as the arbiter of Rome's parties and destinies, until at the close of his consulship he awoke

to find himself the butt of those whose leader he had fancied himself, without further excuse for his would-be magisterial attitude, and equally unwelcome alike to the Senate which he had injured and to the equites and democrats whom he had abetted.

§ 7. For a while the city was quiet: all parties were re-
Attitude of the Senate. lieved that such important changes should have been carried through without an appeal to the sword; and when at the close of 70 B.C. Pompeius at length disbanded his legions, and veiled his political nullity under the chagrined declaration that he sought nothing more than retirement into private life, the various sections of the anti-senatorial party were yet more relieved, and set themselves zealously to collect their strength. True the Senate had to see its last hopes destroyed, when in 68 B.C. the democrats and equites combined to set aside the command of Lucullus in the East, but it was able to substitute for him another good aristocrat, and ergo a useless officer, in the person of Q. Marcius Rex, and in the same year to send out Q. Caecilius Metellus with an extraordinary commission on a small scale for the suppression of piracy. True also, in 69 B.C., it received a blunt reminder of the renewed strength of its enemies when C. Julius Caesar ventured, to the delight of the mob, to parade the proscribed bust of Marius at the funeral of his aunt, Marius' widow. But such damage as the optimates suffered during the years 69-68 B.C., came far more from the failure of the administration abroad than from direct assaults at home. Lucullus was already on his retreat from Armenia, and Mithradates was again in a fair way to recover his kingdom, while by sea the pirates, despite Metellus' energy, were as bold and ubiquitous as ever. The commercial houses were suffering from the insecurity or stagnation of trade, the mob felt the recurrent scarcity of provisions and consequent rise of prices, and the Senate itself was menaced with State-bankruptcy. It was no cause for surprise that, when in 67 B.C. the news arrived of the complete breakdown of the Roman position in Asia, equites and populace again combined to take from the Senate that administration of which it so continuously proved itself in-

capable. By this date new actors had come into prominence—Cato, Cicero, and Caesar—each representing a particular party.

§ 8. M. Porcius Cato, known after his death as Uticensis, was born in 95 B.C., the great-grandson of the famous Cato the Censor who had led the opposition to the Scipios and to the party of culture and Greek tastes in the early years of the preceding century. It was characteristic of the Romans as a people to be politically behind the times, and incapable of matching the development of their mental views with that of their power and nationality; and Cato was the concrete presentment of this characteristic. His ancestor had been an obstructionist and extreme conservative; so was the descendant: but whereas the former had held reasons, good or bad, for his principles, the latter looked for no deeper excuse than was contained in the fact of his descent. He took up his great-grandfather's position as an inheritance, and having no *rationale* for it he necessarily made it ludicrous. It was his pride to be in manners, speech, ideas, even in dress, two centuries behind his day, and he endeavoured to solve the problems of the present by the light of the traditions of the past. As a result, he cut a very respectable figure indeed amongst his dissolute and characterless fellow nobles so long as he was merely passive, setting them an example which they sadly needed in regard to morals and private life; but when he intruded himself into politics he showed an obstinate prejudice and a self-satisfied assurance of his capabilities, which made him indeed the leader of men whose creed was prejudice and self-satisfaction, but made him also of no use whatever save as an obstruction to be set in the way of any and every attack. He was rigidly honest, humane beyond his times, and convinced that the world had never seen anything to equal the Roman nobility for wisdom and capacity; and this was the whole extent of his own capacity and wisdom. He had very little common sense, no political sagacity whatever; and yet he was one of the best men of his class, and his fellows became his followers because he had a character of a sort, while they had none.

§ 9. A very different sort of person was M. Tullius Cicero,

the rising leader of the equites. Born in the Volscian *municipium* of Arpinum (*Arpino*), in 106 B.C., Cicero. son of an eques of considerable local influence, he early came to Rome to study for the Bar. His education brought him constantly into contact with men of the optimate party, so that he grew up with views wavering between those of a senatorian and an equestrian. He served under the father of Pompeius Magnus in the Social war (89 B.C.), but had no taste for a military life, for which indeed he was physically unfit. Essentially a self-made man, he owed all his success in life to his powers of oratory, which were first displayed when, in 80 B.C., he ventured to defend one Sextus Roscius against Chrysogonus, a notable *protégé* and freedman of Sulla—a piece of audacity of which the boldness was only justified by the success. However, he saw fit to leave Rome in the following year, ostensibly, and very possibly actually, on the ground of ill-health, and for two years studied rhetoric at Rhodes and Athens, the universities of the Hellenistic world. In 75 B.C. he held his first public office as quaestor in Sicily, where his integrity won for him golden rewards. Five years later as advocate of the Sicilians he secured the banishment of the infamous Verres. Hortensius, who was retained for the defence, had been for many years the leader of the Roman bar; but Cicero's attack compelled that dignitary to throw up his client's case, and to acknowledge himself now only the second orator in Rome. This case proved of high political importance, and was a prime lever in the demolition of the senatorial monopoly of justice. It left Cicero an accepted and acceptable power amongst the equites, helped him to the curule aedileship (69 B.C.) and praetorship (66 B.C.), and gave him a celebrity as a pleader which never lacked field for its exercise. It has been said that his views were neither purely equestrian nor purely senatorial. He represented in fact the better class of men of both parties—men who would gladly have made a compromise between the two, but were prevented from so doing by the less liberal character of their associates. His political life was that of an unprincipled trimmer, or of a prudent, moderate, and far-sighted statesman, according as

we choose to view it. For the rest, he was without exception the most widely read, and withal the most usefully read, Roman of his day; laudably honest, but with a keen eye to business; fond of power, but without the courage which makes ambition dangerous; cautious, and with a very sufficiently lofty opinion of his own value. At the present moment he was an avowed disciple of Pompeius, at whose instigation he had first won political laurels in the prosecution of Verres.

§ 10. Gaius Julius Caesar, destined to be the first of the Roman emperors, was born in 102 B.C. His Caesar. *gens* boasted of the proudest and oldest blood in Rome, and had long ago attained to nobility. He was too young to have any share in the events of the Social war, only taking the *toga virilis* in 87 B.C. The marriage of his aunt Julia to Marius would throw the young Caesar into constant connection with the leading figures of the democratic party, and thus he imbibed those views of policy which were eventually to make him now the unchallenged leader of democracy. Upon the death of Marius he at once joined Cinna, whose daughter he married. When Sulla's dictatorship broke up the popular party, Caesar's connection with the democrats naturally brought him into notice; he received orders to put away his wife, but, though yet a mere boy, he refused to obey the mandate and fled to the Sabine hills. Pardoned upon the intercession of friends, he returned for a while to Rome, but soon left for Asia. There was no scope for his political bent in the city: he could make some use of his time by travelling and study. He served under Thermus at the capture of Mytilene, winning a civic crown for his valour in saving the life of a citizen (80 B.C.), and became a well-known figure at the court of Nicomedes of Bithynia. In 78 B.C. he heard of Lepidus' democratic reaction, and was urgently invited to give it his support; but he knew the incapacity of the man too well, and held aloof. However he returned to Rome and gave evidence of his hearty but cautious support of the democratic programme by at once impeaching Dolabella (77 B.C.) and C. Antonius (76 B.C.). His failure in these first attempts only prompted him to improve his acquaint-

ance with oratory, and he sailed to Rhodes, to study there as Cicero had done. He was captured by pirates on his way and ransomed by his friends, but he revenged the insult by at once fitting out vessels wherewith he captured and crucified the men who had laughed at his threats of vengeance. After hard study under the famous teacher Apollonius Molo, he returned to Rome about the beginning of 73 B.C., an acknowledged master of oratory. He gave instant and cordial support to the agitations of Licinius Macer in this year, and when Pompeius and Crassus were wavering in policy at the conclusion of the Sertorian and Servile wars, he very possibly had some share in bringing about the alliance between the two, and so securing the overthrow of the Sullan constitution. That Aurelius Cotta who gave his name to the bill reorganising the courts of justice was his uncle, the brother of his mother. In 69 B.C. he was elected quaestor, and after signalling the funeral of his aunt by that open avowal of the democratic triumph of which we have already spoken, he left for Spain in the following year. In 67 B.C. he was back again in Rome awaiting further opportunities for his advancement.

Handsome and winning, he was of iron endurance and untiring activity. No amount of labour was too great for him. His many-sided training made him at once an orator, a diplomatist, an unequalled party-leader, a genius in war, a scientist and author, and withal the leader of fashion and best of boon-companions. He had a wonderful power of reading characters, and very rarely did he read them wrongly. He was just as active and practical as Cato was inert and unpractical; and while he had no need to rival Cicero in mere culture, he far surpassed him in every other qualification for leadership. Cicero had some grasp of the meaning of what he read as history: Caesar grasped it all. Without prejudices or misconceptions he was setting himself to reconstruct the Roman state, for he had that ambition which comes of confidence in one's powers. If fortune gave him the fullest opportunities to carry out his aims, and if he used them to the full, he need not be charged with having sought them by other than honourable means.

§ 11. Under the leadership of these three men the thr

parties steadily developed their respective lines of policy, although such an expression is hardly applicable to the spasmodic action of the Senatorial party which sheltered itself behind Cato. That party in fact had no ambition but to fight as stubbornly as might be for the remainder of its privileges, and to abuse its remaining opportunities for its own profit while there was yet time. The equites on the other hand were bent on securing their new position : they represented the moderate conservatives, and while declining either to commit themselves to the more radical programme of the *populares*, or to join with the optimates in resisting it, they steered an independent middle course which secured for them studied flattery and indulgence from both the extreme parties. As for the *populares*, they were roughly divided into two sections : the one included the rabble of Rome and the reckless of all classes, who from motives of spite or self-seeking were ready to proceed to any extreme under plea of the democratic interest ; the other was formed of such men as Caesar, and the senators Gabinius and Cornelius, men who allowed no party enthusiasm to run away with their good sense. On the one hand they sought to reorganise and strengthen the democratic vote, more particularly by the admission of such of the Italians as were still unenfranchised, notably the Transpadanes ; on the other, they desired to see the foreign administration maintained with vigour, and hoped to find in its maintenance the means for acquiring a democratic military force. Part and parcel of this was the steady effort to purify the electioneering machinery and oust the nobles from their monopoly of office.

The year 67 B.C. was an eventful one in home politics.

Legislation of 67 B.C. Amongst the tribunes were Aulus Gabinius, Gaius Cornelius, and Roscius Otho. The latter

passed a bill restoring to the equites their ancient privilege of occupying fourteen front rows in the theatre—a privilege which was worth little in itself, but of which the restoration marked the revived importance of the *equester ordo*. Cornelius passed, in the face of violent rioting, two laws, which respectively forbade the Senate to grant exemption from any existing law unless 200 of its members were present,

and compelled the praetors to maintain the precepts of their Perpetual Edicts.* A *Lex Calpurnia* renewed and increased the penalties against *ambitus*, and endeavoured to check the influence of the electioneering clubs worked by optimate wire-pullers like Cethegus. Gabinius carried bills whereby the Senate was compelled to give audience to foreign envoys within a stated date, and any loans made to or by such envoys were declared non-actionable. To postpone the audience of envoys, to bribe them or to take their bribes as the case might be, in order to prevent disclosures or to facilitate the envoys' objects, had become a stock resource for senators who dreaded revelations or wished to raise money. But of more historical importance was that *Lex Gabinia* which now again called Pompeius from his retirement into active life (67 B.C.).

§ 12. The jealousy of the equites had long been seeking revenge upon Lucullus, and in this year it
The Command in the East. secured the passing of the bill whereby his command was transferred to M'. Acilius Glabrio. This was the greater gain as no one could fear any display of military ability on Glabrio's part, and thus the legions of the East, while still left nominally under Senatorial control, were reduced to small importance for lack of a formidable leader. But this was only a negative gain: what the democrats really wanted was to take into their own hands the appointment of military chiefs and so find the means for raising legions in their own interests. The greatest innovation would be in transferring from the Senate to the people the right of appointment; and if they could but gain this advantage, even the more moderate democrats were quite willing to concede that the man of their appointment should not be a chief of their own party. The time was an admirable one for making the attempt: everywhere the government of the Senate had failed, for from the East were already coming tidings of Lucullus' enforced retreat,

* *Edictum* was a general term for any written announcement made by a magistrate to the people. The *edicta* of the praetor showed what course that magistrate would pursue in any case of law that was not covered by the Twelve Tables or subsequent legislation. On entering office the praetor declared what part of his predecessor's *edicta* he intended to observe, and hence was formed a body of rules known as *edicta perpetua* or *tralatitia*.

while despite the efforts of the optimate Metellus in Crete, the seas swarmed more thickly than ever with pirate squadrons, and Rome was in constant danger of famine. If Caesar and his colleagues dreamed of empire, they had no wish to see the prize fall to pieces before they could attain it. There must be appointed a man able and willing to restore the dignity of the Roman name.

The *Lex Gabinia* (67 B.C.) proposed that the Senate should name a general to hold absolute military command for a space of three years over the entire Mediterranean waters and the surrounding provinces, to a distance of fifty miles from the coast. He was to be a consular, and to have authority equal to provincial governors who for the time being came within the limits of his sphere of command. He was to have a staff of twenty-five legates of his own choosing, all senators, and all acting with praetorian rank and powers. He was to be free to raise 120,000 troops, and a fleet of 500 vessels; all the revenues of the State were to be at his command; and he was at once to receive a sum of 144,000,000 sesterces. The Senate was placed in a dilemma from which it could not escape. It was ostensibly asked to take the initiative in energetic action against the pirates. Nobody could deny the need of such action. If the Senate refused to adopt such a course, it was aware that the people would, with every excuse, take upon itself this duty of the government. Again, if the Senate should accept the unpleasant alternative, it would create just such a military power as it most dreaded. Nevertheless, if it had to be done at all, it was better for the Senate to do so itself than have the people do it. Then came the question, Who was to be the chosen one? Every one knew that Pompeius, albeit not mentioned, was the man intended. Now Pompeius had been the prime author of the overthrow of Sulla's constitution, and might seem to be the last man whom the Senate would choose. On the other hand, he was the ostensible champion of democracy, and therefore the one man whom the people meant should be chosen. If the Senate should name any one else, it must be either Lucullus or an incapable. To name Lucullus would be to stultify its own course in

hampering and finally setting aside his command in Asia, and would further estrange the equites; to name an incapable would only exasperate the starving populace; and finally, if any one but Pompeius were appointed, the inevitable result would be that the people would forthwith set such appointment aside and substitute Pompeius. The bill must be accepted; and further, Pompeius must be the nominee. There was some comfort in the well-known fact that Pompeius had very little real sympathy with his democratic allies. Indeed, as Cicero believed, his nomination might buy him over to the side of the Senate. As for the mass of the democrats, they supported him because they believed him capable, and they were too hungry to think of his possible defection from their own side. As for Caesar and the moderates, they would be pleased to have Pompeius out of the way: they wanted the restoration of the Roman majesty abroad, and the consequent improvement in commerce and security; they knew Pompeius too well, in the light of his recent self-extinction, to fear his appointment much more than that of any one else; and they were content for the moment to win the credit of initiating a stronger foreign policy, and the satisfaction of having forced the Senate's hand, for the appointment was in reality the assertion of the people's right to manage military matters, and it was only a studied moderation which veiled the popular triumph under a pretence of leaving the Senate free to choose its own nominee. Lastly, though Caesar and his moderate followers would certainly not have introduced such a bill for Pompeius' benefit, yet to endeavour to obstruct it, would only lead to a split with Pompeius, a contingency for which they were not yet prepared.

It is impossible to say how far Pompeius was himself responsible for the suggested measure. It was a move which he could scarcely have ventured to make in his own person, for it would have been too palpable an attempt at monarchy; but it may be taken for granted that he had something to do with Gabinius, and if his follower went farther than he would himself have dared to go, Pompeius at least was not likely to complain.

The voting upon the bill was attended with riot. The

equites went over almost in a body to the Senate, and did their utmost to prevent the measure becoming law. Of the ten tribunes, only Gabinius could not be bought, a sufficient proof either that the bill was not really popular even with the democrats, or that the tribunes were all knaves. On the day of the poll, eight of the nine withdrew their veto in face of the violent threats of the masses, with whom cheap food was of far more urgent importance than political and constitutional considerations. Trebellius alone persisted in vetoing the bill, but even he gave way when Gabinius, in imitation of the conduct of Tiberius Gracchus towards Octavius, commenced to take the people's vote for his deposition from office. The bill became law: Glabrio and Pompeius started for their respective provinces; and the mere fact that the redoubted Pompeius was simply named to command against the pirates, brought down the price of corn to its normal rate.

§ 13. Pompeius more than justified his appointment to the task, as will be seen in the next chapter, but all parties were taken by surprise when, early in 66 B.C., another tribune, C. Manilius, brought in a second and similar bill, whereby the command against Mithradates and the final settlement of Asia were to be entrusted to Pompeius. Manilius was a political scapegoat whom no party cared to claim for its own, and there can be no better example of the utter collapse of all good government and constitutional safeguards in Rome than that this man, seemingly single-handed, was able to carry his bill practically without demur. The bill was only different from that of Gabinius in that it even omitted all limitations of time, and only specified those of space in the vaguest way. Manilius found his plausible excuse in the recently arrived news of the total loss of all Lucullus' late gains in Asia, the inaction of Glabrio, the recent successes of Pompeius, and the renewed aggressions of Mithradates. The parties viewed the bill with feelings no different from those with which they had regarded the *Lex Gabinia*, except that all were more apathetic. As Pompeius had already got what they had not been able to withhold, it seemed immaterial whether his powers were extended or no; and the Senate

and equites began to see their chance in winning him over to their own side, while Caesar and his followers had no other anxiety now than that he should not return to the city before they could organise a military power which should be a counterpoise to his own. Manilius' bill was warmly supported by Cicero, and became law without further comment or resistance.

CHAPTER V.

POMPEIUS AND THE EAST.

§ 1. The Pirates: Roman Policy answerable for their Presence.—
§ 2. Wars of Servilius Isauricus, Antonius, and Metellus—§ 3. Pompeius extirpates them.—§ 4. Pompeius takes command against Mithradates: Position of the Asiatic States—§ 5 Expulsion of Mithradates.—§ 6. Conquest of Armenia.—§ 7. Pompeius at the Caucasus.—§ 8. End of Mithradates.—§ 9. State of Syria: its Annexation and Limits—§ 10 Settlement of Bithynia-Pontus.—§ 11. General Results of the Settlement of Asia.

§ 1. PIRACY has always flourished in the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, when there has been
The Pirates. any interruption of the strictest surveillance over the sea. The shores of Asia Minor are broken up into countless creeks wherein the outlaws' light vessels may find shelter and which a heavier vessel is frequently unable to penetrate. Above the coast tower the inaccessible peaks of the mountains of Pisidia, Lycia, Caria, and Cilicia, sweeping along the whole southern shore of Anatolia and round the Gulf of Issus (*Gulf of Iskanderoun*) to join the ranges of Anti-Libanus and Libanus (*Lebanon*); and every peak furnishes the site for a formidable hiding-place or castle. Seaward again Cyprus and Crete, and all the countless islets of the Aegean, afford so many more stations uniting the harbours of Asia with those of the mainland of Greece, and so by way of Cape Malea (*Malea*) round to the coasts and islands of the Ionian Sea and the broken coast-line of the Eastern and Upper Adriatic.

The various peoples occupying these coasts and waters,

have throughout history enjoyed a bad reputation. Nature made them for pirates and brigands, and they have not failed to obey her bidding. Greek duplicity is not less proverbial than Syrian dishonesty or Jewish finesse, and the wilder peoples of Istria, Dalmatia, and Epirus, made up in ferocity what they lacked in wit. As for the Cretans, St. Paul has endorsed the common estimate of that people.

Before the rise of Rome as a maritime power the combined navies of Etruria and Carthage had acted as a police in the Western Mediterranean, or had at any rate prevented the appearance of any alien flotillas there. Carthage fell, and for many years the strong hand of Rome had exercised a firm control over those waters, while she had in various wars chastised the piratical trade of the peoples of the Adriatic coast. In the middle of the second century B.C. she was the only naval power of the west, and turned her attention now to the eastern basin. In that quarter there flourished, besides many minor commercial states, the maritime ascendancy of Rhodes and the adjacent Asiatic Greeks in league with her, Pergamus, and Egypt; and their own interest compelled them to keep a strong curb upon piracy in their own waters. Their commercial prosperity made them the object of Roman jealousy, and one

Roman Policy
Answerable. by one they were stripped of their fleets; but the Roman speculators who encouraged this policy forgot to substitute the needful Roman sea-police which could alone maintain for them the freedom of the seas. Piracy at once took new head. Too remiss to keep up the necessary fleets of her own, Rome refused to allow the eastern states dependent upon her to do so either, but left them a defenceless prey to the corsairs. Apart from national proclivities, the incessant wars and revolutions of the East drove numbers to a life which was at least free and lucrative if perilous. The Greeks especially, their country's freedom lost, turned their love of the sea to this use. Their headquarters were in Cilicia, whence "Cilicians" came to be a general name for pirates of all nations. Without uniting in any one federation, the pirates of each district or island had their own chieftains and princes working one with another.

Laws they had none, except the law of the strongest, and their code of honour was summed in the recognised duty of one pirate to aid another no matter where or when. They desired no territorial possessions save the isolated rock-fortresses where they might lodge their booty, and they raised few heavy ships of war. Their favourite barks were light feluccas — *myoparones* — which could distance any more formidable craft and from which slow-sailing merchantmen were powerless to escape. During the thirty years which followed the transference of the kingdom of Pergamus to Rome, the pirates ruled practically without molestation in the seas eastward of Italy, and their hunting ground in the Aegean was so lucrative that they knew it as the "Golden Gulf." When at last Rome awoke to her responsibilities it was not so much because the sea coasts of Greece and Asia were practically laid desolate, or because the equites found the world's commerce coming to a standstill for lack of secure transit, as because the corsairs' cruisers threatened to starve Rome by intercepting the Egyptian corn-fleets. In 102 B.C. the Senate made its first feeble effort to check the evil, by occupying one or two posts in Cilicia, and giving to M. Antonius, grandfather of the triumvir, a commission to clear the seas. Antonius effected little, for he had not the skill or the means to cope with these Parthians of the seas who fled from attack only to reappear in another quarter. The chief result of his efforts was to make Rome the peculiar object of the pirates' animosity, and to bring their incursion even into Italian waters. They sacked the coast towns of the Gulf of Tarentum (*Taranto*) and of Campania and Latium, plundered Sicily, and extended their stations to the shores of Mauretania. During the bloodshed of the Social war and the subsequent quarrels of Marius and Sulla they waxed bolder and more numerous: they carried off Roman magistrates with their lictors and held them to ransom, they recruited their galley-slaves from Roman captives, they leagued themselves with Rome's enemies such as Mithradates and Sertorius. The despairing provincials no longer made any resistance to their inroads, and the plunder captured from Roman fleets was publicly sold in

the markets at Ephesus and Smyrna. Even Sulla was constrained to wait for the winter season, when the pirates beached their vessels for the stormy months, before venturing to embark his troops for the brief voyage from Italy to Greece. Trade was ruined and reacted to the ruin of towns once prosperous; the coasts were left desolate, for none dared to venture down within reach of the outlaws; and the loss of wealth helped to entangle the wretched provincials ever deeper in the meshes of the Roman money-lenders. The impoverishment of the provinces meant loss of revenue to Rome, and this prevented the government's undertaking the costly task of repressing the evil; while exiled Marians, refugees from the armies of Lepidus, Sertorius, Perpenna, Spartacus, and Mithradates, thronged to join the corsairs, whose flag was dreaded from Issus to Gibraltar, and whose sails were of Phoenician purple and their oars plated with silver.

§ 2. Sulla had perceived the gravity of the evil, and had ordered his legates Murena and Dolabella to equip the fleets necessary to check it, but nothing came of his orders in his lifetime. In the year of his death the consul P. Servilius Vatia took the province of Cilicia for his charge. The pirates, headed by the Cilician pirate-prince Zenicetes, ventured to give regular battle, and were routed of course for lack of sufficient weight in their vessels. Zenicetes fired his fortress of Olympus and perished there, most of the surrounding stations fell into the Romans' hands, and Servilius crossed the Taurus to take Isaura and reduce its occupants—types of the worst kind of robbers. For his successes (78-76 B.C.) he won the surname of Isauricus, but his achievements had little real result beyond driving the corsairs to new stations in Crete.

Things went from bad to worse. M. Antonius, son of the admiral of 102 B.C., received a propraetorian commission in 74 B.C. to reduce Crete, where the natives and the pirates had made common cause. He began with a disastrous defeat off Cydonia, and died in 71 B.C. after spending time, men, and money in vain. His ill-success had something to do with the overthrow of the Senate which immediately followed it, but that overthrow

only led to greater neglect on the part of the government. Antonius was surnamed Creticus in derision.

The Cretans remained recalcitrant, and in 68 B.C. the pro-consul Q. Caecilius Metellus took up the war against them. He fought a pitched land-battle at Cydonia against the Cretans officered by Lasthenes and Panares, the conquerors of Antonius' fleet. He was victorious, but he had to reduce every town in the island by tedious sieges; and though he succeeded by degrees, the two captains always made good their escape. He was still engaged in this manner when, early in 67 B.C., he learnt that Pompeius was already at sea and the pirates at length attacked in earnest.

§ 3. Pompeius' plan was simple but comprehensive. He divided the whole of the Mediterranean coasts and waters into thirteen districts, and by aid of his twenty-five legates attacked all at once. Such pirates as escaped from one pair of legates could only fall into the hands of another. To clear the western Mediterranean, to destroy the strongholds in Corsica and Sardinia and along the coasts of Spain and Mauretania, was the work of forty days only. Then hurrying eastward, he repeated the same plan in those waters. Nowhere did he meet with any real resistance, for he left to his adversaries neither time nor liberty to unite their efforts. He did not wage a war of extermination as had been the case with his predecessors, but by his clemency invited the corsairs to submit, and such as did so he settled in new localities, as at Soli, afterwards called Pompeiopolis. There was but one notable engagement, when the Cilician princes were defeated off Coracesium (*Alaya*) and lost their entire fleet. To overrun all the hills and valleys of Taurus and destroy the hill-fortresses in detail was an easy task with the force at Pompeius' command. Within ninety days of his nomination as admiral he had crushed piracy throughout the Mediterranean, and ended the war. Crete alone he had not yet touched. There Metellus was still plodding on at his sieges, and treating his conquests with a traditional barbarity which prevented submission. Thither Pompeius sent his legate L. Octavius to inform the proconsul that the Cretans had volunteered

their surrender to Pompeius. But Metellus, a genuine optimate, had no mind to see another snatch from him the fruits of his tardy successes, least of all Pompeius. He persisted with his operations, and before long found himself fighting not only against the Cretans, but also against Octavius. Pompeius was already arming in Cilicia for a civil war with his obstinate rival when he was turned from his purpose by the news that the *Lex Manilia* had entrusted to him the conduct of the war with Mithradates. He left Metellus to his own devices, and that officer earned the surname of Creticus with somewhat greater glory than did Antonius.

§ 4. Early in 66 B.C. Pompeius moved into Galatia where he found the remnant of Lucullus' army at a spot called Danala, near the Halys. The legions of Fimbria had been already discharged; the rest of the army Pompeius took over, to the number of 40,000 or 50,000 Roman troops. To oppose him Mithradates had but 30,000 foot and 3000 horse. His numbers would not allow him to risk a pitched battle: he designed to wear out his enemy by continued marches, by cutting off supplies, and by intermittent skirmishing. He had even made overtures for peace, but they were probably not seriously meant, and as Pompeius demanded nothing short of complete submission they proved futile. Nevertheless the old king felt he was nearing the close of his long struggle with Rome. His country was wasted, its population thinned, its few towns half ruined; and as always with Eastern people, his allies grew the less reliable in proportion to his reverses. He had learnt to put little trust in Tigranes, his son-in-law, although he neglected no opportunity of urging him to take active measures against this greater than Lucullus. It was to Parthia that he looked for his chief aid, but in vain: Phraates made alliance with Pompeius before the latter took the field. There was no need for him to send Parthian troops: his declared attitude was sufficient to paralyse the movements of the Armenian king, who could not venture to throw troops into Pontus while Phraates threatened him from the opposite side. And Tigranes was out of love with Mithra-

Pompeius and
Pontus.
Position of
Mithradates in
Armenia.

dates. He had a son of his own name, Tigranes, who had but lately been driven from Armenia for an alleged plot against the throne. The prince fled to Phraates, and did his best to prevent the latter becoming party to an alliance which would necessitate further flight or surrender. His father, for some reason of his own, chose to believe that Mithradates was answerable for the younger Tigranes' conduct, and accordingly refused to have anything to say to his father-in-law.*

§ 5. Pompeius, without waiting for the arrival of the troops from Cilicia, struck eastwards across the Mithradates expelled from Pontus. Upper Euphrates, unable to bring on a battle with the Pontic army. Here, in the province of Anaitis or Acisilene, he was for a moment checked, for Mithradates was securely entrenched in a hill fortress called Dasteira, and able by means of his cavalry to cut off Pompeius' supplies. The arrival of the Cilician troops turned the tables again, and enabled Pompeius to beleaguer Dasteira. Once more, as at Oyzicus, Mithradates was out-generalled: he retreated still further to the north-west, with the Romans dogging his steps. While he retreated in confident assurance that his enemy was behind him, Pompeius contrived by a forced march to make a detour, which put him in possession of the high ground in front of the Pontic army near the river Lycus, and in command of the road by which it must pass. Here he surprised his enemy at midnight and annihilated his forces. Few escaped. The king himself got away with but three followers, and fled towards Armenia. The site of this victory was near Enderez, where subsequently rose the "City of Victory," Nicopolis.

Within the few weeks occupied by these movements, Phraates, on the suggestion of the exiled son of Tigranes, had invaded Armenia, and even laid siege to Artaxata. He had withdrawn however before the battle of Nicopolis. When Mithradates entered Armenia, intending to seek refuge with his son-in-law, he learnt that the latter had put a price upon his head as the supposed instigator of the

* See Genealogical Table III.

Parthian attack. He wheeled about, still pursued by Pompeius, and made his way to Dioscurias (*Iskûria*), in Colchis, where he would be safe for a brief while from further pursuit, and might collect his scattered wits.

§ 6. Upon reaching the valley of the Araxes (*Aras*) Pompeius desisted from the pursuit of Mithra-
Conquest of Armenia. dates and marched direct down the river towards Artaxata. His sudden attack, following immediately upon Phraates' inroad and Tigranes' disgust at the supposed treachery of the Pontic king, precluded any such preparations for resistance as the Armenian would have deemed adequate. There were a few skirmishes of no magnitude, and Pompeius conformed his plan of campaign to that of Lucullus, wasting not an instant in sieges or pursuits by the way. With incredible rapidity he reached the capital, a city strongly fortified by its position as well as by its walls and ditches. But the expected siege became unnecessary when Tigranes rode into the Roman camp, placed his tiara in Pompeius' hands, and did homage for his life and crown. He retained both, but he was compelled to relinquish all his conquests or claims on the western bank of the Euphrates, which was henceforth to be the frontier of his kingdom towards Cappadocia; while the provinces of Sophene and Corduene, which embrace the sources of the Tigris and the whole of its upper valley to a point below Tigranocerta, were also surrendered, although the latter was restored to him in the next year. It was never sufficient for Roman policy to hold the simple passive frontier afforded by a river or other natural feature: it aimed always at securing the active co-operation of any peoples bordering thereon, and effected this by creating client-princedom or "buffer" states all along the line of her frontiers. The Euphrates was the natural limit of the Roman possessions in Asia, but Pompeius was already seeking the material for client-kingdoms on its eastern bank. Hence his insistence upon the surrender of Sophene, which commands the fords of the Euphrates into Cappadocia; and hence also in the spring of 65 B.C. he threw off a succession of columns whose mission was to traverse Mesopotamia, reduce to submission or take into alliance

the various tribes bordering along the Euphrates from Sophene to Nicephorium (*Rakka*), and garrison the stronger towns of Syria and Palestine.

§ 7. Pompeius was too commonplace a man to be led away by his successes into the belief that he ^{Albanians and Iberians.} was an Alexander. Had he had his own way he would have withdrawn quietly to Pontus, and proceeded to have settled Asia once and for all; but the sight of the Roman legions, quartered for the winter upon the borders of their land, roused the alarm of the Albanians, Colchians, and Iberians, who might fear for themselves a fate like that of Tigranes. These tribes occupied the impassable valleys of the Caucasus, and had little to tempt even a Roman to attack them; but they valued their liberty too dearly to hear without disquiet that Pompeius intended—whether or no it was true—to march across the Caucasus in pursuit of Mithradates whenever the return of spring should permit it. The Albanians, far the most numerous as well as the most inaccessible, assembled their forces before the winter was over and attacked at once the three divisions into which the Roman army was divided for purposes of foraging. They were beaten at all points and withdrew to their own hills again. The Iberians none the less continued to make preparations for war, and in the spring of 65 B.C. Pompeius proceeded to chastise them. The only pass from Armenia into Iberia crosses the river Cyrus (*Kur*), in the valley of which the Romans had wintered, by a bridge beneath the two fortresses of Harmozica (*Armaz*) and Leusamora (*Tsuman*), near Tiflis. Here Artoces, the Iberian prince, gave battle without success. He retreated to the river Pelorus and there suffered a second defeat, upon which he gave hostages for his future good behaviour.

The Roman army now turned westward up the valley of the Cyrus, across the mountains into that of the Phasis, and so to the coast of Colchis where the fleet was awaiting it. But Pompeius would venture no further, and despatching his fleet to blockade the Bosporan kingdom which was now alone left to Mithradates, he took advantage of a fresh rising of the Albanians to order the retreat of his legions.

One battle sufficed to reduce them again, though their forces were alleged to be more than 70,000 men. It was fought on the banks of the Abas (*Alazan*), and led to the immediate submission of all the peoples between Pontus and the Caspian—a submission which was of course of no longer duration than was the presence of the Roman armies. Thence Pompeius returned to Pontus, where he speedily reduced the remaining strongholds. In 64 B.C. he appeared in Syria, and set about the task of bringing order out of the chaos which now prevailed in what was once the empire of the Seleucidae.

§ 8. Meantime Mithradates had passed on to Panti-
Last Plans of Mithradates capaeum in the Crimea, and set himself at once to raise yet another army. He had still treasures enough to equip a fleet and pay an army of 36,000 men, but it was the last levy of his long harassed possessions and largely composed of emancipated slaves. It was said that he designed to march westward up the Danube valley, raise the warlike tribes of those regions, and with them at his back break through into Italy by way of Aquileia (*Aquileia*). But his subjects were weary of him, his ill-success, and his exactions. Disaffection
His End was rife amongst them, and broke out at last at Phanagoria, where the garrison revolted under the leadership of Castor. The revolt spread rapidly amongst the Bosporan towns, abetted by the presence of the Roman blockading squadrons, and when the old king's blind wrath forced his son Pharnaces to join the rebels, Mithradates had to acknowledge that his end was come. It was in 63 B.C. that he compelled his family and harem to take poison, and slew himself over their bodies. So ended, after fifty years of restless activity, the career of the only Asiatic who had as yet endangered the empire of Rome in the East.

§ 9. The empire of the Seleucidae, originally stretching
State of Syria. from the Indus to the Aegean and from the Euxine to Egypt, had rapidly fallen to pieces. The beginning of the end of it came when the Romans entered Asia, and according to their usual policy established a number of its dependent districts as autonomous kingdoms in alliance with Rome. Then followed the rise of

Armenia and Parthia, and Seleucus' line came to all purposes to an end when Tigranes annexed all that lay to the south-west of Tigranocerta as far as the Gulf of Issus. These acquisitions had been abandoned when Lucullus entered Armenia (69 B.C.), and the withdrawal of the Armenians had been followed by the rise of a score of petty Arab chiefs, each with his own city fortress, by the aggressions of the Jews under the Maccabean princes, and by the extension of the power of the Nabathæi whose capital was Petra (*Wady Mûsa*), and whose dominion stretched all along the east of Palestine and far south into the Arabian peninsula. From the frontiers of Cilicia to those of Egypt the whole country was in a state of constant war and anarchy.

Pompeius' remedy was drastic and effective: he annexed Syria as a Roman province. Its limits were
Its Annexation. of necessity vague to the eastward where it merged into the great Arabian desert, but a line drawn from Nicephorium to Palmyra (*Tadmor*), and thence through Damascus to Tyre, approximately indicates the frontier to the east and south. The north-eastern boundary was the Euphrates as far as Sophene, while the remainder of its
And Limits. landward boundaries coincided with those of Cilicia and Cappadocia. It thus included Commagene and confronted the growing power of Parthia. On the south the Jews still remained independent, but they had for many years been drifting gradually under the dominion of Rome. The nominees of Lucullus in Antioch and Commagene, and all other claimants to the throne of Seleucus, were once and for all set aside.

The annexation was of course not effected without the support of the legions, but there was no resistance worthy of the name. The Arab sheik of Damascus, Abgarus and the Mardani, Sampsiceramus of Hemesa (*Hems*), others of lesser note in Byblus, Tripolis, and Lysias, and the mountain tribes of the Ityracans, were all constrained to acknowledge the Roman supremacy. The legate L. Afranius had already in 65 B.C. reduced the Arabs of Osroene, south of Sophene, thus completing the security of the frontier as far as the kingdom of the Jews (64 B.C.). The latter people were com-

pelled to restore the old rule of high priests. An expedition of the legate M. Scaurus against the Nabathaeans, the active enemy of the Jews, ended in a diplomatic arrangement whereby their prince Aretas became a client of Rome.

§ 10. The old kingdoms of Mithradates and Niconedes Bithynia-Pontus, became the new province of Bithynia-Pontus, saving that the most easterly portions, as far as the frontiers of Iberia and Armenia, were added to the territories of Deiotarus, tetrarch of the Galatian Tolistoboi, in reward for his services in the late war. He was in fact advanced to the position of the most powerful dependent prince in Asia, his duty being to guard the fords of the Upper Euphrates against Armenian and Parthian aggressions. The frontier of the Lower Euphrates towards Syria was protected by a dozen or so of client-emirs and princes, while Abgarus of Osroene acted as an advanced post far into the Parthian territories. Pamphylia and Isauria were included in the province of Cilicia, while Crete became a separate province.

§ 11. Thus the Euphrates became definitely the eastward Results frontier of Roman occupation—a frontier covered either by the legions of Syria or by the presence of client-princes. To complete the security of his new arrangements Pompeius should have settled matters with Parthia. In true Roman fashion Phraates had been used as a tool against Pontus and Armenia, and was now discarded and purposely crippled. Not only was much of Mesopotamia restored to Tigranes, who became a fief of Rome, but though it had been arranged that the Euphrates should be the Parthian frontier, Pompeius had made alliances at will all along its eastern bank in order to have a line of friendly states separating Phraates from the river. Moreover it was a gratuitous personal insult when Pompeius arrested the younger Tigranes and his wife, the daughter of Phraates, and reserved them to grace his triumph. The Parthians were justly indignant at the insult.

For the rest Pompeius gave back to Asia peace and a measure of prosperity. He founded scores of new towns, many of which rose to opulence, and he tried his utmost to encourage commerce, trade, and agriculture. Unluckily he

could not do away with the money-lender and the tax-farmer. It was not until thirty years later that one arose strong enough to do this. Pompeius triumphed at Rome on his forty-eighth birthday, September 28, 61 B.C., paying into the treasury two millions of gold and silver. He did not guess that he was laying up treasure to be used to his destruction by his rival Caesar.

CHAPTER VI.

HOME POLITICS, 66—62 B.C.

§ 1. Pompeius and the Democracy: Caesar leader of the Democracy: Case of Rabirius—§ 2. L. Sergius Catilina: Dangerous Social Condition of Rome—§ 3. The First Conspiracy, 66 B.C.: Complicity of Caesar and Crassus not proven.—§ 4. The Second Conspiracy: Consulship of Cicero.—§ 5. The Bill of Rullus: its meaning.—§ 6. The Third Conspiracy: Rising in Etruria: Cicero denounces the Conspiracy: Execution of the Conspirators.—§ 7. Criticism of the Narrative: Attitude of Caesar and Crassus.—§ 8. End of Catilina: the Legal Aspect of Cicero's Action.

§ 1. It has been said that one reason why the more keen-sighted of the democrats acquiesced so readily in the powers given to Pompeius by the Gabinian and Manilian laws, was their desire to have him out of the way, while they looked about for the means of creating a military power which should counterbalance his own. The new charter of democracy had only been wrested from the optimates under fear of violence, and by the same fear it would have to be maintained. There was a growing feeling in the democratic circles that Pompeius was drifting over to the senatorial side, and that their security depended upon either keeping him loyal to themselves, or putting themselves in such a position as should be secure against any attack from him when he returned with his Asiatic legions. The latter was the safer and more desirable course, but the difficulty was to find an excuse for another extraordinary command.

Caesar was curule aedile in 65 B.C. He was already deeply in debt, but his own confidence and the confidence which he inspired in others enabled him to raise money enough to furnish the usual games on a scale of unprecedented magnificence, which won him yet greater favour with the people. Moreover, when on the way home from Spain (67 B.C.), he had spent some time in Northern Italy canvassing the Transpadanes, who alone of the peoples in the Peninsula were not admitted to the full franchise: by promising them his interest in securing this boon he put them all at his back, and many of them doubtless

came to Rome and lent him the support of their presence and an occasional illegal vote. On the strength of his popularity in his aedilicate, Caesar ventured to demand that there should be appointed a commissioner with wide powers to settle the affairs of Egypt. He intended to secure his own appointment, for the situation and wealth of Egypt were alike calculated to recruit his exhausted purse and to place him in a position to rival Pompeius. The scheme fell through, partly because of the opposition of the Senate which saw clearly what was its drift, partly because Crassus, censor in this year, was also a competitor for the post. It was at this time that the tribune, C. Papius, at the Senate's initiative, passed a bill to expel all non-citizens from Rome, probably to deprive Caesar of the possible violent support of the Transpadanes. This was the Senate's reply to the proposal of Crassus as censor to enrol the Transpadanes as citizens. Caesar acquiesced, for he was

not the man to spoil his chances by premature action. He got himself appointed as a quaesitor—president of a criminal *quaestio*—in the following year, and utilised his office to still further insult the optimates by bringing to trial and convicting two of them (*see* p. 92) on the score of long-forgotten violence on Sulla's behalf. Such procedure was not a mere piece of spite: it gave public witness to the illegality of the measures whereby the nobles had been restored to their supremacy by the dictator. With the same purpose the tribune T. Labienus, in 63 B.C., indicted the senator Rabirius for the murder of the popular tribune Saturninus, thirty-seven years before (100 B.C.),

It was notorious that Rabirius was not the murderer, but

Rabirius.

Caesar doubtless never meant that his victim should be condemned, his only object being to emphasise the sanctity of the tribunate, and to remind the people that it alone possessed the power of putting a citizen to death. Cicero was counsel for the defence, and the trial ended in a fiasco which satisfied every one. The democrats gained yet another point in this year, when the *Lex Domitia* of 104 B.C. was re-enacted, and the power of filling up vacancies in the priesthood was thus restored to the tribes. This was the year of Cicero's consulship, an event which is bound up with the story of the Conspiracy of Catilina.

§ 2. Upon scarcely any event in the history of the later

The Republic is there so much divergence of opinion
Catilinarians. as upon this conspiracy. Its very existence has

been denied by some, while others have found in it something far more formidable than seems admissible. The Romans themselves never knew the truth, for their sole authority for most of the alleged details was the language of Cicero, who had every interest in making out the affair to be as desperate as possible. L. Sergius Catilina was a bankrupt patrician, but not a noble. His character was bad, for he had been impeached both for extortion in his province, and for sacrilege in an intrigue with a vestal virgin; but he had escaped on each occasion, and we are not compelled to believe with implicit faith the infamous crimes which Cicero lays to his charge. It is certain, however, that he had been one of Sulla's bloodhounds, and equally certain that he had no reason to stand loyally by the senatorial party. Neither had he any interest in supporting the equestrian order: rather, as having everything to gain and nothing to lose, he may have looked upon the pillage of that class as offering the only means for recruiting his fortunes. The long years of violence and revolution through which the city had passed, and more especially the recollection of the days when fortunes were made by proscriptions, must have left the city filled with men to whom riot offered a congenial and easy means to wealth. Most of all would this be the case with those who were ambitious, or who desired office as a means to money-making, yet could not afford the heavy cost of

canvassing whereby alone office was obtainable. Even among the optimates there must have been many men whose position compelled them to live at a ruinous pace, and who would gladly stave off threatened insolvency by any means however violent; and others who would go any length to recover the senatorial supremacy recently wrested from them. Amongst the lowest classes, too, there were, as always, scores of desperadoes who recollected regretfully the days when the streets ran with the blood of rich men, slain on plea of their Marian or Sullan leanings; scores who brooded in disappointment over the bloodless character of the recent democratic revolution; scores, too, to whom that revolution had given back the impecunious liberty of proletarians, living a hand-to-mouth existence from the gratuities of the corn doles and the bribes pocketed at every recurring election or legislative comitia. There must have been a large leaven of discharged veterans who laughed at bloodshed, slaves who were ready to purchase liberty by crime, and—most dangerous of all—young men of birth and wealth who were weary of having nothing to do, and eager for any field in which to display their reckless daring. In fine, with the exception perhaps of the equites to whom any disturbance was distasteful as menacing the security of property and the prosperity of trade, every class of society could muster hundreds of discontented men to whom revolution would be welcome less for any definite object than for its numberless possibilities. These were the men of whom Catilina is alleged to have been the leader, and if they were all classed as democrats it was perhaps only because the authorities for the conspiracy were men whose political views led them to hate democracy. To a Cicero or a Catulus the name of democrat probably stood for everything despicable and desperate. As we shall see, there appears to be small reason for identifying the programme of the Catilinarians—if indeed they had one worthy of the name—with that of either Caesar or of the bulk of his less sagacious partisans. On the other hand it is quite conceivable that Caesar and Crassus and many of their followers were to some extent aware of what was on foot, and in it a possible means to their own ends.

§ 3. It was in 66 B.C. that Catilina first determined to ^{The Conspiracy} seek restoration for his failing fortunes by ^{First Plot} means of the consulship. Cæsar was an example of a man who could afford to maintain office on the most magnificent scale, albeit overwhelmed with debt. Catilina would probably find no great difficulty in meeting the necessary expenditure, and once in office he might rely upon zealous support in any measures which offered to relieve the debtor from his creditors' claims, while in due course he would pass on to the governorship and plunder of a province. But chance provided him with tools whom he could use for this end with less cost to himself. The consuls-elect for 65 B.C., P. Cornelius Sulla and P. Autronius Paetus, had been convicted of electoral bribery, deprived of the consulship, and ejected from the Senate. Chagrin made them, or Autronius at least, ready listeners to Catilina's suggestions, and a plot was formed for the assassination of L. Aurelius Cotta and L. Manlius Torquatus, the men by whom they were replaced. The plot failed (65 B.C.), and rumours began to get about. Suspicion fell upon Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, a quaestor for this year, as a dangerous malcontent, and the Senate took the precaution to send him to Spain, just as they had once before sent Pompeius thither to be out of the way. Catilina was foiled for the time, but he foresaw a distinct gain in Piso's position. Spain had furnished Sertorius with the sinews for eight years of war, and he might hope that it would do equal service to Piso and himself.

It is possible to find a great deal more behind these simple facts. Rumour grows in inverse proportion to its basis of certainty, and Rome was full of wild stories of which the favourite version was that Catilina had intended, in the event of the success of his designs, to get Crassus declared Dictator with Cæsar as his Master of Horse. Even Mommsen accepts as a fact the criminal complicity of both these leaders. But it is very unlikely that Catilina's plot was as yet so far-reaching as to give him any hope of carrying out such a design. On the other hand it is quite conceivable that, as the news of the conspiracy got abroad

Complicity of
Cæsar and
Crassus not
Proven.

and was magnified into a crisis of unknown danger, men who disliked Crassus and Caesar hurried to the conclusion that they were implicated, and men who disliked Catilina and revolution spoke of one or both of these party leaders as the men to whom ought to be intrusted the task of guarding the State. The equites would of course advocate Crassus, the democrats Caesar. But we may reasonably doubt whether Crassus would have lent any countenance to a revolution which threatened the security of all wealth and property, and whether Caesar would have allowed such blundering in any design to which he was privy; and finally, whether the anti-senatorial party was as yet in so desperate a plight as to resort to the aid of a handful of desperadoes with neither name, funds, organisation, nor armies at their back. The fact that Catilina was left practically unmolested shows that the Senate viewed the whole thing as an alarmist's scare.

§ 4. But Catilina did not remain idle. He set himself to enlist further members in his enterprise, and to tamper with the malcontent Italians and disbanded veterans throughout Italy. By the time of the consular elections for 63 B.C., which would be held in the summer or autumn of 64 B.C., he felt strong enough to come forward in person as a candidate for the consulship. Amongst the candidates were Cicero and the senatorian C. Antonius, an ex-Sullan and a man of more than doubtful loyalty to his party. But the people who had in this very year (64 B.C.) marked their opinion of Sulla and his men by the condemnation of L. Bellienus and L. Luscius, were not likely to vote for Catilina, who had been also arraigned, though unsuccessfully, at the same time. He failed to secure election: Cicero was returned unanimously, and his colleague was C. Antonius. Cicero owed his victory to various causes: he had made it his policy to court the favour of the country voters, who regarded his victory—*novus homo* as he was—as a triumph for themselves; he could rely upon the support of the equites; and the Senate, knowing the weakness of its own candidates, for once swallowed its pride and assisted at the return of a man who was indeed only a provincial and non-noble, but was avowedly

a partisan of Pompeius and of the Senate in one. As for Antonius, his election was, so far as it went, a triumph for the conspirators; but it must have been mainly effected by bribery, and by working the electioneering clubs, with which at this date almost all success or defeat rested.

§ 5. On December 10, 64 B.C., the tribunes for 63 B.C. took office, and the democrats at once showed their intentions by promulgating, under the name of the tribune P. Servilius Rullus, an agrarian law of unusual character.

There were to be elected at once ten commissioners with special military and judicial powers, supported by two hundred equestrian legates of their own choosing. Their candidature was to be made in person, and the election was to be by the votes of seventeen out of the thirty-five tribes. Their duties were to be the foundation of colonies in Italy for the relief of the Roman poor. For this purpose they were to appropriate whatever remained of the state-lands in Campania, without eviction or constraint of existing tenants or occupiers; and further, under the same limitations as to constraint, whatever other lands they could acquire by regular and fair purchase. The funds for such purchases were to be raised by selling all state-property in the provinces (*e.g.*, the old royal-domains of Macedonia, Pontus, etc.), by the tribute now accruing from the new provinces organised by Pompeius in the East, from the booty obtained by Pompeius in the same quarter, and by dealing with any other territories which had come under control of the Empire since 88 B.C.

The proposal was a clever bid for popular favour and for that extraordinary command which the democratic leaders had failed to secure in the matter of Caesar's demand for a commission to settle Egypt. It was intended to leave Pompeius, whose fault was less his uncertain attitude than his monopoly of military force, face to face with a board of ten democratic leaders, acting of course under the guidance of Caesar; for the clause as to personal canvassing made it impossible for Pompeius to be elected as one of the commissioners. Further, the clauses as to the raising of funds, threatened to transfer from him to the democrats the fruits of all his victories and arrangements from the point of view of money. There was no definite statement as to any military power to be raised by the commission, but while they would have a reasonable plea for raising whatever forces they desired for protecting

them in the discharge of their duties, they would find all necessary funds in the practically uncontrolled possession of the revenues of Syria and the spoils of Pompeius, and they would use the colonies which they might found as so many recruiting grounds. They were to hold office for five years, and as Pompeius' task was already practically accomplished, there could be no excuse for his retaining his army and possibly hampering their movements. The clause as to "possessions put under the control of the State since 88 B.C." would include the much-coveted Egypt. Finally, the definite assurance that there should be no eviction or violent enforcement of purchase was a bid for the support of the Italians; the mere mention of colonies secured the support of the proletariat of the city; the favour of the equites was bidden for by offering to them the filling up of the posts of the 200 legates; and the control of the selection of commissioners was practically secured by restricting the ballot to 17 tribes which might be easily bribed or intimidated.

But the bill collapsed completely. The Senate, of course, opposed it in a body; Cicero built up upon it an alarmist oration which went far to discredit it with the commons; the populace themselves did not wish for allotments so long as they could live on somehow with the aid of the corn-doles and the price of their votes; and the equites were not likely to find in filling the posts of legates any sufficient recompense for democratic interference with the finances of half of the Roman possessions.

§ 6. Catilina's repulse in the matter of the consulship had driven him to extremities, for he might at any moment expect the return of Pompeius from Asia, and such an event would render quite impossible any *coup* on his part, the more as his fellow-conspirator Cn. Piso had been recently murdered in Spain. If he was to succeed at all, he must strike quickly. His canvass of the malcontents beyond the walls, and especially in Etruria, was promising, and he found in one C. Manlius, an ex-centurion of Sulla, an active recruiting officer. Within the city he continued to seek allies in every grade of society. His desperation forced him to bid high for favour, and it

Last Plot.

was rumoured that, if successful, he would cancel all existing debts. It was never difficult in the Rome of this era to find desperadoes to do the bidding of a man of daring, least of all when he offered bribes so great as *novae tabulae* ("fresh account-books") and a proscription. It became fairly evident that formidable mischief was brewing.

At the elections in 63 B.C. Catiline again failed to secure election to the consulship, and this reverse Rising in
Etruria drove him to desperation. On October 27, C. Manlius openly took up arms near Faesulae (*Fiesole*), in Etruria, but the other centres of discontent were taken by surprise and by no means ready for action. Catilina's every movement had been betrayed to Cicero through the medium of Fulvia, mistress of one of the conspirators; and on the news of the rising in Etruria he hastened to urge the Senate to declare Catilina a public enemy, together with his more notable colleagues, the praetor-designate P. Lentulus Sura, C. Cethegus, P. Gabinius Capito, L. Statilius, L. Cassius, and the deposed consul P. Autronius Paetus. But the Senate hesitated: it had indeed no evidence upon which to act, and if the conspiracy were really as wide-reaching as Cicero declared it to be, its outbreak would only be hastened by any violence offered to its chiefs. However, the rising of Manlius was a tangible fact, and the Senate ordered C. Antonius to take the field against the revolutionists with what troops he could collect. Such an order was seemingly a repetition of the folly whereby Lepidus had been commissioned to put down his own attempt at revolution, but Cicero had won over Antonius to the cause of the Senate by allowing him to have Macedonia for his province when proconsul, although this province had fallen to Cicero. As for Catilina, not daring to leave the management of affairs in the city to less capable or notorious hands, he braved all Cicero's outcries and moved about as unconcerned as ever. If he was a conspirator, he was a very bold one.

But as Cicero was the life and soul of the movement against him—for Caesar and Crassus kept suspiciously quiet—against Cicero he now directed his first attack. On November 7 an attempt was made

to assassinate the consul, but it miscarried, thanks to the good services of Cicero's spies. On November 8 Cicero told the story of this attempt in the Senate, yet even then Catilina had the courage to take his seat and listen to his opponent's denunciations. But Cicero's action had at last aroused both conspirator and Senate to activity: Catilina left for Etruria; the Senate passed a decree declaring him and his colleagues public enemies unless they should have laid down their arms by a stated date. Yet nothing was done towards arresting his colleagues in the city, though if Cicero is to be believed everything was prepared for firing Rome by night in a dozen places and admitting Catilina with his levies. But nothing happened. To all seeming Cicero was making a mountain out of a molehill, and seeking to create an imaginary scandal which should irremediably damage the democratic cause.

Whatever the facts, Cicero contrived to effect his object. The Gauls of the Narbonese had long been suffering from the effects of heavy tribute, forced levies for Spanish service, and the usual extortions of governors and money-lenders. At the present moment there was in the city an embassy of the Allobroges seeking some alleviation of their nation's distress. They had met with no success in their negotiations with the Senate, and were tempted to join the conspiracy. At the critical moment they were dissuaded, and revealed everything to the government. They agreed to secure documents which should inculpate the Catilinarians, and were leaving the city with these in their possession when they were arrested by Cicero's orders. On the following morning the Senate authorised the arrest of the

Execution of conspirators incriminated by these despatches,
Conspirators. and on December 5, after a long and wordy debate, a small majority of the house decided for their execution. Lentulus, Cethegus, Gabinius, Statilius, and Ceparius were strangled in the Tullianum. The leader of those who advocated the death-penalty was Cato; his chief opponent was Caesar, who pleaded for some more merciful sentence. We are told that the equites supported Cicero, who put into force Cato's resolution, to a man, that he was enthusiastically greeted by the mob, and that the Senate

hailed him as *Pater Patriae*, the second founder of his country; while Caesar barely escaped being lynched for his more moderate attitude by the younger members of the Equestrian Order.

§ 7. Now there is no evidence to show how the alleged documents came into the possession of the Criticism of Story of the Allobroges. It was natural enough that their discontent should have suggested to the conspirators their usefulness in the projected rising, and it is equally natural that they should have preferred to win the favour of the government by betraying the plot; but there must always remain the fact that it was on the word of Cicero alone that the story about the Allobroges was made the ground for putting to death the men whom his fervid orations demanded as victims. Further, the alleged conduct of the populace, if true, clearly disproves the theory that the conspiracy found any extensive support amongst the lower classes. Changeable as the Roman mob always was, we know of nothing which could, in the space of forty-eight hours, have turned them from abettors to opponents of Catilina.

Not the least difficult problem in the whole story of Position of Catilina is to say to what extent Caesar and Caesar, etc. Crassus were connected with the conspiracy. Rumour is said to have asserted their complicity, and Mommsen takes it as certain that they lent what aid they could from the first. Now it is quite conceivable that either or both should have stooped to conspiracy for securing their ends, but it is scarcely conceivable that they would have selected or employed as their instrument a man who seemingly possessed no other qualification than his desperation, and was apparently devoid of either tact or decision. It is quite incredible that as early as 66 B.C. either Caesar or Crassus should have been reduced to such extreme measures; and it is no less incredible that Caesar should have committed the folly of believing that such an incendiary outbreak as that which Catilina is alleged to have planned could win the sympathy of any respectable body of the citizens. We may go further and argue that Crassus, the representative of the moneyed class which would

suffer most heavily in such an outbreak, was the very last person in Rome to countenance it. We must not forget that our only contemporary authorities for the conspiracy are Cicero and Sallust: the former was from the outset prejudiced in favour of the Senate and the equites; the latter was not likely to say anything derogatory about his friend and patron Caesar. The former, therefore, had every reason to romance, especially to the discredit of the leaders of the opposite party; the latter had very good reason for hiding the truth. Sallust tells us that certain of the senators endeavoured to trump up a "false" charge of complicity against Crassus and Caesar, and did their best to spread such a belief. Cicero alleges that the informer Q. Curius, to whom he owed his professed knowledge of the conspiracy, volunteered similar incriminatory evidence, and that one L. Vettius even lodged a legal information against Caesar; but that the Senate refused to hear Curius, and that Vettius failed to appear when he ought to have supported his charge. Now it is easy to understand that it was dangerous even for Cicero, much more for Vettius, to attack a man of Caesar's popularity; while, on the other hand, many of the senators would gladly have seen him so attacked, and the spy Curius might think to win further favour by offering to do it. Indeed the whole story reads like the famous Popish Plot of Titus Oates, and only strengthens the suspicion that Curius was playing the part of Oates and had here gone too far. In fact there was no reason for either Caesar or Crassus to support in good faith an attempt such as Catilina's appears to have been. The least improbable view appears to be this: Catilina was seeking his own advantage only, and was neither able nor willing to lead a party plot; the Senate somehow became aware that there was trouble brewing; Cicero, conscientiously or with the design of making himself agreeable to the Senate, played upon the fears of the Senate; the knave Curius played upon Cicero's fears to his own advantage, and when he had exhausted all other available alarms endeavoured to enlarge the affair into a grand democratic *coup*, supported by the avowed democratic leaders; the better class of senators saw the absurdity of the sug-

gestion, the worse class dared not risk all by involving Cæsar in the affair. Just as there is room for regarding both Curius and Cicero either as sincere or as more or less self-seeking, so we may maintain that Caesar and Crassus either—as is most probable—had nothing to do with the affair * or—very improbably—knew of it, and let it take its own course on the chance that circumstances might demand the interference of an armed authority for the defence of the State, and that such authority might fall to them.

§ 8. Catilina had by this time joined Manlius, near ^{Fall of} Faesulæ. He had intended to move towards ^{Catilina.} Rome, so as to be able to act in concert with Lentulus' rising within the walls; but on hearing of the of the conspirators he had no resource but to fly. he had lost the only means of escape, for, while the consul C. Antonius barred the road southward, the prætor Q. Metellus Celer had moved from Picenum and occupied the passes of the Apennines, over which the rebels might have escaped towards the Alps. It was the depth of winter, and all movement was difficult; but at length, in the last days of January 62 B.C., the army of Antonius, commanded for the time being by his legate M. Petreius, a resolute and experienced soldier, brought Catilina's two badly-armed legions to bay at the foot of the Apennines near Pistoria (*Pistoja*). Here was fought the battle which ended Catilina's fortunes and his life. His troops perished almost to a man, for none would turn to flee. Their leader himself set them an example of desperate but unavailing bravery. Antonius received the honour of a *supplicatio* for his achievement, and the conspiracy was at an end; for the isolated risings in Picenum and Bruttium† scarcely deserved the name.

But the affair of Catilina was destined to have far-reaching effects in the life of Cicero. By the ^{Legality of} ^{Cicero's Action.} Lex Valeria of 509 B.C., a measure often subsequently confirmed, it was decreed that no citizen could

* This is emphatically Long's view. Similarly Merivale, with less confidence. Warde Fowler adopts the view that they were aware of the plot, but kept their knowledge to themselves with a view to making such use of it as might be.

One of these was put down only as late as 60 B.C. by Q. Cicero, brother of the orator.

be put to death without appeal to the people. The people alone, therefore, assembled in its centuries, possessed the power of life and death within the city walls, and when it passed the final sentence the condemned man was put to death in the traditional way—*more maiorum*. From these facts it came about that all cases involving total loss of *caput* must be brought before the people; and also that the execution of a citizen was practically an unknown event in Rome. For, as the population grew and actions multiplied, the people deputed its authority to various *quaestiones*, and these commission courts were never entrusted with the power of inflicting the penalty of death. Again, it was a prime fact in the constitution that the Senate had no power over the lives of citizens, and that even the consuls' *imperium iudiciale* could not touch the life of a citizen within the walls.

If then Lentulus and his colleagues were *cives* at the time of their execution, their death was a violation of the law, for which the responsibility rested morally indeed with the Senate which had decreed it, but legally with Cicero who carried out the decree.

On the other hand the Senate had itself declared the condemned men to be *perduelles*, traitors and public enemies, and therefore Cicero might argue they were no longer *cives*.

But, as has been said, the power of taking away a citizen's *caput* was vested solely in the people; and, widely as the Senate had been allowed to trench upon the prerogatives of the people, this power of life and death had throughout Roman history been again and again reiterated as the prerogative of the people alone. If the Catilinarians were *perduelles* that fact was to be determined by the centuries or their representative the *quaestio de vi*, and not by the Senate.

Against this Cicero might argue that, the office of dictator being in abeyance, and it being now a matter of custom to charge the consuls conjointly with the exercise of the dictatorial powers in any grave crisis,* he and his colleague had been so empowered and were therefore free

* By the *senatus consultum ultimum*. The formula is well known—*Videant consules ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat*.

to visit even citizens with death. But though this view of the *senatus consultum ultimum* met with favour among the senatorial party, its legality was always denied by the democrats.

In fact, the occasion had brought to light one of the many contradictions in the Roman constitution. On the one hand Cicero, as commissioned to use the dictatorial powers, was within his rights in executing the prisoners; on the other, it was contrary to law to assail the life of any citizen without the sanction of the people. Cicero was at once right and wrong, and moreover, apart from the mere question of legality, the crisis was grave enough—if all was true that Cicero's informants alleged to be the facts—to condone stern measures; but unfortunately it came at the very time when the people were triumphantly parading the rehabilitation of their own jurisdiction as vindicated by the condemnation of Luscius and Bellienus, and by the impeachment of Rabirius. It came at a time when the democratic party was anxiously looking for some handle against the government, and it furnished a notable instance of senatorial illegality, whether morally defensible or not.

CHAPTER VII.

HOME POLITICS, 62—57 B.C.

§ 1. Designs of Pompeius: he Quarrels with the Senate.—§ 2. Caesar and Nepos.—§ 3. Clodius and the Mysteries.—§ 4. Return of Pompeius: his Helplessness: Return of Caesar.—§ 5. The First Triumvirate.—§ 6. Agrarian Law of Caesar: the Lex Vatinia.—§ 7. The Triumvirs and the Parties.—§ 8. Tribunate of Clodius: Banishment of Cicero and Dismissal of Cato.—§ 9. Clodius Quarrels with Pompeius.—§ 10. Recall of Cicero: he Attaches Himself to Pompeius: Pompeius and the Corn-supply.

§ 1. MEANTIME Pompeius had taken the place of Catilina as the centre of public interest. One of the Attitude of Pompeius. tribunes of 62 B.C. was Q. Metellus Nepos, a man despatched from Pompeius' camp in 63 B.C. to watch affairs in his interests. Having now completed the commissions imposed upon him by the laws of Gabinius and Manilius, and having completed the settlement of the East, Pompeius was ready to return. Conscious, however, that his lustre endured only while he was on active service, he was casting about for a new sphere in which to play the general, and the news of Manlius rising in Etruria seemed to offer exactly such an opening as he desired. He knew that he was out of favour with the democrats, and he knew that the Senate, though it feared him, was anxious to curry favour with him: Nepos was instructed to put forward Pompeius as the true servant of the optimates, and to secure for him the command against the Catilinarian army and the consulate for 61 B.C. But if the democrats dreaded Pompeius they were too crafty to break with him,

and had on several occasions voted him honours which cost them nothing and pleased him greatly; while ^{He Quarrels} _{with the Senate.} on the other hand the Senate, finding spokesmen for its true feelings in L. Lucullus and Q. Metellus Creticus, both sore from Pompeius' high-handed interference with themselves, openly showed its dislike of the only man able to coerce it. Nepos was told that the Senate had no need of a new commander against Catilina, but was able to manage that affair by help of its good officers Antonius and Metellus Celer. Its chief, M. Cato, had secured a seat on the college of tribunes for the year, and surpassed himself in his violent opposition to Nepos.

§ 2. Caesar and his party were delighted. If the Senate ^{Pompeius and} _{Caesar.} would not aid Pompeius, he must of necessity find allies amongst the democrats, and if he could not be crushed, the next best thing was to have him as an ally. Moreover, Caesar knew that, long before Pompeius could arrive, all need for armed action against Catilina would have passed away. Accordingly, he came forward eagerly to welcome Nepos. Praetor for the year 62 B.C., he opened his campaign by impeaching the respectable Q. Catulus for malversation in his task of restoring the Capitoline temple destroyed in the Sullan wars of 83 B.C., and by proposing that the completion of the work should be left to Pompeius. It was exactly the kind of empty compliment which tickled Pompeius, and at once won the friendship of Nepos, who forthwith arrayed himself against the Senate, and most of all against Cicero, whom he stigmatised publicly as a murderer. When Nepos attempted to put to the vote his proposals as to Pompeius, there was a furious riot led by Cato. The Senate succeeded so far as to feel emboldened to suspend both Caesar and Nepos. Caesar ignored the suspension and was soon restored by the Senate: Nepos returned to Asia and told Pompeius that he might now justly pose as the vindicator of the two ancient rights of civic appeal and of tribunicial sanctity. But again Pompeius' courage failed him. Had he entered Italy at once he might have done as he liked, and forthwith taken up the monarchy, for there was none to oppose him. He dared not act up to the dictates of his ambition: he

only landed late in 62 B.C., and when he did so he at once, to all men's surprise, disbanded his legions. Caesar had again judged his man correctly, and he sailed for Spain with a light heart, there to act as *propraetor* for 61 B.C.

§ 3. Before he sailed, however, he had been made the *Clodius* and the indirect object of another unsavoury scandal. *Mysteries.*

In December, 62 B.C., the festival of the *Bona Dea* was celebrated according to custom in the *Regia*, or palace of the chief pontiff, that is of Caesar, who had won a great victory over *Catulus* in his election to that priestly office in the preceding year. Caesar's wife, *Pompeia*, a distant relation of *Pompeius Magnus* and a grand-daughter of *Sulla*, had an admirer named *P. Clodius*, a dissolute young noble; he was a younger brother of that *Appius Clodius* who had acted as legate to *Lucullus* in Asia and had himself been the chief fomentor of the insubordination of *Lucullus'* legions. On the night of the festival, which was confined to females, *P. Clodius* was detected in female disguise in the *Regia*. Under less embittered circumstances the matter would have been of no political consequence: as it was, it seemed to offer an easy opening for senatorial spite, for *Clodius* was for some unknown reason a favourite with the people, and his partner in guilt was at once a relative of the great *Pompeius* and the wife of the democratic chief. Accordingly, the nobles lost no opportunity to magnify the sacrilege, resolved to make *Clodius* the scapegoat of their hatred for Caesar and *Pompeius*. Unfortunately, in their zeal to ensure his condemnation, they insisted upon establishing a special *quaestio*, intending thereby to secure a packed jury; but the mob understood at once that the matter was to be made a party-question and strenuously resisted the proposition, while Caesar cleared himself of all complicity by at once divorcing *Pompeia*, with the remark that a wife of his must be above suspicion. The Senate was balked in its attempt to diminish Caesar's popularity, but it was too far committed to drop the matter, although popular violence forced it to allow the trial to take place before a jury of the usual formation. It was foiled again, for the *populares* administered bribes so effectively that *Clodius* was acquitted in the face of the clearest evidence. He went

out of court breathing vengeance against his assailants, and most of all against Cicero, until now his friend, who had been compelled to give some evidence which upset the defendant's plea of an *alibi*. It was not until three years later that the full import of this trial was made clear.

§ 4. At about the date of the trial (January 61 B.C.), Pompeius arrived at Rome. He wished to gain three concessions,—a triumph, lands for his soldiery, and the confirmation in a mass of his measures in the East; and, according to law, he was compelled to remain without the walls until his triumph should be celebrated. But the Senate was not at all in a conciliatory mood: it was elated by its victory over Catilina, encouraged by Pompeius' incapacity, and pleased to watch the great general waiting impatiently at the gates until the Senate should graciously permit him to enter. Worse still, with the single exception of Cicero perhaps, Pompeius had no friends; every one either disliked, feared, or laughed at him, and by disbanding his troops he had deprived himself of his one unanswerable argument. For a whole year he waited with growing impatience, while the Senate cavilled over each detail of his settlement of the East, and took away all compliment from its grant of lands to his troops by associating in the grant the soldiery of his rival, Q. Metellus Creticus. He gained nothing when he spent money and influence in securing consulships for two of his creatures, M. Pupius Piso (61 B.C.) and L. Afranius (60 B.C.), for neither proved capable, and the latter failed signally to carry the *Lex Flavia* of the Pompeian tribune L. Flavius, intended to settle at once the question of the granting of lands. Caesar must have laughed to see his rival thus losing time and credit, while he himself was now advancing by leaps and bounds, and he must have blessed the folly of the optimates in thus losing their opportunity of winning that rival's support.

Caesar had found plenty to do in Further Spain, for there was seldom lack of excuse for action against the Lusitani. So vigorously did he deal with them that he not only paid off the greater portion of his enormous debts, but he could also demand a triumph. More than all, he learnt now for

a fact what he had doubtless long felt, that he had military capacities. When he reappeared in Italy in 60 B.C., he was legally in a position to sue for the consulship, and with the consulship he could easily find the means to secure that wide military command for which his party had been so long waiting.

§ 5. To secure election he must by law canvass in person. The Senate knew this, and determined to treat him as it was treating Pompeius—to keep him waiting outside the gates for his triumph until it was too late to seek election. Caesar was unlike Pompeius: he was content to forego his triumph, entered the city, and was returned head of the poll for 59 B.C. By the help of the whole electoral machinery the Senate was able to secure the election of one of its own body, M. Calpurnius Bibulus, as his colleague. Too late it learnt that it was powerless when isolated, and that its only possible allies had been secured to Caesar's interests. The rival parties, which had for eighteen months bickered to no purpose, were in a moment reduced to two, on the one side the Senate alone, and against it the whole array of the mob and the democrats, Pompeius, and the equites with Crassus. The three leaders had formed a coalition in which seemingly all the advantage was to belong to Crassus and Pompeius, while in reality all went to Caesar. Pompeius was to have his triumph, his allotments, and the ratification of his settlement of the East; Crassus and the equites were to receive certain concessions in a bad bargain they had made about the taxes,* concessions which the Senate, led by Cato, had rudely refused, thereby forcing the moneyed men to join hands with the democrats; Caesar was to have his consulship and a subsequent governorship. This coalition, commonly known as the First Triumvirate, marks a stage in the overthrow of the Senate. From this date (59 B.C.) the government of the Roman world passes uninterruptedly into the hands of individuals, until thirty years later it is established under the autocracy of the Caesars.

* It seems that some of them had made a contract for the farming of the revenues of Asia, which threatened to prove a heavy loss to them. They accordingly applied for a reconsideration of the matter, and thus the censors, supported by Cato, refused to hear of. Cicero was forced to support the equites, though he felt that their plea was both unbusinesslike and a bad precedent,

§ 6. Without leaders of ability, with no sure idea of their own aims, and with no allies or support, the nobles resisted with spiteful obstinacy. Agrarian Law of Caesar. Caesar was in all things deferential but firm. He brought before the Senate notice of the agrarian law, which was to include the provision of lands for Pompeius' troops. The law was moderate: it demanded only the surrender of the scanty lands of Capua,—all that was left of leasehold *Ager Publicus* in Italy—and the purchase of whatever other land might be necessary, without constraint or eviction, with funds accruing from Pompeius' recent conquests. Still more moderate was the action of Caesar in maintaining the old forms of constitutional procedure, and thus laying the bill before the Senate for its endorsement. Nevertheless it was thrown out, as was the decree confirming Pompeius' acts in the East, and as was that which concerned the equites. Caesar had expected as much: the nobles had only succeeded in making themselves more than ever obnoxious to all parties. The three bills were brought at once before the people, and passed of course; but their passing was attended by a furious riot, in which the veterans of Pompeius, with arms under their clothing, were ranged against the optimates; in which, too, both the efforts of the consul Bibulus to dissolve the assembly on the score of evil omens,* and the veto of Cato, were alike disregarded; and in which Lucullus was nearly killed, two tribunes badly injured, and the safety of Bibulus and Cato due only to the protection afforded them by Caesar. The execution of the agrarian law was intrusted to a board of twenty commissioners, amongst whom were Crassus and Pompeius. They granted as many as 20,000 allotments, mainly to the discharged legionaries, so that what Cicero had declaimed against in the law of Rullus was now a reality, and Capua had been erected to the position of a garrison town for the rising military despotism. Two other

* By the *Lex Aelia et Fufia* of 156 B.C., the magistrates were empowered to "observe the heavens" (*de caelo observare*), in order to discover whether the omens showed that the gods approved the business in hand. In other words it gave them power to prorogue any comitial business on the plea of religion, and of course proved a valuable political tool. The *locus classicus* for this electoral engine is to be found in Cic. *Philippic II.*, 2, 80.

bills of this date were the *Lex Iulia de Repetundis*, which reiterated the criminal nature of complicity in a provincial governor's extortions, and another recognising Ptolemy Auletes as King of Egypt—a bill which was said to have cost its subject 6000 talents to purchase.

It only remained to provide for Caesar's personal interests.

Lex Vatinia. The Senate, foreseeing that he aimed at a *provincia* wherein he might raise an army, had arranged that the province of the consuls of 59 B.C. should be that of superintending the repair of roads in Italy. Unluckily, it had no means of maintaining its arrangements. The tribune P. Vatinius brought in a bill by which Caesar was to be appointed for five years proconsular governor of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, with a force of three legions. For some years past there had been intermittent rumours of disturbances within and beyond the frontiers of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul—rumours which had of late grown more definite and alarming. It seemed only politic to provide for the security of the northern frontiers of Italy, and the bill was readily passed by the people. Before the year was ended the Senate itself added to this *provincia* the government of Transalpine Gaul with another legion. If rumour was to be believed, there would be some stern fighting in the Narbonese, and to the optimates' view it offered at least a chance for getting rid of Caesar.

§ 7. It must not be supposed that the triumvirate was *Attitude of the* viewed with pleasure even by the populace. *Parties.* They saw as clearly as the Senate that they were becoming the subjects of the tyranny of individuals in lieu of that of the senatorial corporation. But on the one hand the triumvirs were supported by Pompeius' veterans, by the legions which Caesar brought back from Spain, and by bands of hired ruffians under the leadership of P. Clodius, whose desire to be revenged on Cicero and the nobles had thrown him heart and soul into the cause of Caesar, and had led him to secure his adoption into a plebeian house as a means to obtaining the tribunate of 58 B.C. On the other hand the Senate was without a head, for Q. Catulus had died in 60 B.C., Cato was of no use as

anything save an obstructionist, and the consul Bibulus, after the failure of his attempt to work the omens against Caesar, retired into inactivity, and confined himself to declarations that every act of the triumvirs was invalid. Cicero alone was worth a thought, and him the coalition tried hard to buy over. Caesar in particular offered him a place amongst the twenty agrarian commissioners, or a post as legate under himself in Gaul, and, failing this, the honourable retirement of a *libera legatio* (the privileges of an ambassador without his duties). But Cicero, if he had no more honourable motive for refusal, dared not leave the senatorial party. He was content to believe that he had at any rate the goodwill of Pompeius. There were two political marriages this year: Caesar married his third wife Calpurnia, daughter of L. Calpurnius Piso, consul-elect for 58 B.C.; and he gave his daughter Julia in marriage to Pompeius. The other consul for 58 B.C. was Aulus Gabinius, a creature of Pompeius, so that the triumvirs could count on the good behaviour of both the chief magistrates for that year. One of the tribunes was P. Clodius.

§ 8. Clodius opened his year of office by a bid for the
 Tribune of favour of the mob from which he recruited his
 Clodius. ruffians: his first bill abolished the merely nominal sum still paid by the recipients of the corn-doles. A second bill put an end to such obstruction as that recently tried by Bibulus, for it abrogated the *Lex Aelia et Fufia*, and so rendered impossible the employment of the augural machinery as a political engine. His third measure put some restrictions upon the powers of the censors, while a fourth was to rescind a *senatus consultum* of 68 B.C., and again legalise the formation of clubs (*sodalicia*). These clubs were nominally chartered guilds with purposes purely social or religious, but they afforded a ready and sure means of influencing the political attitude of their members; and previous to the year 68 B.C. all comitial business, whether legislative or electoral, was notoriously managed by means of agents in the clubs. In that year they were declared illegal, as being merely a means to bribery, and in restoring them Clodius made a certain bid for the favour of the lower

classes, while he secured for himself and his party a prior claim upon their good services.

But Clodius' pet design was to overthrow Cicero. The execution of the Catilinarians had never been forgotten by the mob; while on the other hand the Senate and equites, who had approved it at the time, felt less enthusiasm for its author now that the danger was over. Indeed the nobles had never seen in Cicero anything more than a substitute for some better champion, and the orator had a bad habit of indulging in sarcasms which made him positive enemies no less than his ceaseless boasting wearied even his friends. His one idea was the service which he had rendered to the State in his consulship: this formed a theme in all his speeches, public and private, materials which he clothed in prose and verse, and which he thrust continually upon the notice of every historian and poet in Rome. The first line of his own poem on the subject—

Cedant arma togæ, concedat laurea laudi

became a proverb for Falstaffian braggadocio. The greatest merit suffers from over-advertisement, and the nobles especially were of the stuff to hate the man who had done them a benefit, especially if he did not belong to their own narrow circle. It is not surprising then that Clodius was able with little difficulty to pass a bill interdicting from fire and water any one who had put to death a Roman citizen without trial. Cicero was not mentioned by name, but every one knew that he was the person attacked. Undoubtedly he had supporters, but they were not bold enough to withstand the popularity, still less the bullies, of Clodius. The triumvirs, whose tool Clodius was, looked on calmly: all three wished the orator out of the way, Caesar because he knew that he was a dangerous opponent, Pompeius and Crassus for less honourable reasons, of which jealousy was the chief. Before the bill became law, Cicero, on the advice of Hortensius and Cato, yielded to his enemies and left the city, and on the same day Clodius carried another bill banishing him by name to a distance of 400 miles from Rome. He retired to Dyrrhachium (*Durazzo*), and there

gave way to a querulous despair which would be despicable in any one but a Roman with a Roman's love for his city. This was at the end of March 58 B.C.

It remained to get rid of Cato, for which purpose Clodius
And of Cato. carried yet another bill, appointing him commissioner to conduct the annexation of Cyprus. That island was the principality of a brother of Ptolemy Auletes, who had at least as much right to his sovereignty as had Auletes to that of Egypt, both being illegitimate;* but it seems he had been unlucky enough to offend Clodius, who thus revenged himself while he pleased his masters by ridding them of Cato's opposition, gratified Roman greed by adding to the empire a most fertile province, and had the further pleasure of forcing upon the only man in Rome who could boast of his integrity the conduct of a very dishonourable business. But Cato was not in a position to refuse. He went to Cyprus and did what he was commissioned to do. In March of this year Caesar also left Rome for his province, nor did he again enter the city until nine years later, and then he came as a conqueror.

§ 9. The withdrawal from Rome of Caesar, Cicero, and
Clodius Rules the Streets. Cato, in March 58 B.C., left the city to the tender mercies of Clodius, for it soon became apparent that neither Pompeius nor Crassus was able to control the unruly tribune who, while professing himself the tool of the triumvirs, belonged in reality to no party unless it were that of the proletariat, and who owned no policy other than his own likes and dislikes. Pompeius and Crassus were busy with the execution of the Agrarian Law, and each was growing daily more averse to the other. Between their jealousies and their duties they had no time to spare for Clodius. The latter, thanks to his interest in the *sodalicia*, to his freehanded bribery, and to his reckless indulgence of such lawless impudence as always attracts the lowest class, moved about the streets with an organised company of gladiators and desperadoes, who carried out his orders without scruple. One of his chief acts was to superintend the demolition of Cicero's house on the Palatine Hill, and of his villa at Tusculum. The spoils of the latter

* See Genealogical Table II.

were administered as a sop to the consul Gabinius; the site of the former was destined by Clodius for a town house of his own. To secure himself against possible retaliation in the future, he consecrated part of the ground to Liberty and erected thereon a temple to that goddess.

The Senate looked on in futile indignation. Too late ^{He Quarrels with Pompeius.} it repented of the exile of the only man who had shown any capacity on its behalf, and as early as June one of the tribunes obtained a unanimous *senatus consultum* in favour of Cicero's recall. This was of course blocked by another tribune when proposed to the people. Meantime, Clodius went from one violence to another. He quarrelled with Pompeius: Pompeius had brought to Rome as a hostage that Tigranes whose intrigues had led to the quarrel between his father, Tigranes of Armenia, and the Kings of Pontus and Parthia. The prince was living on parole in the city: Clodius wanted money, and assisted him to escape, doubtless for a valuable consideration in the future. Tigranes got away, but not before Clodius' ruffians had forcibly prevented the interference of his guardian, the praetor Flavius, in a fight on the Appian Way. There were rumours also that Clodius was bent on the assassination of Pompeius, and that dignitary at least found it well to stay at home. In October eight out of the ten tribunes made another unsuccessful attempt to obtain Cicero's recall, in fact that measure became the general means for the expression of anti-Clodian views. Further, the tribunes-elect P. Sestius and T. Annius Milo began to organise a body of retainers who should meet force with force and outdo Clodius' band.

§ 10. The consuls for 57 B.C. were both adherents of Pompeius: they were P. Cornelius Lentulus ^{Recall of Cicero.} Spinther and Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos, the tribune of 62 B.C. Lentulus' first act was to carry another decree of the Senate in Cicero's behalf. This again was blocked, for although Clodius was no longer tribune, he had two supporters in the new college. However, towards the end of January, the decree was brought before the people; but the only result was a battle in the Forum, in which some bloodshed occurred. This was followed by a

murderous attack upon P. Sestius, who narrowly escaped with his life despite his sacrosanct office. Milo retorted by indicting Clodius, now a private person, for riot, but the defendant had sufficient influence to get the move frustrated. So the quarrel dragged on, until at length Pompeius ventured to come forward as Cicero's champion. The Senate named a day for again moving his recall in the *Comitia Centuriata*, and invited his adherents from all parts of Italy to come to the poll. Milo held Clodius in check, and prevented any interruption of the proceedings, and on August 4 the bill was passed. Cicero was at the time at Dyrrhachium, having recently come thither from Thessalonica (*Saloniki*), where he had been the guest of his friend Cn. Plancius, quaestor to the governor of Macedonia. He crossed at once to Brundisium, and made, as it were, a triumphal progress through the peninsula to Rome. He had always great influence with the Italians. He entered Rome on September 4; on the morrow he thanked the Senate for their good offices, and then set himself to the double task of obtaining compensation for the loss of his house and property, and of showing his gratitude for Pompeius' aid.

The question of compensation involved the usual delays He Sides with Pompeius. of the law, but it was eventually decided in Cicero's favour: he recovered the site of his town-house, and a considerable portion of the value of the property destroyed; but now, and for some years subsequently, he was rather embarrassed financially, and he obtained from his wealthy friend, the eques T. Pomponius Atticus, some very useful assistance. There was less trouble with regard to Pompeius: the city had again been suffering from scarcity of supplies, probably because of a "corner" amongst the large grain-traders, and there was already a popular cry that Pompeius should put things to rights again as he had done in 67 B.C. Cicero became the spokesman of the general wish: his action might not please the equites Pompeius and the Corn Supply. or the extreme senatorials, but it won the goodwill of the masses and of Pompeius himself, and to the moderate senatorials it seemed a useful way of quieting Pompeius' restless craving for employment. It

was not the employment which he would have desired, for it gave him the command of no troops, no opportunity for winning military laurels, and no direct control over the treasury: all these had been included in a proposed *rogatio* of the tribune Messius, but the Senate threw it out as extravagant, and if Pompeius was the wire-puller, he was mean enough to pretend cordial acquiescence with the Senate when he saw that Messius' bill was unfavourably received. Ultimately he got a five-years' commission to look after the corn-supply of the city, with fifteen legates—one of them was to be Cicero—to assist him. It was a position only acceptable as better than the absolute political eclipse which surrounded Pompeius when not begirt with official grandeur. In fact, the greatness of Pompeius was always exactly so much as the State would accord to him: it was never so much as he desired, yet always more than he knew how to support. What he wanted, but had not the diplomacy to create or the courage to dispense with, was an excuse for an *imperium* like that of Caesar.

CHAPTER VIII.

CAESAR IN GAUL, 58—57 B.C.

§ 1. Gaul; its Geography and Condition.—§ 2. Sketch of Relations between Rome and the Gauls.—§ 3. Caesar's Motives.—§ 4. The Helvetii : the Battle of Bibracte.—§ 5. Ariovistus : the Battle of the Rhine.—§ 6. Conquest of Belgica : Battle of the Sambre.

§ 1. In the first chapter of Caesar's commentaries *De Bello*

Gaul : *Gallico* we are told that—
Geography and Condition. “Gaul, as a whole, falls into three divisions; inhabited respectively by the Belgae, the Aquitani, and the Celts—*Galli*,* as the Romans call them. The frontier of the Galli towards Aquitania is the Garumna (*Garonne*), towards Belgium it is the rivers Matrona (*Marne*) and Sequana (*Seine*).”

Western Switzerland, the land between and about the head-waters of the Rhenus (*Rhine*) and Rhodanus (*Rhone*), was also peopled by a Gallic tribe, the Helvetii.

As long back as 600 B.C. the Greeks of Phocaea had founded Massilia (*Marseilles*) at the mouth of the Rhone, for the great trade-route of Gaul lay along that river to the

* That is, Gauls. Their land (*Gallia*) included the subdivisions of (1) Galha Belgica or Belgium, corresponding generally to the modern Belgium and much of Holland; (2) Galha Celtica, Central France; (3) Aquitania, Aquitaine and S.W. France; (4) Galha Narbonensis and the *Provincia*, S.E. France; (5) Galha Cisalpina, the lands of the Italian Celts between the Alps and the rivers Rubico and Macra. The latter was again divided into Galha Cispadana and Transpadana, according as it lay N. or S. of the Padus (*Po*); and in contrast with it Galha Narbonensis was known as Galha Transalpina. Finally, Cisalpine Gaul was known as Galha Togata, the land of the Romanised Celts; Transalpine Gaul as Galha Braccata, the land where the Celts still wore their native costume of “breeks”; and any portion of Galha other than Cisalpine Gaul might be spoken of as Galha Comata, the land of the Celts who still wore their hair long in the native and barbarian fashion.

neighbourhood of Autun, and thence across to the valley of the Upper Seine, down which river again it passed to the coast, where dwelt the Brythonic Gauls of Armorica, connected by doubtful legend and by more certain commerce with the Celts who had passed from Gaul to occupy Britain. Along this route there passed to the Massiliot traders the tin of Cornwall and the pearls of Richborough, the metals and corn and cheeses and woven cloths of Central Gaul, and the more southern fruits and crops of the Rhone valley. The town grew and prospered exceedingly, sending out colonies which fringed the coast east and west—Nicaea (*Nice*), Antipolis (*Antibes*), Monoecus Portus (*Monaco*), and Emporiae (*Ampurias*).

The wealth of Massilia made it the envy of the wild Ligurians of the Maritime Alps and the Riviera, in so much that the Greeks were fain to call in the aid of Rome (154 B.C.). At that date Rome was seeking to open up the coast road along the head of the Gulf of Genoa from Etruria to the Pyrenees. She gladly lent aid to the Massiliots. Thirty years later she reduced the Vocontii and the Salluvii and Sallyes (124 B.C.), and secured her advance by the foundation of Aquae Sextiae (*Aix in Provence*).

Of the three main races into which Caesar divided the Gauls beyond the Alps, the Aquitani played but a minor part: they were least Celtic of the Celts, for the main portion of their blood was that of an older people, whose nearest representatives are the Basques of the Western Pyrenees. The true Galli and the Belgae on the other hand were more closely related, albeit with pronounced characteristics: the former were the truest type of the Celtic race, the latter were of later growth and more closely connected with the Teutonic peoples of the lands to the east of the Rhine. Both Celtica and Belgica included a number of tribes whose mutual rivalry prevented any national union: notable amongst them were the Aedui north of Lugdunum (*Lyons*), between the Arar (*Saône*) and Liger (*Loire*); the Arverni of the modern Auvergne; and the Sequani in the valley of the Dubis (*Doubs*), between the Saône and the Rhone, whose capital was Vesontio (*Besançon*). Like the rest of the so-called Aryans they

had all been ruled by kings from immemorial date, but in the course of the second century B.C. they were passing from the state of monarchy to that of the oligarchic rule of the notables of each tribe. The transition brought additional weakness, for it led to feuds of the royal houses against the commons, of noble against noble, and of the chiefs against the sacred hierarchy of the Druids. These intestine quarrels combined with the rivalries of one tribe against another to lay all at the mercy of foreign foes, the Romans and the Germans.

§ 2. Beyond the Isara (*Isère*) as far as Geneva (*Geneva*) and the Rhone dwelt the Allobroges. In the Interference of Rome in Gaul. year 124 B.C. the recent conquests of Rome had brought her into collision with the Allobroges, while at the same time the powerful Arverni were asserting themselves as overlords of all Celtica. The Romans allied themselves with the Aedui, and in conjunction with them fell upon the Allobroges allied with the Arverni. The latter were crushed by the victories of Q. Fabius Maximus (afterwards Allobrogicus) at the confluence of the Isère and Rhone, and of Cn. Domitius at Vindalium (*Valenes?*), in 121 B.C.; and three years later was formed the Province, as it was called, Gallia Narbonensis,* whose capital was Narbo Martius (*Narbonne*), founded 118 B.C. Narbonne soon rivalled Marseilles, the Greek merchant gave place to the Roman trader, the Gauls of the Province rapidly became Romanised, and far beyond the frontiers the natives lost their barbaric virtues and took up with avidity the vices introduced by the traders and merchants of Rome.

There was fresh trouble in this quarter when, about 110 B.C., some unknown cause drove southward the Cimbri, and afterwards the Teutones, tribes of the southern shores of the Baltic. The Cimbri marched from the Danube into Gaul until they came to the Roman frontiers, where they found their victorious path barred by M. Junius Silanus (109 B.C.). He was defeated. So was the consul M. Scaurus in 108 B.C., and L. Cassius Longinus in 107 B.C. Most of

* Its frontiers were:—E, the Alps; S, the Mediterranean and the Eastern Pyrenees; N., the Rhone and the Cevennes; W., a line passing roughly north and south from the Garonne through Tolosa (*Toulouse*) to the Pyrenees.

the province was overrun, and Tolosa revolted. Q. Servilius Caepio recovered Tolosa in 106 B.C., but in the following year he was caught by the Cimbri at Arausio (*Orange*) on the Rhone, and lost an army of 80,000 Romans. Before the minds of the Senate and people rose the memory of the days when Brennus and his Senones had burnt Rome (390 B.C.), and in panic they sent Marius to avert the threatened second invasion of Italy. At Aquae Sextiae (*Aix*) he destroyed the Teutones (102 B.C.); at Vercellae (*Vercelli*), in the Raudine Plain, he annihilated the Cimbri; and Italy was saved. The province was reorganised, and things resumed their old course.

The Aedui, relying upon their good understanding with Rome, continued to attack their fellow Gauls. The Sequani and Arverni, unable to make head against them, preferred to call in the aid of the Germans from the East, restless peoples known to the Gauls as Suebi ("Wanderers"), and already familiar in many a fight for the passage of the Rhine. Led by Ariovistus, a host of these came over in 71 B.C., and speedily broke the supremacy of the Aedui. The latter people were themselves divided between the party of Divitiacus the Druid friendly to Rome, and the patriotic party led by Dumnorix, who were opposed to any appeal to the foreigner. The Senate, however, was too busy with domestic anxieties to interfere, nor did it approve of the creation in Gaul of a new sphere of military power of unknown extent. Ariovistus accordingly was left to pursue his own course, which was to invite continual reinforcements from Germany, and gradually to occupy the bulk of the Sequanian lands by way of payment for his services. The Sequani were in worse case than ever, and they, too, appealed in vain to Rome. The Senate refused to act on their behalf. Caesar alone saw that something must be done to uphold Roman credit in this quarter, and determined that he should himself be the man to do it. But before he could obtain his consulship matters were further complicated. The oppressed Allobroges, finding that even their loyalty to the government in the matter of Catilina had brought them no reward, revolted in 61 B.C., and had to be reduced by the arms of C. Pomptinus. Such defection within the province,

dangerous in itself, was aggravated by the fact that the Helvetii were stirring. They had shared in the successes of the Cimbri and Teutones fifty years before, and, like these peoples, they were eager to settle upon new lands in the south-west. One of their notables, Orgetorix, set the movement on foot, but for the moment it fell through. A little later the Romans learnt that the Helvetii were burning their villages, collecting their population and supplies, and massing at Geneva preparatory to making the march westward into Aquitania. They were to start on March 28, 58 B.C. Two roads lay open to them: the first and easier led down the Rhone and through the lands of the Allobroges and the Provincia; the second and more difficult passed further north over the Jura and across the lands of the Sequani. While still in Rome as consul, Caesar kept his eye upon the movement. He induced the Sequani to refuse passage to the Helvetii by way of the Jura, thus compelling them to take the route of the Rhone valley; and he bribed Ariovistus to temporary inactivity by sending envoys who greeted him as a "friend of the Romans."

§ 3. Caesar had then plenty of reasons for seeking a special command in Gaul, such as was given to him by the *Lex Vatinia* (59 B.C.). First of all he needed a large army and a wide sphere for training it to veteran excellence and to attachment to himself. The conquest of Gaul provided at once the excuse and the use for many legions, and the terrors of the Gauls were well enough known to call forth all the valour of Roman troops. Here he would acquire also wide influence, possible allies, and untold wealth in slaves and plunder—wealth enough to buy the control of home politics while he was himself absent. But there were higher reasons than these. It was essential that the security of the Provincia should be assured, for if that failed the whole barrier would fall, which for a hundred years the Senate had gradually been constructing against the barbarians of Germany and Gaul. Again, the present frontier was unsatisfactory, and Caesar intended to improve it: he would make the Gauls west of the Rhine at any rate pacific if not subject to Rome, and would put a stop to the constant danger of another Cimbric inroad. The presence

of Ariovistus in Gaul was but the thin end of the wedge of German advance, and must be forthwith removed. And lastly, if the Celtic Helvetii should leave their homes, these would be immediately occupied by advancing Germans, and other considerations apart it was imperative to maintain control over the Helvetic lands which offered an easy route for invaders from Germany. The Helvetii must be kept where they could act as bulwarks of the province. If any reasons were needed, these were sufficient to secure for Caesar the five years' command in Gaul which probably no other man in Rome desired. The people did not see, if the Senate did, that such a command put all Italy at the mercy of him who occupied Cisalpine Gaul, Narbonese and Illyricum—the whole landward frontier of the Peninsula—with powers almost autocratic, and no check but such as his own feelings provided.

§ 4. The news of the massing of the Helvetii at Geneva suddenly called Caesar from Rome. By the Helvetii and BibRACTE. terms of the *Lex Vatinia* he had at his command the three legions which formed the garrison of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, and which were at the moment still in winter quarters at Aquileia on the Adriatic. The subsequent *senatus consultum* gave him also the command of the tenth legion garrisoning the Narbonese. There was no time to wait until the legions at Aquileia could cross Northern Italy: Caesar sent word for them to follow with all speed, crossed the Alps without troops, there took up the tenth legion, and suddenly presented himself on the left and Roman bank of the Rhone below Geneva, where he broke down the bridge. The Helvetii were taken by surprise; they sent envoys to request permission to traverse the province without molestation on their way to Aquitania. Caesar temporised: he must consider the matter, he said, and would give them his answer on a stated day. When that day came the Helvetii met with a refusal, and saw to their chagrin that the interval had been employed in the construction of a line of forts and earthworks which covered the entire left bank of the Rhone for a distance of ten miles from Geneva to Pas de l'Ecluse. Lower down the river was protected by the formation of the ground and its

own precipitous banks. The Helvetii made several fruitless attempts to force a passage. Few as were Caesar's men, they were enough for his purpose, and the enemy gave up the attempt to enter the province. They set themselves to effect the longer march across the Jura, and thanks to the exertions of Dumnorix, the Aedui, Arverni, and Sequani now gave ready permission for them to do so. Evidently the Gauls were beginning to realise that Rome was no desirable neighbour or friend.

The Helvetii must be sent back at all costs to their mountain homes, there to withstand the advance of the Germans. At all costs, too, Rome must establish her authority over these peoples upon her frontiers who ventured thus to disregard her interests. Caesar left T. Labienus, destined to prove the most notable of his legates, in charge of the single legion about Geneva, ordered a levy of two additional legions in the province without applying for the Senate's fiat, and hurried back into Cisalpine Gaul to place himself at the head of the three legions there. In an incredibly short space of time he had fought his way at their head across the pass of Mont Genève in face of the opposition of the Ligurian Graioceli and Centrones, and had united with Labienus and the newly-raised legions a few miles east of Lugdunum (*Lyons*). There he forded the Rhone, and at a point about twenty-five miles south of Matisco (*Maçon*) he overtook the rearguard of the Helvetic host, which had been delayed twenty days in constructing a bridge over the stream. This body comprised the entire multitude of the Tigurini, one of the four cantonal peoples of Helvetia. Caesar annihilated them, crossed the Saône, and pressed on northward after the main body into the heart of the Aeduan territories. He felt himself surrounded by treachery: the Ambarri and others, while professing to be wholly at his disposal, purposely delayed to send up the provisions which he needed. But he could not hesitate: he must catch his enemy, and the sooner the better. At Bibracte, afterwards better known as Augustodunum (*Autun*), the Helvetii turned about: the same causes which made Caesar's advance perilous lent additional courage to his enemies. But Caesar did not refuse

to fight. The battle commenced at noon with an attempt of the Helvetii to storm Caesar's position on some high ground west of Autun. It was not until evening that they desisted from their attacks and retreated, pursued by the legionaries, to a hill still further west. Here in the twilight they formed their lines again, while a large column of Boii and Tulingi, alien tribes which had joined in the migration, was deployed to the left northward. When the legions in their turn advanced to the assault, they found themselves threatened by this column on their right and rear. The battle now became double: one of Caesar's three lines was wheeled northward to meet the Boii and Tulingi, while the remaining two lines assaulted the Helvetii on the hull. The fight was furious, for not one of the barbarians but died with his face to the foe. When it was now far on into the night Helvetii and Boii alike fell back upon the zareba where, barricaded by their waggons and baggage, they had left their wives and children. All night long the struggle continued, but at dawn Caesar was left master of the field on which 180,000 men had been engaged. The remnant of the Helvetii fled northwards, but faster than they could flee went out Caesar's proclamation that all who befriended them should be treated as enemies of Rome, and in view of the victory of Bibracte none dared disobey. Within a few days the remnant surrendered, and were dismissed to their old homes. Scarce a third of them survived to return. The first and most hazardous of Caesar's tasks was accomplished within three months or so: once more the whole frontier of the province was secure, Helvetia was garrisoned by a people who had learnt in long years of warfare how to withstand their German foes, and the fame of their redoubtable conqueror was noised far and near over Gallia Comata.

§ 5. The immediate result of the victory was the renewal of the ascendancy of the Romanising parties in Ariovistus. the tribes near the frontiers. Within a few

days there arrived envoys of the Aedui, Sequani, and others, headed by Divitiacus. Their object was to clear themselves from the suspicion of lukewarmness in their support of Caesar during his advance upon Bibracte: it was true, they

said, that they had been unable to do much for the Romans, but it was not for lack of will but for fear of Ariovistus. He had compelled them by force to lend no aid to Rome, he had hostages as guarantees of their obedience, and he threatened them with the direst vengeance if they disobeyed.

Whatever the truth of these allegations—and it certainly was true that the Sequani and Aedui were as much afraid of the Germans as of the Romans—they afforded Caesar a very sufficient excuse for dealing with Ariovistus without delay. He was aware that the presence of the Germans on the west of the Rhine was a standing menace to the security of the Province, a lively and very real cause of trouble amongst the Gauls, and the excuse for the almost daily arrival of fresh Teutonic hordes. The sooner he dealt with Ariovistus, the less formidable would he find the latter's power. Accordingly he sent a polite embassy to that prince, requesting a speedy conference. Ariovistus replied that if Caesar wished it, he must come for it. Caesar retorted with the demand that Ariovistus should at once surrender his Gallic hostages and refrain from calling further bodies of Germans into Gaul. Ariovistus refused to entertain these demands, and at once called out his warriors who, he boasted, "had for fourteen years never slept elsewhere than in the camp," and were therefore in formidable contrast to Caesar's inexperienced levies. At the same time came the news that fresh swarms of Suebi were waiting for an opportunity to cross the Rhine.

Instantly Caesar struck east and made for Vesontio (*Besançon*), the Sequanian capital, whither also Ariovistus moved with all speed. As usual, Caesar won in the race, and was able by occupying the place to secure unlimited supplies and a strong basis for his operations.

At this place, however, there was trouble with the legions. The Romans had never forgotten the terrors of the Cimbro-Teutonic invasion of Marius' day and the awful carnage of Arausio. The Germans were to their fancy giants whom it was folly to provoke, an opinion which was specially favoured by the numerous traders who followed the army, and by the unwarlike young nobles who followed Caesar either as petty officers or as attachés. The panic which manifested

itself in the tears and will-making of these heroes soon spread to the rank and file, and Caesar, when he would have moved straight against his enemy, found himself embarrassed by a dangerous mutiny. There was some ground for anxiety doubtless: the Germans were in stature and physique far superior to the best Italian levies, and they were moreover well supplied with formidable cavalry, an arm which was sadly wanting in Caesar's army. But to have wavered would have proved fatal. Caesar assembled his men and spoke boldly: if none else would follow him, at least his valiant tenth legion would go on with him to victory. His words aroused the spirit of his men: they humbly deprecated his scorn and anger, and clamoured for an opportunity to redeem their character. The whole army pressed north-eastwards towards the Rhine.

Between the ranges of the Jura and the Vosges there is a wide break where the lower lands about the Doubs merge into the valley of the Rhine. To-day the gap is occupied by the fortress of Belfort, which stands upon the French frontier. Beyond lies Elsass-Lothringen with the German fortress of Mülhausen. Caesar's march led him past Belfort towards Mülhausen, and in the neighbourhood of the site of the latter town he was met by Ariovistus hurrying up the Rhine valley. The German prince now asked for the conference which he before refused. Caesar granted the request, carefully, and very necessarily as it happened, guarding against treachery. The only result of the meeting was that Caesar learnt that his enemies in Rome were intriguing with Ariovistus to secure his death. After some further futile negotiations Ariovistus suddenly marched past the Roman camp and entrenched himself in the rear. Then making full use of his excellent and numerous cavalry, he did his best to cut off Caesar's supplies and so wear out the Roman army. Caesar for his part dared not attack with his comparatively small force of 30,000 legionaries, yet every day was precious, and if he were once forced to yield a step he must expect to find all Gaul in arms against him. He resorted to stratagem: he drew up his light-armed Gallic auxiliaries as two legions, and posted them upon Ariovistus' right, while with his main army of six legions he again

offered battle. Ariovistus was deceived ; afraid of a simultaneous attack in front and flank, he drew out his line and massed the pick of his troops upon the right to guard against the expected double onset. Thereupon Caesar charged the German left. The battle was furious and bloody, but the legions fulfilled their promise, and the threatened rout of the Roman left was averted by the prompt action of young P. Crassus, son of the triumvir, now acting as legate to Caesar. Charging with the cavalry he saved the day in this part of the field : on the right Caesar was already victorious. The Germans fled headlong to the Rhine and crossed it as best they might. The slaughter was terrible, but we have no record of its extent. Seven nations had sent their warriors to swell the defeated host, and with them passed away the German occupation of Gaul. Ariovistus escaped with a few companions and was heard of no more. Caesar led back his men to the Sequanian lands for the winter, thereby showing that he had made up his mind to conquest rather than to merely defensive warfare. In person he returned to Cisalpine Gaul to do his duty as governor by holding the usual assizes (*conventus*), and also to learn what was going on in Rome (end of 58 B.C.).

§ 6. Bravest of all the Gauls were the Belgae, whose various tribes stretched across the whole of France and Belgium between the Sequana (Seine) and the Rhine. Later comers than the pure Celts of Central Gaul, they had perhaps German blood in their veins, and they lay out of the reach of those traders whose presence had demoralised the more southern Gauls. Probably also, as being less developed in civilisation, they were less torn by party feuds than their countrymen in the south ; yet even here there were jealousies at work preparing the way for Caesar's victorious interference. The Treveri were a Belgic tribe (about *Trèves*, *Trière*) who had been compelled by the aggressions of Ariovistus to appeal to Caesar for aid in 58 B.C. The Remi (about *Rheims*) were also Belgae, and aimed at using Roman support to secure in Northern Gaul a position similar to that of the dominant Aedui in the south. The Romanising tendencies of both tribes were regarded as treason by the Belgae at large. In

Conquest of
Belgae : Battle
of the Sambre.

consequence, during the winter of 58-57 B.C., Labienus, commander of the legions amongst the Sequani, could send word to Caesar that the spring would see a united attack of the patriotic Belgae upon both Treveri and Remi. Caesar at once raised two more legions, and started northwards from Vesontio in the spring with a force of eight legions, a considerable number of cavalry partly Gallic, and a large force of Aeduan auxiliaries under Divitiacus. Moving down the valley of the Matrona (*Marne*) he crossed the territories of the Remi, passed their capital of Durocortorum (*Rheims*), and reached the Axona (*Aisne*) at Berry-au-Bac, where he occupied the bridge and pitched his camp upon the further and northern bank.

As usual, he had forestalled his enemies. The Belgic coalition had not yet mustered, and when at length it did so it was without the powerful contingent of the Bellovaci. Caesar had diverted their forces by sending his Aeduan auxiliaries to attack them at home. The remainder of the Belgae mustered in full force and moved upon the Roman position. Caesar awaited them calmly. For several days they assailed his camp unsuccessfully; and failing also in an attempt to force the passage of the Aisne and so put themselves in his rear, they decided to return to their several homes and muster again when occasion required. Before they could do so the legions had swept westward, stormed Noviodunum (*Soissons*), the capital of the Suessiones, and reduced that people to submission, then passed onwards to occupy the Bellovacan capital of Bratuspantium (*Beauvais* or *Breteil*), unite with the Aedui, and reduce this tribe also. A few days later they occupied Samarobriua (*Amiens*), the stronghold of the Ambiani. Everywhere Caesar ordered the conquered to surrender their arms and to give hostages for their good behaviour. It may seem a careless way of securing their submission, but it was sufficient, for no Gaul would endanger the life of a kinsman given as hostage.

From Amiens the legions marched eastward past Cambrai towards the lands of the Nervii, a people pre-eminent amongst warriors for their valour. He was already in their territory and was descending into the valley of the Sabis (*Sambre*) when he received news that the Nervii were pre-

paring to surprise him on the march. Accordingly he altered the disposition of his troops: instead of allowing each legion to advance in order with its own baggage, he sent the whole of his baggage and siege-train to the rear, and ordered the legions to move within short distance of one another. Arrived at the Sambre, where now stands the village of Maubeuge near Hautmont, he found but a handful of Gauls prepared to dispute the passage. They were easily brushed aside, the stream was forded, and the legions piled arms upon the high ground beyond and set themselves to construct the camp without which no Roman army ever bivouacked. While they were thus engaged, unarmed and scattered, the whole force of the Nervii, 60,000 in number, broke from the cover of the forests on the further bank, darted across the stream, and fell upon the Romans. So swift was the attack that there was no time for the men to fall into their places. Each seized his weapons and fought as best he could, unconsciously adopting the accustomed legionary formation. There were six legions in action in all, two others recently levied in Cisalpine being in charge of the baggage, which had not yet come up. The whole divided into three divisions of two legions each, but without any pretence to orderly array. The brunt of the Nervian attack fell upon the right and centre. On the left Labienus drove his enemies before him down the slopes across the river back to the woods. When he rallied his men from the pursuit he saw that the centre of the Roman line with difficulty held its ground, while the right was recoiling rapidly, and through the gap thus formed the mass of the Nervian warriors was pushing with the intention of separating the right from the centre and surrounding each in detail. Caesar, on foot and covering himself with the shield snatched from a legionary, was fighting in the thick of the rout, doing all he could to rally his right wing. By sheer desperation and courage he induced the two legions to fall back to back and so to present a solid face to all attack, and to prevent any onset in flank or rear. But it was a critical moment. Already the camp-followers, cavalry, and Gaulish auxiliaries had fled from the field, and it seemed that nothing could save the four legions of

the centre and right. At this moment Labienus recrossed the river—it was barely three feet deep—and charged the Nervii in the rear. Instantly their victory became a rout, and the Romans pursued them until darkness compelled them to desist. When within a few hours came envoys to crave mercy for the nation, it was alleged that of 600 notables but three survived, and of the 60,000 warriors but 500 were still fit to fight.* Caesar granted the terms asked. Of course the statements of the envoys were exaggerated, but assuredly there was nothing left to fear from them now. Moving still further east he demanded the submission of the Aduatuci between the Scaldis (*Scheldt*) and Mosa (*Maas*). That people did not dare to resist openly, but they made a futile attempt to surprise the army to which they had pretended submission. Caesar's vengeance was terrible and swift: he sold the whole tribe of 53,000 souls into slavery (57 B.C.).

The campaign was ended, the league of the Belgæ shattered, and its most formidable peoples reduced to obedience. Caesar's good fortune was completed when he heard from P. Crassus, who had been sent with one raw legion to the coast about the mouth of the Liger (*Loire*), that there, too, the Gauls were submissive. The troops were cantoned for the winter at different points in Belgica, and Caesar withdrew as usual to Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum to perform his duties there. He spent the winter in putting upon a sounder footing the organisation of Illyricum, and as the spring drew on he found other matters to attend to in reference to his fellow triumvirs. In May of this year (56 B.C.) occurred the Conference of Luca, and by the terms there agreed to Caesar was assured of a further period of five years for the completion of his conquest of Gaul. As will be seen, it was none too much.

* This is usually known as the battle of the Sambre.

CHAPTER IX.

CAESAR IN GAUL, 56—51 B.C.

§ 1. Conquest of the Veneti and Aquitani.—§ 2. The Usipetes and Tencteri: Invasion of Germany.—§ 3. First Invasion of Britain, 55 B.C.—§ 4. Second Invasion of Britain, 54 B.C.—§ 5. Troubles in Belgica: Massacre of Sabinus and Cotta.—§ 6. The Revolt Quelled: Second Invasion of Germany.—§ 7. The Last Rising of the Gauls: Vercingetorix.—§ 8. Avaricum and Gergovia.—§ 9. Alesia: the Pacification of Gaul.

§ 1. P. CRASSUS wintered with his single legion near the Lower Loire. As spring came on (56 B.C.) he sent the customary requisition for corn and supplies to the tribes which had in the previous year professed submission; but in the meantime those tribes had repented of their weakness. They arrested the Roman commissioners, retaining them as a set-off to the hostages surrendered to Crassus in 57 B.C.; they came to an understanding with the entire population of the coast northwards as far as the mouths of the Rhine; and intrigued also with the lately conquered Belgae, and even with the trans-Rhenic Germans. The news of these movements reached Caesar in Cisalpine: political necessities prevented his instant return to the scene of defection, but he sent orders that Labienus should take the cavalry and patrol the Rhine frontier to overawe the Eastern Belgae, and to prevent the crossing of any German troops; that Titurius Sabinus should act with three legions in Normandy to oppose the land-levy of the insurgents;

and that the legate Decimus Brutus should equip a fleet on the Loire. When at last he reappeared in person he brought with him from the Narbonese the necessary rowers, and moved at the head of three legions into the peninsula of Brittany (56 B.C., June).

The leaders of the revolt were the Veneti, whose territories stretched northwards and westwards along the broken coasts of Morbihan and Finisterre. To this day that coast is Celtic, and alike in configuration and in the character of its inhabitants it recalls the rugged coasts of the western isles of Scotland or of Galway. The Veneti were the great naval tribe of ancient Gaul. Their vessels, huge flat-bottomed hulls with lofty freeboard, were built of beams of solid oak clamped with iron, and navigated not by oars, which are useless in a heavy sea like the Atlantic, but by immense sails of leather. In these they traded with Britain. Less important, but more inaccessible, were the Morini and Menapii of Picardy and Flanders, people whom their marshes and poverty defended against every attack. These formed the northern members of the maritime confederacy as the Veneti did the southern, but the whole length of coast between was in arms with the insurgents.

It was in vain that Caesar assaulted the strongholds of the Veneti, for so long as the Celts were masters of the sea they could provision or evacuate their fastnesses at pleasure, while it was scarcely possible to reach them by land. From the estuary of the Loire to the peninsula of Quiberon stretches an archipelago of rocky islets, sundered by dangerous tidal channels and girt by rocky spits or "bills" of land, between which the lochs and rivers run far up inland. Caesar was compelled to play but a secondary part, for the burden of the war fell upon the admiral Brutus. After long delay that commander put to sea and gave battle off the western extremity of the peninsula of Ruis. His vessels, built on the Roman plan, were too light and low to be of any avail, according to the ordinary rules of naval warfare, against the stout and towering hulls of the Venetian vessels. Their victory was due to the sagacity of Brutus, who ordered his men to give all their attention to the enemy's tackle and cordage. The cutting

of the halliards brought down the great leathern sails upon the crews' beneath, and, in the absence of carage, left them at the mercy of the well-managed Roman vessels. Seeing how matters were going the Veneti would have put out to sea and dared their enemies to follow thither, but the wind fell and cut off this means of escape. The entire fleet was destroyed, two hundred and twenty sail in all, and the Veneti submitted. They were punished as the Aduatuci had been punished, not for their courage but for their ill-faith. The whole nation was sold into slavery, but their name lingers still in the modern Vannes, a few miles north of their chief stronghold.

The submission of the Veneti was followed by that of most of the confederates. The Morini and Menapii, however, still declined to swear allegiance to Rome, and against these Caesar moved in person, albeit his motive must have been less the conquest of so insignificant and worthless a land of marshes than the thirst for adventure, and the wish to inure his men to all forms of warfare. He gained nothing, for the autumn rains soon made the marshes of the Netherlands perfectly impassable.

In the interim both Labienus on the Rhine and Sabinus ^{Crassus} in Normandy had done yeoman-service, as also ^{in Aquitania.} had Crassus, who was despatched in the summer to reduce Aquitania. He obtained the submission of all the peoples between the Garonne, the Pyrenees, and the western frontiers of the Province. By the close of 56 B.C. the whole of Gaul had felt the strong hand of the legions and was submissive. More than this, it was easily and safely accessible from Italy, for the route westward across the Mont Genève was now pushed up to the passes of the Pyrenees, and northward there was opened a new military route across the Great St. Bernard into the Valais, and so to Lake Geneva.

§ 2. As usual in the Roman system of conquest, it was ^{Invasion of} held needful to make demonstrations of the ^{Germany.} Roman power even beyond the limits of actual conquest which Caesar proposed to lay down. The year 55 B.C. was occupied with such demonstrations in Germany and in Britain.

Of the need for still further impressing the trans-Rhenic peoples there may be the less question, as their restlessness was a constant temptation to the less indomitable Celts. As has been seen, the Germans encouraged the Celts to look to them for support in the event of any risings against the Roman occupation, the real reason for such encouragement being doubtless their own desire to obtain footing again in Gaul. Their threatening attitude had kept Labienus employed during the whole of the previous year, and even then vague rumours were abroad that two Teutonic peoples, the Usipetes and Tencteri, had crossed the river near its mouth, despite the opposition of the Menapii, and were now moving southwards in search of lands whereon to settle. This news was confirmed by the appearance of bands of German horse, which ravaged the Gallic lands as far as the Treveri. Without delay Caesar went northward to meet the advancing host—it numbered 430,000 souls—and came up with it near Clèves. The Germans were not at the moment prepared for action, for their most formidable arm, the cavalry, was still dispersed. Accordingly they sent envoys to Caesar, requesting leave to find lands in Gaul, and when, as they had anticipated, they were refused, they begged a few days' respite, during which they might communicate with their kinsmen beyond the Rhine. Caesar suspected treachery, and his anticipations seemed to be confirmed when a party of German horse attacked a squadron of his own weaker cavalry and cut down some seventy of them. He made no sign, but when the chiefs of the people came shortly afterwards to apologise for the breach of truce, he placed them all under arrest and fell at once upon the whole body of emigrants. It was a horrible massacre, for the Germans were encumbered by their wives, children, and baggage, and had no means of escape. The few who got away recrossed the Rhine with all speed, and found protection amongst the Sugambri on the river Luppia (*Lippe*). But Caesar was not yet satisfied. He was determined to show that he was as able and ready as the Germans to ravage the enemy's land. In ten days' time he had constructed a bridge of piles between Coblentz and Andernach, and marched his whole army across on to German soil.

His ostensible excuses were two: firstly, the Sugambri had declined to surrender the fugitive Usipetes and Tencteri; secondly, the Ubi, the most civilised and the least patriotic of the German peoples, finding themselves attacked by the same Suebi who had been the original cause of the migration of the Usipetes and Tencteri, appealed to Caesar to protect them. For eighteen days he moved up and down on the eastern bank of the Rhine, finding no enemy to give him battle—a fact for which he was possibly not very sorry—and then returned to Gaul, breaking down the bridge behind him. He had already commissioned his legates to prepare a fleet for the passage to Britain, and had despatched one Volusenus in the early spring to reconnoitre the opposite coast. He now marched to the shore of the Channel, near Boulogne, where he found upwards of a hundred vessels awaiting his arrival.

§ 3. Britain was at this date almost a *terra incognita* to the Romans, who knew of it only from the fables built up upon the truthful observations of Pytheas of Marseilles and Posidonius, both contemporaries of Aristotle in the latter half of the fourth century B.C. We know that the island had been invaded by swarms of Belgic Gauls, who drove before them the earlier population, and founded kingdoms on the eastern and southern shores and in the southern midlands, leaving names identical with those of the parent kingdoms in Gaul.* We know, too, that, whether with reason or no, it was famous even to Roman ears as a land of corn and tin and pearls,—a land whose “painted warriors” were outlandish enough to furnish subjects for the curtains of Roman theatres.† But something more than the mere spirit of adventure suggested the invasion of the island to Caesar’s mind. Here were the headquarters of the Gallic religion, whose priests, the Druids, had gained lately in Gaul a theocratic ascendancy which constrained the will of the common folk while it oppressed them. Druidism had become a political lever in the hands of the Gallic nobles, and though Caesar might

* Thus there were both in Britain and Gaul *Belgae* and *Atrebates*. There were *Parisii* on the Seine and in Yorkshire.

† Vergil, *Georgics* III. 25, *Purpurea intexti tollunt aulaea Br.*

seek to break down its strength in Gaul, it could not be destroyed so long as its headquarters were unassailed. Moreover, Britain furnished a refuge for the discontented patriots whom Caesar had driven into exile: there they could foment fresh insurrections, and thence they might draw support for future struggles. In any case it was as well to learn something definite of the nature and resources of the insular Celts.

Two legions and a detachment of cavalry were selected for the enterprise: the rest of the forces were put under the command of Crassus, with orders to renew the previous year's attack upon the Morini and Menapii. On the night of August 26 Caesar put to sea, and landed on the following day in Britain.*

The Britons were prepared for his arrival, and made his landing a dangerous undertaking. Moreover, when the legions had at last disembarked and entrenched themselves upon the shore, they were unable to make any decisive movement through lack of cavalry, for the vessels transporting the horse had been misdirected in their course and had eventually to put back to port. Worse than this, before any movement could be effected a storm wrought havoc amongst the vessels riding at anchor off the camp. All that Caesar was able to do was to refit his damaged vessels—he lost twelve completely—as best he might, sending out foraging parties for short distances to gather supplies. Even thus he was continually harassed by skirmishing parties of the Britons. When he offered regular battle they at once dispersed, but no advantage could be gained from their flight. Early in October the legions were again embarked, and the whole force returned to Portus Itius. The reverse—for it was nothing less—was calculated only to whet Caesar's ambition. The army went into winter quarters (55 B.C.) with the understanding that the ensuing year would see another invasion of Britain on a more ex-

* It never has been decided, and presumably never will be, from what point Caesar sailed or where he landed. It is at least as likely a view as any that his start was from Wissant (which he calls *Portus Itius*?), and some other haven on the west of Cape Grinez since choked up; and that he landed near Romney. The question is incapable of certain solution, because (1) Caesar gives us next to no geographical information, and (2) the configuration of the coasts had greatly altered since his time.

tensive scale. The winter was employed in the construction of a special fleet, designed expressly for navigating the tidal waters of the Channel and for effecting a landing even upon dangerous coasts. In person Caesar, as usual, went southward, and amongst his other duties found time to carry out some needful punitive forays against the predatory border tribes of Illyricum.

§ 4. It was about May, 54 B.C., when Caesar again put out from Portus Itius with five legions and a strong force of cavalry in some 600 transport vessels. His departure had been delayed partly by adverse winds, partly by the insubordination of Dumnorix, the head of the national party amongst the Aedui. In order to keep him constantly in sight and so prevent his intriguing amongst the Gauls, Caesar had appointed him to command one of the squadrons of Gallic horse destined for service in Britain; but Dumnorix, thinking perhaps that Caesar would hardly delay his expedition on any but the most urgent plea, and seeing in the absence of the legions and their general an opportunity for effecting his own purposes, rode away without warning. He was mistaken in his calculations: Caesar despatched in pursuit a troop of horse, which speedily overtook and killed the deserter. Caesar might regard it as a painful measure, but it would prove a salutary warning to other malcontents not to imitate the Aeduan's example.

The landing in Britain was on this occasion unopposed, but intelligence soon came in that the British were strongly posted at some distance inland under the chief command of Cassivellaunus, prince of the modern counties of Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire, with parts of Cambridge and Hertfordshire, and exercising a general suzerainty over the surrounding tribes. His position was probably upon the Stour, and he was well provided with cavalry and scythed chariots. The legions, however, had little difficulty in forcing the position; but they were prevented from following up their advantage by the news that their fleet had again been wrecked. There was a consequent delay of several days while Caesar returned in person to the naval camp, gave the necessary orders for the repair of the damaged vessels and for the construction of new ones in

Gaul, where Labienus was left in command, and recalled a portion of his legions to effect these repairs and garrison the camp. He then advanced westward, meeting with no serious resistance, and reached the Thames somewhere above Kingston. On the opposite bank Cassivellaunus was awaiting him with all his forces, and had further obstructed the ford by piles; but the legions crossed the river and made good their landing in face of the British warriors, and Cassivellaunus fell back towards his capital. Unfortunately for Britain, here, too, there were dissensions and jealousies. The Trinobantes, inhabiting the modern Essex and Middlesex, were impatient of Cassivellaunus' supremacy. That chief had put to death the Trinobant prince, and driven his son to seek refuge in Gaul. There he had joined Caesar, and now his own prayers for restitution were seconded by the petition of the Trinobantes themselves. Caesar, of course, granted the petition at once, trusting to this example to spread defection amongst the remaining subjects of the British overlord. He then marched inland in a northerly direction to the stronghold of the Catyeuchlani, Cassivellaunus' tribe, identified with the modern site of St. Albans, and took it with little difficulty. At the same moment Cassivellaunus learnt of the failure of a skilfully planned attempt to cut Caesar's communications by inducing the petty princes of Cantium (*Kent*) to attack the naval camp. This double reverse induced him to offer submission, for he probably guessed that such submission would be merely nominal. His offers were accepted, because there was little to be gained by refusing them. Caesar returned to the coast and back to Gaul in safety. If he cherished any idea—and it is not likely—of resuming his operations in the island at a subsequent date, he never found any opportunity for doing so.

§ 5. When Caesar ordered the execution of Dumnorix, <sup>Rising of
the Belgae.</sup> he must have felt that the Gauls were restless, that the battles and campaigns of the past three years had not stamped out all desire for liberty, and that a salutary example would prove of benefit. And for the months of his absence in Britain there was no sign of

mischief brewing: Labienus, with his three legions, found little to do, and so quiet was the land that Caesar had no misgiving while he ordered his army—for the harvests had been bad—to separate for the winter and thereby avoid the difficulty of provisioning a large force at the same spot. The various camps were all within a circle whose radius was less than one hundred miles, or five days' march. Most central was the camp of Q. Cicero's legion, at Charleroi on the Sambre, some miles above Namur in the Nervian territories. Further to the north-east at Aduatuca (*Tongres*), amongst the Eburones, lay Titurius Sabinus and Aurunculeius Cotta, with a legion and a half of the most recent levies; and at about the same distance to the south-east, bordering upon Aduatuci Remi and Treveri, lay T. Labienus with one legion. The remaining legates lay more nearly together, Plancus amongst the Suesiones, Crassus amongst the Bellovaci, and Fabius upon the southern borders of the Morini. The two last-named were about equally distant from Samarobriua, the headquarters of the whole army, where Trebonius was to be in command upon Caesar's departure for Cisalpine Gaul.

While the general was still delaying his departure, Sabinus and Cotta. there reached him a messenger from Q. Cicero: Ambiorix and Catuvolcus, chiefs of the Eburones, had attacked the camp of Sabinus and Cotta. Failing to take it by storm they had induced Sabinus, sorely against the will of his colleague, to leave his entrenchments on promise of safe conduct to the camp of Labienus. The whole legion and a half had perished almost to a man, for the Gauls had surrounded them in a place where there was no means either of shelter or of escape. The surrounding tribes had instantly flocked to arms, and Ambiorix was now besieging Cicero's camp with thousands of warriors at his command. Unless help came speedily the place must fall, for even now scarce one man in ten was left unwounded.

§ 6. It was evening when this news arrived. The same night there rode off messengers north and south to Fabius and Crassus, and before dawn each was on the march. Crassus occupied Samarobriua, while

The Revolt
Quelled.

Caesar took the single legion there quartered, united with Fabius, and pushed eastward by forced marches towards Charleroi. Other messengers had sped to Labienus and to Cicero: Labienus was to join Caesar if he thought it wise to do so, but so disturbed was the neighbourhood that he did not venture to move; and Cicero, when his few surviving troops were beginning to lose heart, learnt at last that succour was at hand, for Caesar's messenger, unable to enter the camp, had fastened his message to a dart and flung it within the Roman lines where it was accidentally found. At almost the same moment Ambiorix heard of Caesar's approach, and raised the siege with the intention of preventing his further advance. Venturing to assault Caesar's camp, he was completely routed, and on the fifth day from his departure from Amiens Caesar entered Cicero's camp.

A few days later the Treveran Indutiomarus attempted to deal with Labienus as Ambiorix had done with Sabinus. Supported by well-nigh all the tribes of the north-east of Gaul, the Remi only excepted, and even by Germans from beyond the Rhine, he essayed to storm the camp; for the Gauls seemed incapable of learning that they must fail when attacking a legion within its entrenchments. Labienus with little difficulty defeated the attempt; but despite these reverses the Gauls continued to stir ominously, and to defy or reverse Caesar's arrangements with threatening insolence. For this winter Caesar never left his legions. In the early spring he successively reduced to a second subjection the Nervii, the Senones on the Sequana (*Seine*), and the Carnutes of Central Gaul, the tribe within whose boundaries lay the sacred centre of Gallic Druidism; then led a triple attack upon the Menapii, and, despite the difficulties of their country, reduced them at length to submission. He then doubled back to the territories of the Treveri, the real ringleaders of the whole trouble, but there was little to do here, for Labienus had effectually broken their strength and slain their chief Indutiomarus. To punish the Germans again for the assistance which they had lent to the Eburones, he once more crossed the Rhine, but retreated without being able to draw his enemies into battle. Lastly, he

turned upon the Eburones themselves, the tribe which had been first to insult the legions, and the only tribe which had done so with success. The whole Roman force of 50,000 men was let loose upon them: the few who escaped from the avengers fell by their own hands, saving a handful that passed beyond the Rhine. In this way Caesar revenged the destruction of the fifteen cohorts of Sabinus and Cotta, but though Caturvoleus died, the more guilty and more formidable Ambiorix escaped to the Germans. For a few weeks more Caesar marched to and fro through the "pacified" districts, visiting with civil justice such as had escaped the speedier justice of the sword. The Gauls made no sign; and not even their far-seeing conqueror was aware how vengefully they saw the forms of Roman law thus easily set at work amongst them. At the close of this year of retribution (53 B.C.), Caesar withdrew to attend to the accumulated arrears of public business in Northern Italy and Illyricum, leaving his whole army of ten legions quartered as before on or beyond the Seine.

§ 7. But the Gauls were now less than ever disposed to submission. If the rising of the previous winter had failed, it was because they lacked a national leader, and because Caesar was himself in the field. But now the dreaded Roman was away beyond the Alps, and even the Gauls knew that there might be such complications in Italy as should prevent his return. More than this, they had found a leader in one Vercingetorix, the heir of that famous kingdom of the Arverni which had once been paramount in all Gaul, and whose sovereign Betuitus had been taken captive at Vindalium. His fall had been caused by the unpatriotic ambition of the Aedui, and intestine troubles had led to the transfer of the government to the hands of a council of Romanising nobles; but the common folk were still loyal to the memory of their royal line and their liberty, and even their rivals the Aedui might now unite with them against the foreigner. It was still winter when Caesar learned that Vercingetorix was moving about Central and Southern Gaul, everywhere rousing the tribes to a last struggle for freedom, that the Carnutes had joined him and put to death all the R

traders whom they could seize, and that a Gallic chieftain had even violated the frontier and appeared within the Province. There was not a moment to lose. Only Caesar's personal presence could save his legions, and with every day that passed it became more difficult to reach them. Vercingetorix was doing all he could to make it impossible for him to join Labienus, and moreover was training his host to a discipline hitherto unknown amongst the Gauls. But at present he set himself to win over the Aedui, and other adherents of the Romans, to the national cause, leaving Lucterius with a division to watch the frontiers of the Province. He did not expect Caesar's reappearance as yet, for the snow was still deep in the passes of the Cevennes, and by no other route could he reach his legions.

Caesar lost not a moment. With marvellous despatch he had raised two legions and a force of cavalry in the Province, had sent the cavalry to await orders at Vienna (*Vienna*), and had distributed most of the infantry in garrisons along the frontiers of the Province. With a handful that was left he forced his way through the snow, and descended upon the lands of the Arverni, while Vercingetorix was still away to the northward and wholly unaware of his approach. Decimus Brutus was left in charge of these few troops with orders to ravage Auvergne, and so draw Vercingetorix back southward. Caesar himself hurried as on a mission of life and death to Vienna, picked up the cavalry there awaiting him, and with them rode night and day across two hundred miles of hostile country. He had joined his legions before either his legates or Vercingetorix knew where he was.

Vercingetorix had missed his opportunity, but he did not lose heart. He knew that it was futile to oppose the legions with Gallic infantry, and he knew, too, that Caesar was ill-supplied with cavalry, while he had as many as 60,000 men to feed in a hostile country. Vercingetorix resolved that he would wear out his foe by lack of food: he would burn all but the most impregnable towns, destroy all crops, and raise such a force of cavalry as should make it impossible for the Romans either to forage or to separate. And for the Gauls allowed themselves to be persuaded,

§ 8. But Caesar was undaunted. He raised a few cavalry by enlisting mercenary Germans, and led eight legions instantly into the field, leaving the other two to garrison Agedincum (*Sens*) as a basis of operations. Every tribe of Gaul was either already in arms or on point of revolt saving the Treveri and the Remi and their dependents, and the small canton of the Boii. The latter had been settled, after the fight at Bibracte, upon lands of the Aedui, south of Noviodunum (*Nevers*), on the Loire, and against them Vercingetorix was now marching. Determined to save his allies, Caesar came southward, ravaged the lands of the Carnutes, and burned their capital of Genabum (*Gien*), near Orleans, and so passed on towards the Bituriges. This people had joined the revolt upon compulsion, but they stood loyally by their countrymen. Only they would not, as Vercingetorix desired, evacuate and destroy their capital of Avaricum (*Bourges*), reputed the fairest town in Gaul. Thither accordingly the whole insurgent army retreated, and thither Caesar pursued it. He strove in vain to draw Vercingetorix into a general engagement: that chieftain would not be tempted from his settled plan, but he could not prevent the dogged assaults of the legions, although his cavalry cut off well-nigh all supplies. Neither could he induce the Gauls to evacuate the place while there was yet time: he had to stand by and witness its storm and sack, and to see the Romans masters of all the stores there collected.

But this reverse did not, as usually happened, result in the immediate dissolution of the Gallic league. Vercingetorix had the genius requisite for keeping even Gauls together in the face of disaster, and he had faith in his own plan of action if he could but carry it out. Already it was bearing fruit, for Caesar found himself unable to provision eight legions, and was forced to divide his army. He dismissed Labienus with four legions to act as best he could upon the Seine, where the Parisii and other Celts of the north-west were in revolt, and where the Belgae were moving to join them. The other four he led amongst the Aedui, and overawed that tribe, which still wavered between patriotism and the calls of the Romanising party.

Then turning southward, he marched straight for Gergovia (*Gergoie*, near *Clermont*), the capital of Vercingetorix and his Arverni.

The step was bold, but unfortunately Caesar had not troops enough to carry it out, for the town was securely placed and protected moreover by the whole of the insurgent army, and 30,000 men were incapable of reducing it by siege. Yet Caesar made the attempt, and only desisted when perseverance would have meant disaster. As it was, his retreat from Gergovia was regarded as a triumph by the Gauls, and even the Aedui at length made up their minds to join the rebels. An Aeduan contingent was holding Noviodunum for Caesar: it handed the town over to Vercingetorix, together with all the stores there deposited. Caesar could not prevent it, for he was now in full retreat towards Labienus.

§ 9. That officer had been little more fortunate. His aim had been to occupy Lutetia (*Paris*), and make that his headquarters for the control of the Celts and Belgae north and south; but the position was so well protected by its river and marshes, and by the host of Celts there collected, that Labienus was unable to reach it. His difficulty at once roused the Bellovaci, and they were now in full march upon him, hoping thus to take him between two fires, when he received pressing orders to fall back upon Agedincum and there unite with Caesar. He obeyed at once, but moved in such a way as to make his retreat seem an advance: he crossed the Seine in the face of the Celtic army, drove it before him, and made his way victoriously back to Agedincum, although in reality he was out-generalled and his purpose foiled, and although his retreat was followed by the further spread of the insurrection in the north and north-west.

Having united with Labienus, Caesar turned about and marched towards the frontiers of the Sequani; all Gaul being in arms his first care must be to place himself in touch of the Province. Vercingetorix understood his design, and endeavoured unsuccessfully to intercept the march. Thereupon Caesar faced about once more: instead of continuing his retreat

Alesia:
Pacification of
Gaul.

he shut up his enemy with the whole of his forces in the hill-fortress of Alesia (*Alise Sainte Reine*), on the Icauna (*Yonne*), and there besieged him. The task of blockading so large a position was immense, but it was doubled by the need of protecting the legions alike from sallies of the besieged and from the attacks of relieving armies from without. The siege-lines covered a circuit of eight miles, and there was omitted no known device of Roman military engineering whether for attack or defence. Vercingetorix and his garrison resisted stoutly, until a host of 240,000 Gauls assaulted the lines from the further side. Even against the double attack, and despite the desperate odds, the legions held their own: the attempt to raise the siege failed entirely, and a few days later Vercingetorix surrendered. With him the Gauls gave up hope: silently but quickly the rebel armies melted away, and during the campaign of 51 B.C. Caesar meted out reward or punishment at will. He met with resistance only amongst the Bellovaci under their prince Correus, the Atrebatas under Commius, and a miscellaneous band of various tribes who congregated around Drappes and Lucterius in Uxellodunum (*Luzech*, near *Cahors*). That town was reduced by siege, and its defenders dismissed with the loss of their right hands. Elsewhere Caesar was more merciful: his time was growing short, and he wished to leave behind him no mere allegiance of terrorism. By judiciously cultivating in each tribe the party which favoured Rome, imposing no oppressive tribute and allowing no interference by tax-farmers, and by studied respect for national religion and customs, he brought the entire nation to a condition of peaceful loyalty which was able to withstand the temptations of independence. Some years later, when Caesar was dictator, he divided his conquest into two provinces: one comprising Celtica and Aquitania, the other Belgica. The dependence of the outlying tribes, both of the south-west and the north, was indeed for a time scarcely more real than that of Britain; but the peace of Gaul was none the less a solid reality, and not even the Germans dared violate it for nearly thirty years.

CHAPTER X.

HOME POLITICS, 57—49 B.C.

§ 1. Anarchy in Rome.—§ 2. Revival of the Senatorial Party : Cicero attacks the Triumvirs.—§ 3. The Conference of Luca.—§ 4. Second Consulate of Crassus and Pompeius.—§ 5. The Opposition : Clodius and Milo : Death of Clodius . Pompeius, sole Consul, unites with the Senate.—§ 6. Position of Caesar.—§ 7. The Problem of his Governorship, and his Measures of Self-defence.—§ 8. Pompeius attacks Caesar.—§ 9. Attitude of Parties in Rome.—§ 10. Progress of the Quarrel.—§ 11. The Final Rupture.

§ 1. THE year 57 B.C. passed away in riot. Clodius was a candidate at the election of aediles in December : Anarchy in Rome. also, he had no mind to see his new house destroyed and its site handed back to Cicero. One delay succeeded another, until at last the Senate, more to vex Clodius than to oblige Cicero, declared there should be no election of aediles until the question of Cicero's compensation was decided. This only made things worse. There were daily fights and murders alike in the best and worst quarters of Rome; the tribune Milo divided with Clodius the mastery of the streets; there was anarchy everywhere. When Clodius finally obtained his aedilic year—and he needed it, because he was threatened by Milo with an impeachment *de vi*—he turned the tables by indicting Milo, now a private citizen, on the same charge. Pompeius offered himself as Milo's champion, but the matter ended in a riot which drove him to despair: he began to call in his veterans and other dependents, intending to put an end to Clodius

and his crew by sheer force, but the latter was wise enough to draw off, and leave Milo alone for the present (56 B.C.).

The result was only that Pompeius became the laughing-stock of all parties, and knew it. Even Cicero took heart of grace from the great man's incapacity. Crassus he knew to be more than ever estranged from Pompeius, Pompeius was of no account, Caesar was far away: it seemed an excellent moment for asserting once more the dignity of the Senate, and for securing recognition of himself as head of the conservatives and the equites in one. Either his patriotism or his conceit prevented his recognising that even now the senatorials felt towards him no more loyal feeling than that of tolerance.

§ 2. Now it was just at this time (January 56 B.C.), that Cicero attacks the Senate was busy with the case of Ptolemy the Trumvirs. Auletes, who had been forced to leave Alexandria and had come to Rome to intrigue for his restoration.* If he were to be restored it would most naturally be by force of arms, and here was an opportunity for Pompeius to obtain that Egyptian commission for which Caesar had tried in vain. But he failed to secure it; in great part because he dared not assert himself. The Senate, which saw his purpose clearly enough and strongly suspected that the whole affair was trumped up by his supporters, pretended to find a Sibylline oracle forbidding armed interference in Egypt; and Pompeius, discovering that there was to be no army attached to the commission, ceased to have any wish for it. It was given to P. Lentulus, governor-designate of Cilicia for 56 B.C. Lentulus did nothing, and Gabinius took upon himself to restore Auletes.†

Such a confession of powerlessness on Pompeius' part was all that was needed to complete Cicero's confidence in his own importance and power. As the Senate clearly would not support Pompeius, he took it for granted that it would support himself if he took action against Pompeius. On April 5 he obtained a resolution of the Senate that on May 15 the house should consider the question of the allotment of the Campanian domain-lands. The optimates

* See p. 168.

† See p. 201.

had never ceased to declare that the agrarian law of 59 B.C. was illegal, but had not yet ventured to make public assertion of their beliefs. At this moment however they conceived the idea that they were in a position to do so and to maintain their views.

§ 3. By this time the patience of Pompeius and Crassus was exhausted. As soon as they heard of the Conference of Luca. resolution of April 5 they sent to Caesar notice of the turn which affairs had taken, and a few days later they met him at Luca (*Lucca*), on the northern borders of Etruria. There was no secret about the fact of the conference, for upwards of 200 of the Senate were there—a fact which throws light upon the utter disorganisation of the senatorial party—and six score lictors, attending upon more than half the magistrates of Rome. What passed at the conference is less certain: we only know its results. The appeal of Crassus and Pompeius to Caesar was the acknowledgment of the latter's superiority in the triumvirate; and, indeed, as the only triumvir with an army at his bidding, he naturally took the lead. But his conquest of Gaul was as yet but begun: he would not leave it incomplete, and for its completion he required firstly that his command should be continued beyond its original limits; and, secondly, that his allies should be able to rule Rome for him in his absence. But both these allies were painfully aware that without armies they could be little but the tools of Caesar, and they would require a sufficient equivalent for furthering the first of Caesar's demands, the extension of his *imperium*. On the other hand the equivalent which they most desired—corresponding special military commands for themselves—was a serious matter, for by granting it Caesar would throw away his present armed superiority. Yet so confident was he that he never hesitated: Crassus he knew to be more of a financier than a statesman; Pompeius had too often shown himself but the puppet of any who had the courage to handle him. The triumvirs accordingly came to the following understanding:—

- (i.) Caesar was to have his *imperium* prolonged for a further period of five years. He was also to be free to increase his legions of ten, and the State was to find their pay.

(ii.) Pompeius was to receive the government of the Spain for five years, 54-50 B.C.; Crassus that of Syria for the same length of time.

(iii.) Pompeius and Crassus were to be consuls 55 B.C. for the purpose of carrying these bills.

The upshot was that both Crassus and Pompeius found themselves restored to the position which they had occupied in 70 B.C., with the further advantage of having Caesar to support them in maintaining it. It was understood between the three that Pompeius should use the legions allotted to him not for action in Spain, but as a garrison wherewith to overawe Italy and Rome. On the other hand Crassus could hope for golden harvests in his governorship of Syria, for therein was included the conduct of the war against Parthia and the reassertion of the Roman authority on the Eastern frontiers. Moreover P. Clodius was induced, we are not told how, to adopt a less offensive attitude towards Pompeius. The senatorials whose rash proceedings had brought about these new arrangements, were glad to draw back from the hostile attitude they had assumed. Cicero was amongst the first to trim, and the most frank in doing it: "I have made a fool of myself," he wrote to Atticus, in reference to his support of the Senate. Caesar treated him gently, and contrived that he should be able to salve his conscience with the fancy that his recantation was due not to fear but to his kindly feeling towards Caesar.

§ 4. In due course Pompeius and Crassus entered upon their second consulate (55 B.C.). There was a riot, of course, but the triumvirs were too strong to be worsted—nay, they forced their partisans into almost every magistracy for the year. A *Lex Licinia-Pompeia* gave to Caesar all that he bargained for: the tribune Trebonius gave his name to the *Lex Trebonia* which bestowed the commands in Spain and Syria upon the consuls. The proceedings of the two were marked by the most flagrant bribery, as a set-off to which Crassus passed a new and peculiarly stringent law against bribery and clubs (*Lex Licinia de Sodaliciis*). They showed a contemptuous disregard for senatorial claims which stung such men as Cato more keenly than any violence: they endeavoured to remove from the Senate's cognisance all

Second Con-
sulate of Crassus
and Pompeius

questions touching foreign policy, official succession, or military matters. Cato struggled blindly and vainly: he was only wounded and maltreated for his pains. The two consuls raised the legions which they desired. At the close of the year Crassus set out for Syria, and took with him his share of these troops. Pompeius stayed on in Rome, sending his two legates L. Afranius and M. Petreius to represent him in the two Spains: they took over the command of the troops already stationed there, while the new levies were dismissed on leave, ready at a moment's notice to fall in before the gates of Rome.

§ 5. But while on the one hand Pompeius proved no more ^{Opposition to the Triumvirs.} able now than formerly to justify his exalted position, the republican party continued to seize upon every opportunity for annoying him and his fellow-triumvirs; indeed the virtual joint monarchy of the triumvirs had a salutary effect in reducing the better members of the old factions of senatorials, equites, and democrats, to something like a unified opposition. True the extremists still maintained their positions—on the one side Milo as the agent of Cato and Bibulus, on the other side Clodius; but while these fought as constantly and as violently as in 57 B.C., the more moderate men combined to thwart the triumvirs' programme in the elections and the law-courts, now defeating a candidate of the three, anon securing the condemnation of one of their tools, while men like Catullus, the epigrammatist of Verona, held up even Caesar himself to the most ribald ridicule and represented the press of a modern opposition. At the close of 54 B.C. the Pompeian ex-governor of Syria, A. Gabinius, was condemned on charges of treason and extortion. Pompeius lost his temper and fretted. His wife Julia, Caesar's daughter, whom he had really loved and for whose sake doubtless he had tried to show himself tractable to Caesar, had died earlier in the year, thus removing the only bond which could appeal to his peculiar temperament. He was free now to give full rein to the jealousy with which he had all along regarded Caesar's achievements in Gaul. Jealousy suggested treachery, and this was rendered the more inviting because he saw that he could not defeat the attacks

of all the parties that were opposed to him. He began to dream of the possibility of renewing his old allegiance to the Senate: with its aid he might preserve the dignity which he could not maintain otherwise. In 53 B.C. matters had come to such a pass that life in Rome became insupportable to all moderate men: all business was arrested by the riotous behaviour of Clodius, who sought to prevent the election of Milo to the consulate. Amidst this anarchy came the news that the Parthians had slain Crassus, and that Caesar was threatened with a combined rising of all Gaul. It seemed to Pompeius a good opportunity to relinquish his untenable position, and draw nearer to the Senate. The year 52 B.C. opened without consuls: no elections could be held, and interrex succeeded interrex without prospect of better results. At length the two street-captains met in

Death of
Clodius.

a final brawl upon the Via Appia. The affair was accidental, but it ended in the deliberate murder of Clodius by Milo's men (January 13). The deed inflamed the mob to such a degree that they fired the Senate-house as a pyre for their champion's body, kept Milo under siege in his house for several days, and greeted Pompeius as a dictator in the hope that he would revenge them upon Milo. The Senate found resolution to adopt

Pompeius sole
Consul.

the cry at secondhand: on the motion of Cato and Bibulus, the most rigid of the conservatives, Pompeius was declared sole consul for the year, and instructed to restore order in the city. Nothing loth, he summoned his legionaries, garrisoned the Capitol, and secured the formal trial of Milo who was condemned and sent into exile to Massilia (*Marseilles*). Then Pompeius tried yet again to legislate in such a way as might enable him to remain the independent arbiter of all parties. He restricted the liberty of speech in the law-courts—a measure much analogous to a modern interference with the liberties of the press; he passed still more stern laws against bribery and political clubs, hoping thus to prevent further failures

He quarrels
with Caesar.

of the candidates whom he put forward for office. At the same time he obtained the prolongation of his own proconsular command of the Spains for five years more, and passed a momentous law *De Iure*

Magistratum, of which we shall speak in the following sections. On August 1 he laid down his sole consulship, taking as his colleague for the rest of the year Q. Cæcilius Metellus Scipio, whose daughter Metella he had married shortly after Julia's death.

§ 6. If the Senate and Pompeius would rid themselves of Caesar they had two courses: either they must rescind his *imperium* forthwith, or they must contrive that he should be unable to obtain any further magistracy before laying aside his *imperium* at the date of its expiry as at present fixed; for either of these courses would leave him for the time being a mere civilian, and as a civilian he might at once be impeached upon any number of counts; and while it was illegal to impeach any one as long as he actually held a public magistracy, it was also legally impossible for any one to obtain office while either convicted or awaiting trial. Caesar must contrive not to be reduced to the helplessness of a civilian: the Senate must do its best to reduce him to that condition. Caesar, who counted on the consulship in 48 B.C., must not only preserve his *imperium* uncurtailed, but contrive to get it practically extended to the close of 49 B.C.: the Senate must find means, if not of curtailing it, at least of preventing its extension to the end of 49 B.C.

There was a minority in the Senate prepared for the most extreme measures, the immediate abrogation of Caesar's *imperium* and recourse to force if he should hesitate to comply. This party relied upon Pompeius as their agent, and upon the troops at his service for the means.* But as usual Pompeius was afraid of his own opportunities, and but a half hearted ally; while there was still a majority in the Curia in favour of more peaceful measures. The whole body of optimates agreed only in this, that Caesar must be disarmed, and as soon as possible, for his army made him dangerous, and that further he must be kept out of the consulship. He had used that office in 59 B.C. in a fashion which they could not forget. At the present moment his party, the democratic party, was crushed and

* At the outbreak of the Civil War there were—seven legions in Spain (35,000 men); two legions (one borrowed from Caesar) in Italy (10,000); and the general levy of all Italy, estimated at 100,000 at least.

silent. Caesar's return to the consulate would at once rehabilitate that party, with proportionate di-aster to the senatorials.

On the other hand, upon losing his present *imperium* Caesar would be politically powerless unless elected to the consulship or to some further extraordinary *imperium*; the consulship was the office to which he was eligible in virtue of the *Lex Annalis*; he would have conformed with the Sullan requirement that a space of ten years should intervene between his two consulates; and nothing short of a consulship would place him really beyond the reach of his many enemies, and enable him to reorganise his party with freedom.

Now, as things stood, Caesar's *imperium* was to expire not later than March 1, 49 B.C.* By the Position of Caesar arrangements of the conference of Luca, Caesar was to be free, if he should choose, to stand for the consulship of 48 B.C., for which the elections would occur about August 49 B.C. Between the expiry of his *imperium* and the new year next following, supposing that he secured his election, he would be a private man, and liable as such to impeachment. He had enemies in plenty who would undertake to impeach him: if their attack should succeed, then Caesar would be legally incapacitated from further political life; if it were not brought to an issue before the date of the comitia, it would none the less prevent his election; if he succeeded in getting himself elected, he would still as consul-designate, be liable to impeachment; and if he were not elected, he would continue to be a private man open to constant fresh attacks. It was, therefore, a matter of necessity with Caesar that, by some means or other, he should be able to retain his *imperium* until December 31, 49 B.C. But the law required that a candidate for office should canvass in person: therefore, Caesar must be in Rome in the summer of 49 B.C. Further, the law declared that any *imperator* who should enter the city, by so doing

* It is not certain whether the actual date was five years from the passing of the *Lex Licinia-Pompeia* of 55 B.C., viz. November 13, 50 B.C.; or five years from the expiry of the original term of Caesar's command (last day of February, 54 B.C.), as fixed by the *Lex Fufia* of 59 B.C., viz. the last day of February, 49 B.C. In either case there would be an interval of some months between the expiry of his present *imperium*, and the possibility of his entering upon the consulate of 48 B.C.

lost his *imperium*: therefore Caesar required some dispensation whereby he might either appear in Rome without detriment to his official position, or offer himself as candidate for the consulship without personal attendance and canvass; and he must at the same time guard against any attempt to curtail his tenure of the *imperium* as at present fixed.

§ 7. Firstly then, with regard to the question of Caesar's candidature for the consulship of 48 B.C. The only way out of the difficulty was for Caesar to obtain a *privilegium*—in itself an illegality—permitting him to dispense with personal canvass. By aid of the tribunes of 52 B.C., and with the sanction of Pompeius, he obtained such a dispensation, and thus the first difficulty was solved, illegally indeed, but by the action of the sovereign people in their comitia.

Secondly, with regard to possible attempts to abridge the term of Caesar's *imperium*. In accordance with His Measures of Self-defence. the arrangement introduced by C. Gracchus, the allotment of the provinces for any given year was made before the election of the consuls who would, after their year of office, take up the government of such provinces. In due course, therefore, Caesar's provinces, falling vacant in March of 49 B.C., would be open to reassignment prior to the election of the consuls for 50 B.C. (viz., before midsummer of 51 B.C.), if his *imperium* were held to expire in February 49 B.C.; or even prior to the election of the consuls for 51 B.C. (viz., before midsummer of 52 B.C.), if his *imperium* were held to expire upon November 13, 50 B.C.* Now Caesar was aware that the Senate would take the first opportunity of depriving him of his province: therefore he had obtained in the *Lex Licinia-Pompeia* the insertion of a clause to the effect that there should be no discussion as to the reassignment of his provinces, that is, of a successor to himself, until after March 1, 50 B.C. He knew that the matter would then be discussed at once, and a successor appointed to supersede him: but by the terms of Gracchus' arrangement, such successor could only be one of the consuls for 49 B.C.; and as by a further law of Sulla,

* See above, p. 151, note.

no consul could while still consul leave Italy, such nominee of 49 B.C. could supersede Caesar only on January 1, 48 B.C. at the earliest. Therefore, Caesar would remain governor of Gaul and Illyricum, in full possession of his *imperium*, and legally beyond the reach of impeachment, until December 31, 49 B.C.; and on the next day he would, if his designs prospered, take up the consulate of 48 B.C. Thus the second difficulty was guarded against.

§ 8. Caesar might now feel secure. If he had suspected Pompeius' good-faith, the latter's readiness in supporting the *privilegium*, and his refusal to allow any debate upon the reassignment of Caesar's provinces before March 1, 50 B.C., seemed to show either that such suspicions were ungrounded, or that the man was too dull-witted to be worth fearing. Caesar would remain a magistrate throughout 49 B.C.; he might offer himself as a candidate to the electors in August of that year, without coming in person to Rome and so sacrificing his position of magisterial security; his bribes would secure his election; and as consul in 48 B.C. he might proceed as he best could to make good his further political immunity.

All this elaborate web was suddenly destroyed, when in midsummer of 52 B.C. Pompeius carried his new law *De Jure Magistratum*. As will be seen, it was the public proclamation of Pompeius' coalition with the Senate, and a declaration of war against Caesar.

This famous bill contained two main articles, viz.:—

(i.) That any person seeking election to office must personally attend the election and appear in Rome.

(ii.) That henceforth there should elapse an interval of five years between the tenure of a consulship or praetorship, and the subsequent government of a province.

The first clause requires no comment. It was like Pompeius to throw down so tactless a challenge to an enemy, and it was like Pompeius too, when Caesar remonstrated, to append to the bill on his own authority another clause declaring that this new law did not in any wise interfere with the tribunicial bill previously passed, whereby Caesar's candidature in his absence was declared

legal. Pompeius' course was doubly foolish, for he had both shown his hand and stultified his own enactments, and had moreover committed an illegality in tacking an unauthorised clause to the original bill.

The second clause was more diplomatic. In its furthest effects it would reach the prospective consulship of Caesar in 48 B.C., would deprive him of any legal accession to another provincial governorship until 43 B.C., and would leave him after the expiry of his possible consulship at the mercy of his enemies. But it had more immediate consequences: its action commenced with the ensuing year, 51 B.C., and inasmuch as the consuls for 52 B.C., Pompeius and Scipio, were by the terms of the law eligible for provincial commands in 47 B.C., not only would it secure to Pompeius, as consul in 52 B.C., legal accession to command at the very moment (47 B.C.) when Caesar, laying down the consulship of 48 B.C., would become a private citizen, but it further gave to the Senate perfect freedom in the assignation of all provinces from January 1, 51 B.C., onwards; and as Pompeius and the Senate were now in alliance, such assignation would be practically vested in Pompeius; and lastly, the law would allow the immediate superseding of Caesar upon the legal expiry of his term of government by any nominee of the Senate, regardless of the two years' delay prescribed by the law of Gracchus and further guaranteed in Caesar's case by a special clause of the *Lex Licinia-Pompeia*. But even here the would-be legislator could not bring himself to obey his own laws, for at the very moment he was demanding an extension of his own Spanish command from 51 B.C. onwards, instead of accepting the five years' non-official retirement which should have followed his tenure of the consulship in 52 B.C. "Law-maker and law-breaker in one," Tacitus calls him. The question of the reassignment of Caesar's provinces was "in the orders of the day" for March 1, 50 B.C.: there was no longer even formal need to abide by the terms of the law of Gracchus; without waiting for the services of any consul of 49 B.C., the Senate might appoint a successor forthwith, and Caesar would certainly be superseded early in 49 B.C. The whole of his careful system of safeguards was at once thrown down:

he would be left a private man during most of 49 B.C., and in that case there was no need for Pompeius to have stultified himself in the matter of the other clause of the bill, since, if superseded in 49 B.C., Caesar would have no reason to absent himself from the elections of that year.

§ 9. It was while Pompeius was thus bungling in Rome that Cæsar was engaged in his last struggle with the Gauls under Vercingetorix. To lesser men this would have furnished another excuse for abandoning a seemingly desperate war, and giving closer attention to his interests in Italy. But Cæsar held upon his course: he was not minded to hasten the quarrel which seemed bound to come, and he was bent that it should be none of his making. Meantime, his agents and his gold permeated all classes of society in Rome, where men's minds were divided more than ever; but though there were still some who believed themselves divided on the old question of senatorial or democratic ascendancy, to most men it had become clear that those party-questions had for the present given way to personal partisanship of Cæsar as against Pompeius. The optimates might flatter themselves that they had the stronger position: they were at home, entrenched as it were in Rome, with the legions of Pompeius to protect them, and Pompeius himself as their figure-head; while Cæsar was fighting for life beyond the Alps, and apparently left to choose between submissive obedience or civil war. If he submitted they could impeach and annihilate him; if he made war—for every one knew that the alternative was possible—they were confident of an easy victory. The populace as a mass were in favour of Cæsar, the heir to the place of Marius, but they made no sign, and the optimates of course ignored them. But within the Senate itself there was a very large party of moderate men who were averse to bringing matters to extremities—the men who represented the traditional aristocratic policy of *laissez faire* and peace at any price, the abler men who had no wish to make Cæsar a scapegoat for Pompeius' exaltation, and the juster politicians who viewed impartially the claims of the rival generals. The equites in the main would side with Pompeius from fear

of the proscriptions and confiscations which they believed would mark any victory of Caesar. As for Cicero, he was in a miserable condition of incertitude. Very literally he could not afford to quarrel with Caesar, to whom he owed considerable sums advanced free of interest. On the other hand, he was fain to try once more his old plan of making Pompeius a stalking-horse, and himself by his aid becoming the head of the republican party—optimates, equites, and moderates of all classes. He settled the question for the moment by shelving it, and going as governor to Cilicia for 51 B.C.*

§ 10. The consuls of 51 B.C. were Servius Sulpicius Rufus Progress of the and M. Claudius Marcellus, the latter a man of Quarrel. the stamp of Bibulus and Cato. He spared no efforts to rouse the Senate to such action as should settle Caesar's case once and for all, but when at length in September he moved the question of appointing a successor to Caesar for March 1, 49 B.C., thanks to the blundering of Pompeius, to the bribery of some, and to the faint-heartedness of others, the matter was postponed to March 1, 50 B.C. Whereupon Cato, with his usual tact, gave public notice that he would impeach Caesar for treason in his consulship (59 B.C.) at the earliest opportunity after the expiry of his command on March 1, 49 B.C.

The following year (50 B.C.) found Caesar now thoroughly master of Gaul, and free to give full attention to home affairs. It was a year of attempts at compromise, wherein Caesar seemed by degrees to concede everything while the Senate and Pompeius, in mutual dread of each other and in still greater joint dread of Caesar, sought to gain each a selfish advantage, and thereby profited little.

The new consuls were L. Aemilius Paulus, an agent of Caesar, and C. Claudius Marcellus, a cousin of the Marcellus consul in 51 B.C., and a man of the most obstinate aristocratic views. The first move of the Senate was an attempt to reduce Caesar's forces: he had been compelled in 53 B.C. to borrow an extra legion from Pompeius; this he was now asked to send home, together with a second legion of his own, the excuse being that they were needed for service

* See below, p. 203.

against the Parthians, and that Pompeius was about to go to the East in order to fill the place left vacant by Crassus' death. Caesar saw through the excuse, but he complied without demur, and as he expected, the two legions were kept in readiness for action near Rome, while nothing was done in the matter of the alleged Eastern war.

In March the tribune C. Scribonius Curio, once a senatorian but now bought over by Caesar's gold,* laid before the Senate a despatch from Caesar wherein he offered to resign both his army and his province upon the date named by the Senate, if Pompeius would take the same course at the same time. This was certainly the course most desired by all men of prudence and moderation, but the party of Cato did their utmost to prevent Pompeius' acquiescence: the latter declared that, if Caesar led the way in resignation, he would follow—a statement which people took for what it was worth. It was already far on in the summer when Curio at last obtained a division on his motion that Caesar's offer be approved: it was carried by a majority of nearly twenty to one in an unusually full house. The result was that the deadlock was shown to be due to Pompeius, for he quietly ignored the Senate's voice. He had supporters: the consul Marcellus, in particular, did his utmost to oppose a division upon the motion. To entertain it at all was, to his thinking, an act of grace which Caesar did not merit. A few days later he endeavoured to obtain a decree empowering Pompeius to arm against Caesar, but Curio prevented it.

§ 11. The consuls for 49 B.C. were C. Lentulus and The Rupture. another C. Claudius Marcellus, not less violent than his relatives and predecessors.† At the commencement of their year of office the tribunes M. Antonius (Mark Antony) and Q. Cassius Longinus, agents of Caesar, gave notice that they held further offers of compromise from Caesar, and asked for a discussion of the same. The consuls could barely be induced to allow the reading of this ultimatum, indeed it seems they had already

* Lucan calls him "the lever of the civil war"—*Momentunque fuit mutatus Curio rerum*.

† He was brother of M. Marcellus, consul of 51 B.C., and therefore, like him, a cousin of C. Marcellus, consul of 50 B.C.

given to Pompeius orders on their own responsibility to call out his legions and to levy new ones. However, the letter was read at length. Its contents are not known with certainty: it is said to have contained Caesar's request that his personal canvass for the consulship should be formally sanctioned, and that he should be allowed to retain some part of his *imperium* until his election only. He would be content to resign eight legions—practically his whole army—and his command in Transalpine Gaul, if allowed to retain only Cisalpine Gaul with two legions, or Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum with a single legion. Such an ultimatum must have come as a surprise to those who believed him only anxious for war, and already massing his troops upon the frontiers of Italy; for it conceded every point which his enemies had declared to be needful, and moreover promised to reduce Caesar to the condition of a private person between the date of his prospective election as consul and the commencement of his year of office in 48 B.C. But matters had gone too far: the extremists under Cato and Marcellus desired no compromise at all; others saw in Caesar's offers a confession of cowardice, and took new courage to side with Cato; yet others doubted the sincerity of the offers made; and the upshot was a burst of senatorial dignity which found shape in a resolution that Caesar should surrender his province and his troops alike upon a set day without further conditions, on pain of being declared a public enemy. Antonius and Curio vetoed the resolution, whereupon the consuls passed the traditional ultimate decree empowering Pompeius to save the State—*videat ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat*. The city was already filled with Pompeius' legionaries, and the two tribunes, crying out that their sacrosanctity was insulted, escaped by stealth and fled to Caesar at Ravenna (January 7, 49 B.C.).

CHAPTER XI.

CAESAR.

§ 1. Caesar enters Italy: Failure of the Senatorial Defences: Pompeius evacuates Italy.—§ 2. Perilous Position of Caesar: Curio occupies Sicily.—§ 3. Siege of Massilia: Reduction of Spain: Herula: Death of Curio.—§ 4. Caesar Dictator: his Preliminary Measures.—§ 5. The Campaign of 48 B.C.: Siege of Dyrrhachium: Battle of Pharsalus.—§ 6. State of Egypt: Death of Pompeius.—§ 7. The Alexandrine War: Battle of Zela.—§ 8. The African War: Thapsus and Munda.—§ 9. Character and Extent of Caesar's Power: his Clemency. Disturbances of Rufus and Dolabella.—§ 10. Caesar's Measures of Government.—§ 11. His Social Measures: Measures for Benefit of Provincials: Other Measures.—§ 12. The Opposition: Cicero.—§ 13. The Conspiracy, and Murder of Caesar.

§ 1. CAESAR was at Ravenna when the fugitive tribunes ^{Caesar enters} came to demand his protection. So little was ^{Italy.} he prepared for civil war that he had but one legion with him: the rest of his forces were wintering on the Liger and Arar, but already his orders for them to move southwards to Italy were well upon the way. He hurried to the Rubicon, the small stream which divided his province from Italy proper;* and there, before venturing to cross the stream, he appealed to his handful of men to know whether they were loyal to him or no. Their enthusiasm satisfied him: he forded the stream, and moved down

* It was treason for a provincial governor to quit his province without orders to that effect. It was further treason for any one to hold an armed force within the boundaries of Italy unless so ordered. It was greatest treason of all to make war upon the Senate and Rome.

the coast-road along the Adriatic. It was midwinter,* he had less than 6000 men at his back, he had no fleet and no allies to count upon save the Transpadane Gauls; but the Transpadanes were loyal to the core, for Caesar's victory meant their own enfranchisement, his men were veterans, his enemies were as yet unprepared, and he must risk all to gain a foothold in Italy before the levies and allies of Pompeius could muster their strength. Chiefest of all, he was the sole arbiter of his own movements, while the camp of his enemies was divided between a dozen would-be generals.

The Senate and Pompeius were taken by surprise. Nominally there were ten legions in Italy, but with the exception of the two just taken from Caesar, and therefore hardly to be trusted, all were on furlough. There were seven veteran legions under Afranius and Petreius in Spain, but they needed time in which to reach Italy. Senatorial officers had hurried to the various parts of the peninsula to enforce the levies with all haste, and apart from the support of the old veterans of his wars in Spain and the East, Pompeius could count upon that of all the better-class Italians. Popular ideas made Caesar to be the desperate leader of all desperate classes—a second Catilina; and the Senate found it to its profit to enlarge upon the certainty of proscription, murder, and plunder, as the only sequel to any success on Caesar's part. There was indeed a large class of moneyed men, and a very considerable number of the senators, who were for peace at any price; but even these naturally leant rather to the established government of the Senate than to any military revolution. Beyond the walls of Rome, as it turned out, the Italians welcomed Caesar; but there was no room for the Italians in the narrow view of the optimates.

Pompeius was generalissimo of the government party. He ought to have prevented Caesar's entering Italy. Too slow to do this, he ought to have so disposed his forces as to be able to maintain himself in Rome until the arrival of reinforcements from Spain and elsewhere; for, generally

* Mommsen fixes the date as about January 12, 49 B.C., according to the calendar then in use; that is, the last week of November 50 B.C., according to the true (Julian) calendar.

speaking, with the single exception of the Gauls, all the Roman world was on the side of Pompeius, and whether by policy or by chance, there was scarce a client-state which he had not bound to his interests in one way or another. But he was too sluggish to profit by this. Hearing that Caesar was already in Picenum, and that his legate the tribune M. Antonius was moving down the Tiber valley towards Rome with a handful of German and Noric cavalry, he evacuated the city in panic, accompanied by all the more decided of his partisans. The consuls issued an insane edict that all who failed to join in the retreat would be treated as Caesareans and rebels. Capua had been originally named as the rendezvous for the Pompeian legions, but Pompeius did not venture to stay there. His whole force, as far as at present under arms, was at Luceria (*Lucera*) in Apulia, and thither he hastened to join it. As he moved he learnt that Auximum (*Osimo*), Cingulum (*Cingoli*), and other fortresses of Picenum had opened their gates to Caesar, and that the senatorial officers in charge of the levies there had either left their troops to fall into Caesar's hands or had fled to Corfinium (*Pentima*), where Gaius Domitius Ahenobarbus was in charge of the conscription. On February 4 Caesar laid ^{Flight of Pompeius.} siege to Corfinium. His whole purpose was to overtake Pompeius in Italy, and force him to a battle before the arrival of his reinforcements; but he could not venture to leave so strong a fortress as Corfinium in his rear and in the hands of an enemy. Had Domitius been a man of courage he might have prolonged the siege for some time: he was a coward, and ere a week was out he was discovered by his troops to be planning his secret escape from the town. In disgust they arrested him and his fellow-officers, and surrendered to Caesar. The latter dismissed Domitius and his fellow-officers unhurt, and enrolled the troops of the line under his own standards, then pressed on towards Luceria. Arriving there he found that Pompeius was already at Brundisium preparing to embark for Greece. Caesar strained every effort to prevent his doing so; but the brief delay at Corfinium had given to Pompeius a start which enabled him to forestall Caesar,•

the more easily as the latter had no fleet. In March, two months from his passage of the Rubicon, Caesar found himself master of Italy and Rome, while Pompeius, securely entrenched with 60,000 men at Dyrrhachium, was calling to his aid all the forces of the provinces and client-states of the East.

§ 2. Caesar had gained much but not everything. Safe
Perilous Position in Greece, and supported by all the East, of Caesar. Pompeius might at any moment descend again upon Italy from that quarter, while in the West his legates in Spain were able to do the same from their side. The whole sea was mastered by his fleets, and Rome might be starved in the course of a few weeks. In fact the peninsula was at the mercy of Pompeius either to blockade or to place between a double attack from East and West. Within the boundaries of Italy, indeed, public feeling had changed very materially. Naturally the retreat of Pompeius was regarded as due to cowardice, and as a virtual abandonment of all claim upon the allegiance of Italy; and on the other hand Caesar's unexpected clemency, and absolute refusal to shed unnecessary blood, won over to his cause many who had before looked upon him as a second Marius. But the seeming security of Pompeius' position had another effect: it gave new life and vigour to such of the Senate as remained in Rome, so that when at length Caesar appeared in the city and invited the Senate to meet, its representatives declined to further his views at all, and even attempted to prevent his appropriation of the public treasure to the purposes of his wars. Whereupon he took it by force, telling the crestfallen grandees that if they
Curio occupies Sicily would not help him he could very well do without them. He had already sent Curio to Sicily to wrest that corn-producing island from the Pompeians, and thus put its supplies at the disposal of the city. Curio found Cato in command of the island, but Cato, like Pompeius, withdrew to Greece without a battle. The occupation of Sardinia completed all that was needful in the direction of securing Rome from famine. Leaving M. Aemilius Lepidus to govern the city as *Praefectus Urbi*, with M. Antonius as his coadjutor, Caesar in person left

for Spain. His hope was to win that peninsula, and thus unite all the West against Pompeius and the East, while at the same time removing the possibility of a double attack from West and East.

§ 3. Arriving at Massilia (*Marseilles*) Caesar found that Domitius, after being dismissed at Corfinium, had induced the Massiliots to declare for Pompeius. At the same time he learnt that the Spanish army was moving northwards to seize the passes of the Pyrenees. He sent on his main army of six legions to forestall the latter movement, and only remained himself sufficiently long to see his legate C. Trebonius well settled down to the siege of Massilia. Rejoining his army he found that, now as ever, his promptitude had been successful: Afranius and Petreius had failed to block the passes, and Caesar was free to descend into Spain as he chose.

The Pompeian legions had fallen back upon Ilerda (*Lerida*), a hill fortress on the western bank of the Sicoris (*Segre*), a tributary of the Ebro. Here alone was there a bridge over the stream, and this bridge was in the enemy's power. Caesar was compelled to build bridges for himself twenty miles higher up the stream, and thus to move southward along the western bank of the river. Attempting to occupy a hill which separated the town of Ilerda from the Pompeian camp, Caesar's men were badly beaten, and at the same moment a freshet carried away his bridges. He was thus left isolated: in front were the enemy, on his left the Sicoris in flood and not to be forded, on the right at some distance another river in the same impassable condition. Supplies were not to be had in this narrow district, while on the other hand the Pompeian cavalry, crossing the Sicoris by the bridge at Ilerda, could intercept all convoys coming up from the eastern plain. Caesar's position seemed desperate, but as usual he came out of it triumphantly. He built coracles by which he was able to throw across the Sicoris a force sufficient to protect his convoys and secure the needful supplies, and at the same time to turn the tables on the enemy by intercepting their own convoys. The Pompeian officers decided to retreat beyond

the Ebro. They crossed by the stone bridge, leaving there a picket of sufficient force, as they believed, to check Caesar's attempts to follow them. Caesar's men replied by fording the river on foot, and pressing after their retreating foes. Still the latter were in front, and it seemed certain that they must be first to reach the Ebro, in which case they need not fear further pursuit. Their contented belief was strengthened when they saw Caesar's army wheel westwards toward the hills along the line of march: it seemed that he was abandoning the pursuit. Before they could prevent it, they discovered his real purpose: Caesar again wheeled about, and hurrying along the hills came round and occupied the road in front of the Pompeians, where alone the army could hope to find a way towards the Ebro. To attempt to force a passage was hopeless, and already the Pompeian legionaries had begun to lose faith in their cause and their officers. Within a few hours the whole army went over to Caesar, and thus Spain fell into his hands without a pitched battle. He left Q. Cassius Longinus to administer it as his legate, and returned to Massilia. His approach ended the siege: the town capitulated, Domitius making his escape to the main army of Pompeius in Greece.

Meantime Curio had passed over from Sicily into Africa, according to instructions. Encouraged by his first successes there, and by his easy rout of the Pompeian general Metellus Scipio, he ventured to march inland to meet Juba, king of Numidia, who was advancing to the help of Scipio. On the Bagradas (*Mejerdeh*) Curio let himself be surprised: his army was destroyed, and himself slain.

Nevertheless, when late in the autumn Caesar returned to Rome, he could rest content with what he had accomplished. He had united the West under his flag, he had won the confidence of Italy, and he had successfully deprived Pompeius of his most dangerous weapon—the blockade, and consequent starvation, of the capital. He set himself to organise the government of the city and provinces, while his troops were cantoned at Brundisium in readiness to be transported to Greece at the advent of spring.

§ 4. Both the consuls were with Pompeius in Greece, and there was in Rome no one legally qualified to hold the consular comitia for 48 B.C. To solve the difficulty the city-prefect named Caesar dictator for the express purpose of holding the comitia.* He was himself returned consul with P. Servilius Isauricus as his colleague, and thereupon he laid down his extraordinary office. He spent the winter months in various efforts to restore public and private credit in Italy. The outbreak of the civil war had naturally had a disastrous effect upon the value of property, and every one was eager to convert his assets into ready money, while bullion was largely withdrawn from circulation. Caesar's lenient treatment of his enemies had gone far to conciliate the neutral: his personal moderation, and the stern control in which he kept his legions, reassured the wealthy whose first fear was of proscriptions, confiscations, and riot. The men of property who yet remained in Rome, comparing his clemency with the open menaces of the Pompeians, transferred to him their cordial allegiance. Amongst his measures for the readjustment of finance was one which ordered the amount of all debts to be calculated upon the known value of property before the outbreak of war; and though prices had since fallen greatly, the average loss of the creditors was not ruinous to them. A still more popular measure was the recall of those sent into exile by the party of the nobles and Pompeius during past years. Finally Caesar probably now carried a measure which he had long had at heart: he bestowed the full *civitas* upon Cisalpine Gaul, thereby meting out tardy justice to its inhabitants and securing their loyalty to himself should he ever be threatened with an attack from the Pompeians by way of Northern Italy.

§ 5. Caesar had resigned his dictatorship within eleven days of assuming it. Early in the spring of 48 B.C. he rejoined his legions at Brundisium, and despite the fact that as many as five hundred ships of war were patrolling the coasts of the Adriatic and Ionian seas to prevent his crossing, he

* It is not clear that the prefect's nomination was strictly valid, but it was the nearest attainable approach to validity.

speedily contrived to throw one-half of his troops upon the coast of Illyricum, and was barely prevented from seizing Dyrrhachium (*Durazzo*). The remainder of his legions were long delayed in their passage, but at length M. Antonius faced every risk and landed them all in safety at Nymphaeum. He lost one vessel in the passage, but had the satisfaction of seeing a Pompeian squadron which had chased him go to pieces on the shores about his landing-place. Within a few hours he joined Caesar, and the entire army commenced to beset the camp of Pompeius. The admiral M. Bibulus, through whose remissness the legions had been enabled to cross, died of vexation or overwork, and his command passed to L. Scribonius Libo who proved no whit more fortunate.

For some months Caesar had been seeking in vain to induce Pompeius to fight. That general remained stubbornly on the defensive. He was indeed in a difficult position. True he had all the East at his back, and his eleven legions were swelled by contingents from Deiotarus and a dozen other Asiatic princes, while even the Parthians talked of sending him aid. His army was more than double that of Caesar, if its quality was not equal to its numbers. But Pompeius was in a false position: compelled by fortune to be the representative of the Roman conservatives, he found himself unable to keep in control the two hundred senators and the crowd of fugitive equites and grandees who wished to form as it were the government of which he should be the officer. Such men as Cato and Cicero—the latter had recently, after long debate, crossed over to the camp in Epirus—were not by any means the least tractable of his retinue. All were full of their own pretensions. They were the Roman State and Caesar was a rebel. Rome had sheltered the rebel, and upon both Rome and Italy they would take vengeance with fire and sword. The wealth of the peninsula, and the property of all who had not yet joined their banners, was to be divided amongst them. Above all, Pompeius must recollect that he was after all only their servant to do their bidding. Their threats drove Rome and Italy into Caesar's arms: their wranglings disgusted their general and his troops: and their incapacity

allowed Spain and Sicily to fall into the enemy's hands, and the enemy himself to land in Epirus, without their achieving a single success to counterbalance these losses.

Pompeius, even had he been less hampered by his would-be advisers, would not choose to fight until further reinforcements had reached him. He remained sullenly behind his lines about Dyrrhachium, and there Caesar determined to beleaguer him like another Vercingetorix in Alesia. To compel a capitulation he could hardly hope, for the Pompeians were in complete command of the seas; but he could count on putting out of action Pompeius' cavalry, his most formidable arm, and upon humiliating the conqueror of the East in the eyes of all the world. His army numbered but 22,000 men, yet with this force he constructed, and for some weeks successfully maintained, siege-lines extending to nearly fifteen miles, besides detaching two legions under Calvinus to move eastwards into Thessaly and Macedonia with a view to winning support in that direction, and preventing the arrival of succours from the East under Metellus Scipio. Pompeius at last broke through the lines, drove Caesar back with loss, and shook himself free again. Caesar instantly followed Calvinus into Thessaly. He succeeded in uniting with that officer, but he was unable to prevent a reinforcement of two legions under Scipio from making its way to Pompeius. He pitched a camp in the plain of Thessaly, upon the banks of the Enipeus, near Pharsalus (*Fersala*), and then quietly awaited events.

Flushed with his recent success, Pompeius soon appeared
Pharsalus. and entrenched himself upon hills near the river
to the east of Caesar's position. There, on August 9, he was forced against his will to fight. He had 50,000 legionaries, at least half as many light troops and archers levied from the whole of the East, and 7000 horse. Caesar had but 30,000 of all arms, including but 1000 cavalry. The attack came from the Caesareans. Pompeius had expected to have them come to close quarters already breathless from their charge: on the contrary they halted within a few paces of their foes to recover breath, and then fell to with all the coolness with which they had so often,

faced the Gauls. Meantime the Pompeian cavalry fell upon the flank of Caesar's army, and easily drove back his handful of horse; but they now found themselves face to face with the redoubtable tenth legion, and they proved unequal to the struggle. The tenth legion drove them from the field, and immediately moved up to the support of the line which was still fighting at close quarters with the Pompeians. This reinforcement decided the day: the Pompeians fled to their camp, whither the Caesareans followed them and carried it with a rush. Those who escaped at the time were surrounded and compelled to surrender before the next morning. Caesar's loss, he tells us, was 200 men: his enemy lost 15,000 dead and wounded and 24,000 prisoners, together with all the treasures and stores of the camp and eight legionary eagles. Pompeius fled on horseback and took ship to Lesbos, where he had lodged his wife Cornelia. Thence he pushed on with all speed for Alexandria.

§ 6. Alexander II. of Egypt, dying in 81 B.C., left his kingdom to Rome. With characteristic caution the Senate declined to accept the legacy: it was fearful of affording an opening for some ambitious governor, and therefore left Egypt still nominally independent in consideration of an annual tribute. The crown fell to Ptolemy Auletes, who held it until expelled in 58 B.C. His expulsion revived the question of senatorial interference: Caesar and Pompeius and Crassus all desired the commission to settle the Egyptian question, and the jealousy of the Senate finally found shelter behind an alleged oracle.* Gabinius, the tool of Pompeius, being now governor of Syria, cared nothing for oracles, and restored Auletes on his own responsibility (55 B.C.), leaving a considerable Roman force to maintain the restoration. Auletes died in 51 B.C., leaving as joint heirs his son and daughter Ptolemy XII. and Cleopatra, for whom the Senate named Pompeius as guardian. The two of course fell out: Pothinus, his minister, persuaded Ptolemy to expel his sister, who forthwith raised an army in Syria and moved upon Egypt from that quarter. In the neighbourhood of Pelusium the

State of Egypt.
Death of
Pompeius.

* See p. 45.

two rivals lay watching each other when (September 23, 48 B.C.) the galleys of Pompeius put in to the roads of Alexandria.

Pompeius' original design had been to seek refuge with the King of Parthia. This was frustrated by the attitude of Syria, which declared for Caesar. Cyprus followed suit, and Egypt alone of the Eastern nations offered an apparent refuge. Pompeius might indeed have gone westward and joined either his fleet under Libo or the remnant of the Pompeians in Africa or Spain; but he hated his aristocratic partisans, and he was ashamed of his defeat. The West knew him for what he was worth, while the East, he believed, still regarded him as the Great. He turned to Egypt, expecting to find ready support with the troops left there by Gabinius and with his ward Ptolemy XII. But Ptolemy, or Pothinus, was crafty: Pompeius was ruined, and Caesar would shortly come to demand an account of Egypt's conduct. To befriend Pompeius was but to incur Caesar's anger in a falling cause: to put him in Caesar's power was to win the conqueror's gratitude. Pompeius was treacherously invited to land, and while in the small boat which was to bring him to the shore, he was stabbed by one of his old soldiers, the tribune L. Septimuleius. It was the thirteenth anniversary of his triumph over the nations of the East. So died the champion of the aristocracy. He was truly one who "had greatness thrust upon him," and who proved unequal to the burden. As feeble a statesman as he was fortunate a general, he exhibits, as Mommsen says, "an example of spurious greatness to which history knows no parallel." His position as leader of a party he left to his two sons Gnaeus and Sextus.

§ 7. A few hours later arrived Caesar. He had but 3000 men with him, but forthwith occupied Alexandria, and proceeded to arrange matters in Egypt. He ordered Ptolemy and Cleopatra to be reconciled and resume their joint government, and demanded immediate payment of nearly half a million sterling due as arrears of tribute to Rome. The Egyptians murmured, and speedily broke out into revolt. Caesar with his handful of men was put into the extremest

Alexandrine
War.

Battle of Zela.

danger: he was compelled to burn his ships to prevent their capture, and once he had to swim for his life; but he had already begun to make headway against his enemies, when Mithradates of Pergamus appeared with an army of relief. In a battle upon the banks of the Nile the revolted Egyptians were dispersed (spring, 47 B.C.). Ptolemy was drowned in attempting to escape, and Caesar finally settled matters by declaring Cleopatra and her younger brother Ptolemy Dionysius joint sovereigns under Roman supremacy. He left a permanent garrison of three legions in Alexandria, but wreaked no vengeance upon its people.

Upon the fall of Mithradates of Pontus his son Pharnaces had been declared client-sovereign of the Bosphorus. He had taken advantage of the civil war, and especially of Caesar's detention in Egypt, to land in Asia Minor and help himself to all he could wrest from such of the Asiatics as had aided Pompeius. Caesar ordered Calvinus to stop this conduct: Calvinus was defeated at Nicopolis (*Enderetz*), and the progress of Pharnaces was only arrested by the arrival of Caesar which caused him at once to make apologies and to temporise. Caesar was dissatisfied: with one legion of his own troops, and the support of Calvinus and Deiotarus, he suddenly moved upon Ziela (*Zile*), attacked Pharnaces, and drove him out of Asia by this one stroke. *Veni, Vidi, Vici*, he phrased it in his despatch to the citizens at home. Pharnaces was dethroned, and his kingdom given to Mithradates of Pergamus, his half-brother. Deiotarus had supported Pompeius; therefore, he was stripped of the wide additions made to his kingdom by Pompeius in 62 B.C., and once more reduced to the position of a Galatian tetrarch, his place being taken by Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia. Caesar made no delay whether in the field or on the tribunal, yet it was already September when he returned to Rome.

§ 8. In the interim the Pompeians from all quarters had found a quiet rendezvous in Africa, where Campaigns of 47-46 B.C. in Africa. Juba, son of that Hiempsal to whom Pompeius Thapsus and Munda. had in 81 B.C. given the kingdom of Numidia, supported them with all his power and with all the presumption of a barbarian who felt himself able to make or mar the fortunes of the once omnipotent senatorians.

Thither came the refugees from Pharsalus and Greece; from Illyricum, where they had for a while held their own against Aulus Gabinius, only to be driven out by P. Vatinius, who routed the Pompeian admiral Marcus Octavius off Tauris (*Torcola*) in the spring of 47 B.C.; from Egypt after the reduction of the Alexandrine revolt; and from Spain, where the misconduct of Caesar's legate Q. Cassius Longinus had provoked a revolt which was pacified only by the delay of the Pompeians in sending leaders from Africa, and by the arrival of a more able Caesarean governor in C. Trebonius. The chief command devolved upon Metellus Scipio, father-in-law of the dead chief, while amongst his more prominent subordinates were Cato, Afranius, and Petreius. Left in quietude for a whole year, the fugitives recruited for themselves an army of ten legions, to which Juba added four more and a host of superb cavalry. Caesar's only hold upon Africa lay in the support of the native princes Bogud of Tingis (*Tangier*) and Bocchus of Eastern Mauretania (*Algiers*), who were both jealous of Juba, and in the population of the towns of the province of Africa, who looked to him to save them from the high-handed despotism of the Pompeians.

In October 47 B.C., after confronting and quelling a formidable mutiny of his veteran legions in Campania, Caesar sailed from Lilybaeum (*Marsala*), and landed unopposed at Ruspina (*Sahalil*), with less than 5000 men. The cavalry of his adversaries were too numerous to allow him to move freely, and for several months he barely maintained his position while awaiting the arrival of the remainder of his forces. At length, in the spring of 46 B.C., he felt himself strong enough to move from his lines at Ruspina towards Thapsus (*Demas*), which was held by Cato and a considerable garrison. Scipio, who was no general, at once gave battle before the walls, and with the most disastrous results. His entire army was annihilated: 50,050 men were left dead upon the field, and of these only the odd fifty were Caesareans (April 6, 46 B.C.), the Pompeian camp was taken, and Utica fell into the conqueror's hands when Cato, to avoid further bloodshed, took his own life. If the death of Pompeius marked the

overthrow of the senatorian power, that of Cato marked still more clearly the victory over its spirit. After him there was no party of the ancient Senate, though there were many pretended claimants to his place. Of the other leaders, Labienus, and Sextus and Cn. Pompeius, fled to Spain for one last effort; Scipio perished in the battle; Petreius, the man who had conquered Catilina, and Juba fell by each other's hands. The territories of Juba were mainly annexed to the province of Africa; the western part was given to Bocchus; the fortress of Cirta (*Constantine*) was made over to P. Sittius, the last of the Catilinarians, who after living the life of a military adventurer for eighteen years in the service of various African princes, had at last thrown in his fortunes with those of Caesar.

In Spain the Pompeian refugees found little difficulty in again raising an army, but their plans were aimless and their conduct stained with cruelties. When Caesar followed them thither in the first months of 45 B.C. his presence only roused them to worse excesses. The campaign, a brief one, centred chiefly about Corduba (*Cordova*). Some distance east of that town lay the small fortress of Munda, where Cn. Pompeius and Afranius were speedily blockaded. In a battle in the vicinity Caesar was completely victorious: his victory put into his hands Corduba, and made Sextus Pompeius a fugitive. Some weeks later fell Munda itself. Afranius had already fallen: Gnaeus Pompeius escaped for a time, but being betrayed he met his death soon after. Sextus maintained a guerilla warfare amongst the Lusitanian hills, to reappear in the troubles which followed upon Caesar's death. With Munda, however, the civil wars of Julius were ended. It remains only to speak of the use to which he put the power which he had thus won by four years of fighting.

§ 9. Caesar was consul in 48 B.C. In the following year
Powers of
Caesar.
 he was for the second time named dictator, and for an indefinite period. Holding this office throughout 47 B.C., he resigned it in 46 B.C.; being then consul for the third time. In the same year the dictator-

ship was bestowed upon him for ten years. In 45 B.C. he was sole consul, and no other curule magistrates were named. In 44 B.C. his dictatorship was renewed for the fourth time and for life, he being then for the fifth time consul. Over and above the absolute *imperium* conveyed by the tenure of these offices, he was in 48 B.C. invested with the privileges and powers of a tribune, including the right of *auxilium*, of veto, and of bringing laws before the popular assembly; and in 46 B.C. he received a quasi-censorial authority which gave him control over the constitution of the Senate, the judicial benches, and the populace generally. He had since 63 B.C. held the office of Pontifex Maximus. He was therefore by legal formulae constituted supreme in matters of executive, justice, legislation, and religion, and master of the entire armed forces of the Roman world.

The measures which he took upon the authority of these powers fall into three main divisions, according to *His Clemency*, as they aimed at the reorganisation of the home government, of the social condition of Rome, and of the relation of Rome with the provinces. It must be understood moreover that, once supreme, Caesar was no longer a partisan. In so far as affected his administration and legislation, he was neither a democrat nor a Sullan. The clemency which signalised his first return to Rome was maintained throughout his life. The implacable enmity of his opponents compelled him indeed to banish the chief of them, and to confiscate the property of a few; but of very few did he cause the death, and if he confiscated, he made due provision for the family of the outlaws. More than this, he recalled to Rome, almost without exception, all who had been banished before his dictatorship, of whatever political party; and in the year 44 B.C. he rescinded his own decrees against exiles in one universal amnesty. Nevertheless, his tolerance made him fresh enemies: he grew ever more unpopular for the simple reason that he refused to sanction proscriptions and massacres, or to go the Catilinarian length of cancelling all debts and giving over the wealth of those who possessed it entirely to those who had none. As for the nobles, of course they had, as a body, no love for the man who had whipped them.

As early as 48 B.C. the dissatisfaction of the more violent democrats found a mouthpiece in M. Caelius Rufus, then praetor. From decrying Caesar's financial measures of the preceding autumn he passed to mooted measures more to the taste of the rabble, and ultimately to an attempt at revolution with the abolition of all debts and rents as his party-cry. Driven from the city by the more loyal Caesareans he betook himself to Bruttium, whither came Milo from Massilia to join him; but the prefect of Capua crushed the attempted revolt and took the lives of its leaders. In the next year (47 B.C.) Publius Cornelius Dolabella, the third husband of Cicero's daughter Tullia, took up the same inane policy, and was put down by M. Antonius, the dictator's Master of Horse. He was banished for his pains, but soon afterwards restored to favour.

§ 10. Between the autumn of 49 B.C. and the summer of 46 B.C. (at which latter date Caesar celebrated a fourfold triumph over Gaul, Egypt, Pharnaces, and Juba) he had no time for legislation. The government of Rome was vested from year to year in consuls and praetors, often of his own nomination, controlled by city-prefects and Masters of Horse, whose appointment could not be challenged. In the overthrow of the old Senate it was inevitable that the government should thus pass into the hands of one man. Lepidus was city-prefect in 49 B.C., Antonius in 47 B.C. Similarly, the provincial governors were appointed by Caesar's sole will. But throughout the dictator was aware that such a course was tenable only during the time of his conflict with the Pompeians, and he felt the need of creating a new and more workable constitution which should replace the effete senatorial system. He did not live to realise his object. Two cardinal features of his designs can alone be traced: firstly, he would have no more of a Senate of *nobiles*, but a Senate that should represent all that was best in the Roman state irrespective of birth or degree; secondly, he intended to make permanent that supremacy of one to which he had himself attained. To the former end, he enrolled a new Senate of nine hundred members, including

in it men of all ranks and all opinions, and even a few prominent provincials. To the latter end he strove gradually to accustom the city to the presence of scarcely disguised monarchical authority, with all the powers and many of the insignia of monarchs elsewhere; keeping the new Senate very markedly within control, and exercising no less palpable a suzerainty over the comitia and the magistrates. It is commonly said that it was his policy to degrade the Senate, but this is not true: he destroyed the old Sullan Senate, and made it his task to raise up a new, more liberal, non-exclusive Senate with only those prerogatives which had always in theory belonged to the Roman Senate, as distinct from those which that body had in the course of generations usurped.

He dealt freely too with the Executive. The office of city-prefect was one which had existed under the kings, so that while there was no absolute novelty in its revival, it plainly marked Caesar's own assumption of sovereign powers. The number of praetors he increased to sixteen, and made similar innovations in regard to many minor magistracies; but such innovations found their justification in the fact that there was work enough for all to do. Indeed, not the least fault in the old system had been the jealous refusal of the Senate to multiply offices as need arose. What else he might have done towards reconstructing the constitution we cannot say. It need only be noted that when his heir Octavianus, then Augustus, developed the dictatorship of Julius into the completed Principate of the Emperors, not one of all these innovations of Julius but was retained as an essential in the fabric.

§ 11. Caesar's measures towards reforming the social
Social and
others. state of Rome and Italy were more numerous, but these, too, failed of their immediate fulfilment because of the renewed civil wars which followed his death. Of his financial measures we have spoken already, but it remains to note the deeper reasons which prompted them. Under the old *régime* the concentration of wealth in a few hands had led to the most bloody and ceaseless conflicts of the rabble with the rich, to the pauperisation of Italy and its consequent depopulation, and to

the spoliation of the provinces. Caesar aimed at remedying one and all of these abuses. Against the first he passed sumptuary laws, laws against hoarding, and levied new custom-dues upon imported articles of luxury; against the second he did away with the premium put upon pauperism by Clodius' extension of the Gracchan corn-doles to all applicants, and limited the number of those who should thus receive relief to 150,000 under penalty of heavy fines; to repopulate Italy he settled his thousands of veterans throughout its length and breadth, not in clusters here and there, that they might forget their old livelihood and settle down quietly to lives of industry, and not without the means to set up in their new life, but each with a modest but sufficient capital paid as prize money upon the occasion of their leader's triumph; to relieve and protect the provincials, he substituted direct money payments for the tithe (*decumae*) in Asia and so freed Asia from the *publicani*; he also imposed limits on the exactions of the governors and the

And for rapacity of the usurers. Indeed, it is Caesar's
 Provincials. greatest merit as a statesman that he acknowledged what no other Roman had yet brought himself to own—that until Rome and the provinces were brought to feel themselves to be one people with one common system of laws and privileges and duties, there could be no solid unity in the Roman empire. It was in furtherance of this unification that he revived the scheme of Gracchus and planted colonies of Romans in the provinces: that he extended the Latin Rights to many of the provincials, and to not a few the full *civitas*; that he even summoned provincials to seats in his new Senate; and that he plainly treated Rome as no longer *terrarum domina*, but simply *princeps*—the chief amongst thousands of other communities.

By other enactments—classed generally under the *Leges Iuliae* of 46 B.C.—he once more relegated the duties of jurors to the Senate and equites conjointly, a measure of decidedly anti-democratic tendency; he legislated again upon the ever-recurring question of bribery, and abolished the clubs which had been revived by Clodius in 58 B.C.; to prevent any one provincial governor from obtaining too great an authority at a distance from home, as well as to

provide room for new claimants, he fixed the duration of provincial commands to two years in the case of consular, one year in that of praetorian provinces; and lastly—the

And Others. one measure of which we reap the direct benefit to-day—he reformed the calendar, and in place of the old and faulty lunar year substituted the correct solar year of $365\frac{1}{4}$ days. So great was the accumulated error in the Roman calendar that to bring the new or Julian calendar into harmony with the course of the sun it was found needful to intercalate three months in the year 46 B.C., making a total of 445 days in that year, and earning for it the derisive name of the Year of Confusion. Finally, he amended and enlarged the law of treason or *maiestas*, and that relating to defamatory libel—a measure prompted by the ceaseless activity of professional lampoonists like Catullus and Nigidius Figulus; he strove to reform the domestic morality of the Romans, and by encouraging marriage to remedy the depopulation of the peninsula; he instituted a street-police for the protection of property and the maintenance of order; and he inaugurated by the building of the great Basilica Julia and the temple of Venus Genetrix that era of magnificent municipal improvement which was speedily to convert Rome from a city of brick to one of marble.

§ 12. Upon his return from Spain (September 45 B.C.),
 The Opposition and Caesar. Caesar celebrated another triumph, nominally over the Lusitani, while all classes vied with one another in heaping upon him the honours of royalty. He was declared consul for ten years, dictator for life, sacrosanct as a tribune; he was allowed to wear on all public occasions the purple robe of triumph and the wreath of laurel; and he took permanently the title of Imperator.

Meantime discontent grew apace. Apart from the extremists amongst nobles and democrats alike, even the men of moderate views nursed ill-will against him, if only in secret. Some feared him, still expecting an outbreak of violence and proscription; some hated him for the sake of friends lost or exiled; many envied him his high place.

Like every autocrat, he must needs make enemies for lack of means to confer favours upon all. And at heart all Rome disliked the man who had replaced the old turmoil and excitement of senatorial misrule by a government which left no room for the play of intrigue, canvass, bribery, and personal effort. All or most of these motives are discernible in Cicero's writings. Pardoned after Pharsalus, he had deserted the cause in which he had never felt confidence. He became a member of Caesar's new Senate and delivered at least three orations between the years 46-44 B.C., couched in terms of the humblest flattery towards his new master. But for the most part he withdrew to the privacy of his villas at Naples and Tusculum, busying himself, for lack of more congenial employment, with the composition of his treatise on oratory, the *Academics*, and the *De Finibus*. But in the active correspondence which he maintained throughout these years, one can read the restlessness and doubts of his mind; and he was but one of many who preferred the liberty of the past anarchy to political annihilation under the present monarchy.

"Monarchy," indeed, was the party-cry of all who were restless. The Romans hated the name of king as cordially now as when they had murdered Maelius and Spurius Cassius and the Gracchi; and those who desired to fan the discontent took every occasion to accentuate the reality of the monarchism of Caesar. They even pressed upon him the very title of *Rex*, to his manifest annoyance and anger. In particular M. Antonius, in all seeming one of his most loyal friends, intrigued ceaselessly against his patron. Caesar had other friends—C. Oppius and Cornelius Balbus, his secretaries; C. Matius and Asinius Pollio, men of letters—who never wavered in their loyalty; and with a royal disregard of danger he dismissed his bodyguard and moved about alone amongst the people, seeming to invite attack if it were offered.

§ 13. In the autumn of 45 B.C. he secretly adopted as his heir C. Octavius, his grand-nephew. At the same date he raised fresh legions and sent them into quarters at Apollonia to be in readiness for service in 44 B.C. He is said to have meditated an attack upon the

Parthians, who were at the moment supporting a Pompeian fugitive, Caecilius Bassus, in Syria. What was his real design is not known, but his departure was fixed for March 18, and his absence was expected to last for two years or more. He busied himself therefore in arranging for the continuance of the government during his absence: his friends Hirtius and Pansa were to be consuls of 43 B.C., P. Dolabella was to take over the second consulate of 44 B.C. upon his own departure from Rome; and he made similar arrangements for the remaining state offices.

On February 15, 44 B.C., M. Antonius, now consul, publicly offered him a regal diadem at the crowded festival of the Lupercalia. Caesar's angry refusal was watched with mingled applause and sneers, but Antonius had given a fresh impulse to the prevalent ill-will. Thirty days later, on the Ides of March (March 15), Caesar was assassinated in the Senate-house by a band of sixty conspirators. Chief of them were M. Brutus, praetor urbanus for the year, and to Caesar the object of an affection almost fatherly; C. Cassius, praetor peregrinus; Decimus Brutus, governor of Cisalpine Gaul; L. Trebonius, governor-designate of Bithynia; and L. Tillius Cimber. Indeed of the whole band there seem to have been few or none who did not owe preferment, either present or prospective, to the man they murdered, and none who owed him requital for any personal injuries or insults. Their chief motive was a blind belief that the traditions of the old republic demanded that they should sacrifice its subverter; and meaner motives were accessory, as with Cassius, who was dissatisfied to find his preferment less speedy than he had hoped. Cicero was not a party to the deed, but both he, and every one else save Caesar alone, felt that there was mischief in the air; and when the deed was done he disgraced himself, like Dolabella, by claiming to have been privy to the crime. Under pretence of presenting a petition Cimber hampered Caesar's movements while one P. Casca struck the first of the three-and-twenty blows which laid the dictator dead at the foot of the statue which he had himself caused to be erected in honour of Pompeius. "The most foolish murder that was ever committed," says Goethe; and the

meanest, for it was the work of ingrates who slew their benefactor, of philosophical sentimentalists who had no plan or purpose, of bigots who tried in cold blood to restore the old *régime* of violence and misgovernment, and who set up in lieu of peace a state of anarchy worse even than the former one. Nemesis overtook the assassins: of the whole sixty there was not one but died a death of violence.

CHAPTER XII.

THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES, 44—42 B.C.

§ 1. Feeling in Rome: the Liberators find no Support.—§ 2. The Senate resumes Confidence: Funeral of Caesar: Antonius and his Designs.—§ 3. Octavianus returns to Rome.—§ 4. Antonius estranges the Senate: the Senate supports the Liberators.—§ 5. Cicero heads the Opposition: Octavianus arms for the Senate.—§ 6. Battle of Mutina.—§ 7. Octavianus Master of Rome.—§ 8. Conference of Bononia: the Second Triumvirate.—§ 9. The Proscriptions: Death of Cicero.—§ 10. Partition of the Empire: Position of Sextus Pompeius.—§ 11. Campaign of 42 B.C.; Battle of Philippi.

§ 1. THE conspirators had expected to find the murder of Caesar hailed with delight by all classes. They were quickly persuaded of their mistake. So cold was their reception when they passed from the Curia to the Forum to invite the approbation of the populace, that they found it wise on the same evening to retreat to the Capitol, which they barricaded in expectation of attack. They had counted so surely upon the support of people and Senate that they had taken no thought as to what should be done when their deed was accomplished. Disappointed of their hope, they had neither plan nor purpose: the assassins were nonplussed, the people paralysed, the Senate dispersed in expectation of a general massacre. In this moment of doubt their opportunity was lost. While they hesitated, Lepidus marched with a legion into the Campus Martius, and thence into the Forum, regardless of the constitutional illegality* of such a course. Himself an officer of Caesar, he now turned to Caesar's colleague in the consulship,

* He held the *imperium*, and could not therefore pass within the *pomerium* without resigning the same or by special *privilegium*.

M. Antonius, sending to him assurances of his support. Antonius, like the Senate, was apprehensive of a general massacre of the adherents of Caesar, and knowing himself to have been the most prominent of those adherents, he had fled into hiding as soon as he was aware of the murder: but representing himself as Caesar's champion he persuaded Calpurnia, Caesar's wife, to give up to him the bulk of her husband's treasure and all his private papers, memoranda, etc., to prevent their falling into the hands of the assassins.

During the evening many of the senators took courage to believe that the assassins had no designs against the government at large. They ventured, therefore, to enter the Capitol. With them was Cicero. They debated long, but without any material result save that their action showed to some extent the strength of the anti-Caesarean faction amongst the nobles and senators. It was resolved that on the morrow there should be made to the people another and formal appeal. The attempt failed: the populace would hear of no compromise with the murderers of their favourite, and the upper classes dared not frankly show their approval of the murder while the people were so excited, and while Lepidus' legions and numbers of Caesar's veterans filled the streets. If the State, whether in the Senate or the popular assembly, should express its approval of the murder, then it would follow that Caesar had been a lawless usurper and that all Caesar's acts would be *ipso facto* invalid. The honours and offices, the rewards and punishments, which he had for so many years dispensed, would all alike be cancelled. In such a condemnation the interests of so many were involved that it would be in itself a revolution. And even supposing the claims of others were to be put aside or their dissatisfaction overlooked, at any rate Caesar's veterans were resolved to allow no measures which should invalidate the grants made to them by their late general; and they were so numerous in the city as completely to overawe any opposition.

§ 2. In these veterans Antonius saw his strength. The appeals of the Liberators—so the assassins styled themselves—had no result: the only citizen of note openly to approve their act was P. Cornelius

Dolabella, himself one of the closest of Caesar's friends, and destined to succeed as suffect to the consulship when Caesar should have left the city for his projected Parthian war. He hated Antonius, and to gratify this hatred he now declared himself one of the conspirators; but his conduct, by its very isolation, only proved to Antonius how feeble were the resources of the liberators and how few their supporters.

As consul, Antonius took at once the first place in the State. Having no longer reason to dread personal violence or to fear the attitude of the senators, he convened the latter in the temple of Tellus for March 17. On that day there was passed a bill of amnesty: the past was to be forgotten, the assassins were not to be called to account, and Caesar's acts were declared lawful and valid. Cicero sided with Antonius in advocating this course, and though some of the senators might demur, the attitude of the populace and of the veterans overruled their scruples. The veterans were much more interested in the maintenance of Caesar's acts than in the punishment of his murderers.

The Senate went further: it decreed a public funeral of Caesar's body, thereby declaring him to have been a benefactor of the State. If he were a benefactor, then his murderers were the opposite, and the Senate was to blame for not punishing them. As usual, the senators contradicted themselves. Moreover the publication of Caesar's will revealed the fact that he had left to each citizen the sum of three hundred sesterces, and to the populace as a body his magnificent pleasure-gardens beyond the Tiber, facing the Aventine Hill. At the funeral Antonius ordered the public herald to read the *Senatus consultum*, passed at the beginning of the year, which had awarded divine and human honours to Caesar, and also the form of oath by which the Senators had bound themselves to protect Caesar. He thus tried to satisfy both parties, but the tension was too great. The mob tore up the woodwork of the Forum as material for the pyre, and tried to seize the murderers. They had fled, but Antonius had gained his point: while seeming to be all for peace and conciliation, he had got himself declared the favourite

of the people in Caesar's place, and he had compelled his opponents to fly for their lives.

Indeed it was very evident that he intended to grasp a power like that of Caesar. In order to gain the support of the upper classes he professed the most absolute deference to the wishes of the Senate, and himself proposed the decree abolishing for ever the name of Dictator. Early in April he forcibly put down the agitations of one Herophilus or Amatius, a horse-doctor, who professed to be the grandson of the great C. Marius. This act pleased the nobles if it was not pleasing to the people; but the nobles in their turn grew alarmed when they found that under cover of the late decree that all Caesar's acts should be valid, Antonius was doing exactly as he pleased with the powers and possessions of the State. Of any measure which he might wish to carry, he had only to assert that it had been Caesar's wish or that it was entered amongst the dead man's memoranda. Himself without great personal influence, and representing no political party, he was compelled to buy the support of any who would sell it. Moreover he was a man of dissolute habits, and he needed large sums to pay for his costly indulgences. It was mainly for these ends that he so misused his authority, and it soon became known that any office or immunity could be purchased for an adequate price.

Nevertheless, although he had appropriated all Caesar's private means, and an enormous amount of State treasure besides, and though he continued to raise money by selling favours to all who would buy, he professed himself unable to pay the legacies which Caesar had left to the people. The people were angry, but Antonius required all he could lay hands on in order to purchase the support of the veterans and of rich and clever men: as for the mob, it might fume as it pleased, for he knew it to be powerless. When it became actually threatening he persuaded the Senate that his life was in danger, and so secured a legally-authorised bodyguard. He had contrived to buy at least the neutrality of Dolabella: he now set off for Campania to look after his interests amongst the veterans there. All was peaceful at present, but he was aware that his power could not long go unchallenged.

§ 3. Caesar had left no descendants, and in his will he had named as his heir C. Octavius, son of Atia, Octavianus. and grandson of his sister Julia. Octavius had been for some months in the military camp at Apollonia, amongst the legions destined for the Parthian war. Hearing of the death of Caesar, he at once crossed to Italy despite the advice of his friends. On landing at Lupia, in Apulia, he learnt that he had been named heir of Caesar. Again his friends tried to dissuade him, and again he refused to take their advice. He entered Brundisium to find himself hailed with enthusiasm by Caesar's veterans. Gently declining their too bold advances he moved slowly through Italy towards Rome. At Naples he met Cicero, who had left Rome when he found that the cause of the liberators was hopeless, that their counsels were worthless, and that the death of Caesar had only transferred his power to Antonius. He greeted Octavius with pleasure: here, thought he, was at least a legitimate claimant to Caesar's name, a rival to Antonius' pretensions, and to boot a mere lad who might easily be used as a tool in the interests of the republican party. Octavius gave no sign. Cautious beyond his years, he passed on to Rome without committing himself to any party. Arrived there, he found himself courted by all parties save Antonius, who despised him. He professed all loyalty to the Senate, boldly claimed his inheritance, took in due course the name of C. Julius Caesar Octavianus, and demanded from Antonius the funds handed over to him by Calpurnia. Antonius would not or could not find them. Thereupon Octavianus raised the money amongst his own friends and paid the legacies bequeathed by Caesar. From that moment he was sure of the support of the mob, and he lost no opportunity to further secure this in a quiet but crafty fashion.

§ 4. Like Cicero, the bulk of the republican party amongst the nobles and all the Liberators had found it wise to leave Rome. The Liberators indeed were hopelessly incapable, unable to act with energy, and equally unable to confess their inability. Brutus and Cassius still loitered near the city, hoping for a reaction in their favour. Decimus Brutus was the only one amongst them who gave sign of any

energy; he had gone to Cisalpine Gaul to assume the command for which Caesar had destined him there. Similarly C. Trebonius had withdrawn to his province of Asia, and L. Tillius Cimber to the government of Bithynia. Rid of their presence in Rome, Antonius set himself to secure a military force which should enable him to deal with them in the provinces in case they should have recourse to arms. His first object was to obtain control over the six legions quartered at Apollonia, but he dared not proceed too openly. He professed to find notes amongst Caesar's papers which authorised him to cancel the prospective commands of Brutus and Cassius in Macedonia and Syria respectively. Of the two provinces that of Syria was apparently the more valuable, for with it would go the conduct of the impending war against Parthia. This province he gave as a further sop to Dolabella, whose anti-Caesarean proceedings had led to further riots in Rome. He obtained a decree transferring to himself the government of Macedonia (June 1). Brutus and Cassius, thus ejected from their governorships, were asked to be content with petty commissions to superintend the grain supply. Shortly afterwards, Antonius obtained further decrees whereby Macedonia was given to his brother the praetor C. Antonius, while Decimus was ordered to surrender his command in the Cisalpine. This province, together with five of the legions in Illyricum, was transferred to M. Antonius, on the plea that Decimus and the other Liberators were meditating armed attacks upon the city, and that it was dangerous to leave such powers in their hands. The Senate demurred, but the people readily granted whatever Antonius asked. To Cicero and the Senate it seemed that resistance was hopeless, for their adversary was now formally equipped with all the forces he desired, and there was none to oppose him. Most of them left the city. Again Cicero, retiring to his various villas, busied himself in writing his philosophical treatises on old age, friendship, and similar matters.* Octavianus said nothing, but set himself quietly to raise troops on his own account. The Liberators declared invalid all these

* To this year belongs the composition of the *Tusculan Disputations*, *De Natura*

De Finibus, *De Divinatione*, *De Fato*, *De Gloria*, *Topics*, and *Ti*

various decrees as to the redistribution of provinces, and treated them as null. But they took no measures to fortify their position. Their only hope was built upon the successes of Sextus Pompeius, youngest son of the great Pompeius, who had come out of his hiding-place in the Spanish hills immediately upon Caesar's retirement after the battle of Munda, and had gradually made himself master of Spain. The Roman commander there was Asinius Pollio, an incapable, and to relieve him M. Lepidus was at this very moment raising four legions on behalf of the Senate.

§ 5. Things were not going as smoothly with Antonius as he could wish. He had lost the confidence of Senate and people, and though he had professed a reconciliation with Octavianus, he was daily growing more alarmed at the popularity of the latter. Apprehension made him fretful, and he vented his spite in a violent attack upon Cicero. The latter was undoubtedly the only man of ability in the ranks of the senatorial opposition, but he had done nothing to call for so sudden an attack. Nevertheless he had expected it: he replied with a speech which, if moderate, was at any rate fearless; and when Antonius declined to allow the matter to drop, Cicero published the famous oration which now stands second in the fourteen speeches against Antonius collectively known as the *Antonianae* or *Philippics*.* More than this, he stepped forward once more as the avowed leader of the party of constitutional government, and strained every nerve to rouse his countrymen against this mimic Caesar. The quarrel thus begun on September 1 was ended only by Cicero's death.

Matters grew more and more threatening for Antonius. The popularity of Octavianus advanced steadily with the populace and the veterans, for it was no secret that he offered a largess of 2000 sesterces to every man who would join his cause. Antonius saw that the appeal to arms would not be long delayed: he left Cicero and the Senate to govern as best they could, while personally he paid a second visit to Southern Italy. He found the country more disposed to support Octavianus than himself, nor did even

* So called as being, in style and tone and circumstances, somewhat similar to the orations of Demosthenes against Philip of Maced

the legions from Illyricum give him a very cordial welcome. He strove to secure their fidelity first by promises, then by punishment; but he could waste no more time. Octavianus, regardless of the fact that he had no *imperium*, was raising troops rapidly in Central and Northern Italy, bidding them assemble at Ariminum (*Rimini*), his excuse being that he intended to protect the Senate against Decimus. Decimus was now in possession of Cisalpina, and declined to retire in favour of Antonius, alleging the recent decree for the transfer of the province to have been informal, and therefore illegal. While he marched northwards to attack Decimus and to wrest from him the province which he declined to surrender, Antonius found his troops deserting by whole legions to Octavianus. Nevertheless he had an easy task, for the province was devoted to the Caesareans and ill-disposed to one of Caesar's murderers. In December he laid siege to Mutina (*Modena*), and kept Decimus immured within that town. Octavianus professed to await the Senate's orders. Cicero worked night and day to bring the Senate to solidarity and vigour: Octavianus, he declared, was loyal to the core, and he praised him as loudly as he attacked Antonius. But the Senate hesitated: it preferred anything to civil war, and it could not be brought to do Cicero's will by declaring Antonius forthwith a public enemy. Every moment was valuable, for while the Senate delayed, the three armies of Lepidus, of Plancus governor of Further Gaul, and of Pollio, might be preparing to enter Italy, no one could say whether to aid Antonius, or Octavianus, or the Senate.

§ 6. The new consuls (43 B.C.) were A. Hirtius and C. Vibius Pansa, both good senatorians. Hirtius was ordered to march upon Mutina, and Octavianus put himself and his legions at the consul's disposal. Meantime envoys passed to and fro between Antonius and Rome, but the former, far from making any concessions, only made demands which the Senate would not recognise. Towards the close of the month Hirtius received definite orders to drive Antonius out of the Cisalpine province. While Pansa was still on the way to join him, Hirtius had succeeded in drawing off the bulk of Antonius' army towards Bononia (*Bologna*),

but the siege of Mutina still continued. At length the two consuls, supported by Octavianus, made a joint advance upon that place. At Forum Gallorum, between Mutina and Bononia, Pansa was met by Antonius' veterans and mortally wounded (April 15). The arrival of Hirtius prevented a disaster. A few days later (April 21) the second consul fell* at the moment of his victory over Antonius beneath the walls of Mutina. The siege was raised, and Antonius withdrew beyond the Alps to seek for support from Lepidus. Octavianus, upon whom now fell the command, might have prevented his retreat; but he had reasons of his own for not doing so. Decimus, the man against whom Antonius had taken arms, was one of Caesar's murderers, and Octavianus had no mind to associate himself with an assassin for whose life his troops were daily clamouring.

§ 7. The refusal of Octavianus to do the Senate's bidding, and the consequent escape of Antonius, disillusioned that assembly as to Octavianus' real designs. Most of all did Cicero see too late how wrongly he had gauged his character. There was nothing to be hoped from Caesar's heir, and the fortunes of the republican party depended now upon Sextus Pompeius in the west, upon Decimus in the north, and upon Cassius and Brutus in the east. Decrees were passed creating Pompeius admiral, and ordering all the subjects of the State to support Brutus and Cassius, who were arming in the east, as legitimate governors of Macedonia and Syria; while Dolabella, who had left Italy at the close of 44 B.C., and had brutally murdered Trebonius, whom he found installed as governor of Asia, was declared a public enemy. But mere decrees are useless instruments of government: the Senate found itself again at fault when there arrived emissaries from Octavianus demanding for their master a place in the vacant consulate. Led by Cicero, the Senate refused it; whereupon Octavianus marched straight upon Rome. He met with no resistance, and on September 22, 43 B.C., while still not twenty years of age,† he was elected consul. His colleague was Q. Pedius, a grand-nephew of

* Ovid alludes to the events of this campaign in the line—

Cum cecidit fato consul uterque pari.

† He was born September 23, 63 B.C., in the year of Cicero's consulship. C

Caesar, and therefore cousin of Octavianus. Cicero and his fellow-republicans fled.

Octavianus' first care was to get passed bills interdicting the murderers of Caesar, declaring Sextus Pompeius to be a public enemy, and repealing the recent decree against Dolabella.* Then handing over the custody of the city to his colleague, he moved his army once more northward.

§ 8. There were now four armies beyond the Alps. Of these the forces under Pollio were quartered in Spain, and carefully kept out of action by their timid commander. Lepidus lay encamped in the eastern part of the Province, Plancus in the western portion. The army of Antonius, flying from Mutina, crossed the Apennines towards Genoa, was there joined by P. Ventidius with three raw legions, pushed across the Alps, and found itself face to face with Lepidus. That officer had already shown his sympathies with Antonius; but now that the latter was apparently ruined, the Senate hoped to find him abandoned by his friends. It was with consternation that it heard that, at Forum Julii (*Fréjus*), Antonius and Lepidus had come to an understanding, and that Plancus and Pollio had soon afterwards joined them. Decimus, who had boldly crossed the Alps, found himself disappointed of the support of any army in Gaul. He was forced to retrace his steps, and the united army under Antonius and Lepidus pressed him hard. His only resource was now to escape from Italy round the head of the Adriatic, and so effect a junction with Brutus in Macedonia. Before he could do this he was intercepted by Octavianus, now acting heartily with Antonius. Too weak to fight, Decimus attempted to throw himself across the Northern Alps into the Danube valley. His army deserted almost in a body to Octavianus, and a few days later his head was sent to Antonius by a Gaulish chief named Camelus. So fell the bravest and most capable of the liberators.

At the close of October, Octavianus, Antonius, and Lepidus met in conference near Bononia. Three days later they marched back upon Rome, entered the city, and posted

*, * Dolabella was slain about this time. See below, p. 193.

a list of proscribed. More than 200 senators and 2000 knights were included in the various lists from time to time issued. A few of them, such as Cicero, were political enemies; the greater number were men whose wealth tempted the envy of the conquerors, who had now a force of 40 legions to maintain. The horrors of the Sullan and Marian massacres were eclipsed by those of the present proscription: many, indeed, of the proscribed escaped to be subsequently pardoned, but there fell many whose names were not mentioned, and both the city and Italy at large were filled with outrage and rapine. The consul Pedius died of shame at the infamy of his position. He was succeeded by P. Ventidius Bassus, the son of a Picentine captive of the Social war, and for years first a stableman and then a common soldier in Caesar's army.

§ 9. Most notable of the victims of this proscription was Cicero. Antonius had never forgotten the language of the *Philippics*; Octavianus had been insulted more recently when making his request for the consulship. Nevertheless the offender might have escaped had he chosen. He hesitated long, and was finally overtaken by the pursuers at his villa near Formiæ. He did not resist, and quietly offered his neck to the sword. His head and hands were nailed up upon the Rostra, and Antonius' wife Fulvia avenged his language against her present husband and against her former consort Clodius by thrusting her needle through the tongue.

Livy says of him that, of all his misfortunes, he bore only death as a man should. Undoubtedly he was weak in his sorrows, and found it hard to practise the philosophic resignation which he was fond of preaching. But he was a true patriot, a staunch believer in the old *régime*, and no self-seeker. If he was unable to see that the march of events had made impossible the old state of things, this was a fault which he shared with every Roman of his day. He was vain; but he was pure in his moral life, as pure perhaps as the times allowed even in public life, and too honest and outspoken a patriot for his own security. He was one of the world's greatest orators and Rome's most voluminous authors, and to this day the purity and

elegance of his style are at once the admiration and despair of classical scholars.

§ 10. At the Conference of Bononia it had been decided that the three participants should combine to govern the Roman world, since it could not or should not govern itself. By this date, all eastward of the Adriatic was practically in the hands of Brutus and Cassius: there only remained to divide the western portions of the Empire, reserving the rest for subsequent reconquest and division. They took the style of *Triumviri Reipublicae Constituendae*—the second triumvirate. To the weak Lepidus was given the task of administering Rome, together with the consulship of 42 B.C. Antonius and Octavianus dared neither allow the other to occupy the seat of government; but Lepidus was little to be feared. Further, he received the command of the Spains and of Narbonese Gaul. Antonius received the rest of the Gauls. To Octavianus fell the seemingly unequal share of Africa, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica—that is, command of the city's corn-supply and the consequent maritime power for maintaining it. Having got rid of their enemies at home, and somewhat replenished their purses by proscription, the three turned their attention to their enemies abroad.

When the Senate declared Sextus Pompeius its admiral he was at Massilia (*Marseilles*), having at last been ousted from Spain by Pollio. The Senate's call gave him fresh boldness. Within a few weeks he was master of all the seas west of Italy, and had permanently fixed himself in Sicily. To him flocked many of the proscribed to swell the ranks of his now considerable army; he was in league with the pirates, and in a fair way to cutting off all supplies from the city. Famine in Rome meant riot—blind riot which would vent itself, regardless of party considerations, on whatever government happened to be in power at the moment. If the triumvirs were to be free to act against other enemies, they ought first to drive Sextus from Sicily, and protect the corn-ships from his assaults. This task fell to Octavianus, and it proved beyond him. He led his legions southward to Rhegium, where his admiral Salvidienus Otho was instructed to be in readiness to transport

them into Sicily; but Pompeius discomfited Salvidienus in the Straits of Messina, and Octavianus was compelled to look on at the defeat. There was no reaching Sicily while Pompeius was master of the seas, and the legions were accordingly hurried to Brundisium to join those of Antonius now in Macedonia.

§ 11. It has been said that Brutus and Cassius, having declined to recognise the validity of the bills whereby Antonius had sought to deprive them of their respective provinces, had gone severally to Macedonia and Asia in the beginning of the preceding year (43 B.C.). Brutus had had no difficulty in mastering Macedonia, for the provincials of the East generally leaned to the Senate rather than to Antonius and the Caesareans. Leaving the province in charge of his lieutenants, Brutus had thence passed into Asia, where Cassius had held his own by force and had revenged the death of Trebonius by that of his murderer Dolabella. The two Liberators rapidly raised new legions or won over such as were already in the East, and of the various client-princes of Asia the greater number lent them cordial assistance. Lack of money was their greatest difficulty, and to meet this they allowed themselves to treat the Asiatic cities in a fashion little calculated to retain their goodwill. Moreover, while thus occupied in Asia, they allowed the legates of Antonius, C. Norbanus and Decidius Saxa, to land in Illyricum, overrun Macedonia, and advance into Thrace as far as Mount Rhodope (*Despoto-Planina*). When, in the spring of 42 B.C., the great armies of Antonius and Octavianus were set in motion for the East, they were able to cross the Adriatic without hindrance, and quietly to unite with the forces of Norbanus and Saxa in the neighbourhood of Philippi. Brutus and Cassius, having crossed into Thrace by way of the Bosphorus, were too late to prevent the junction. The rival armies of the triumvirs and the liberators lay face to face, each numbering nineteen legions. The legions of Brutus and Cassius were numerically weaker than those of their adversaries; but, on the other hand, they were supported by a host of Asiatic and especially of Galatian auxiliaries, and their cavalry, 20,000 strong, was nearly twice as numerous as that of the

triumvirs. The weakness of the Eastern army lay chiefly in its want of competent officers. The poet Horace, as yet a mere youth of three-and-twenty years, and quite inexperienced in military matters, was promoted to the position of a tribune in its ranks; and his was certainly no exceptional case.

It was already late autumn when the decisive conflict at length occurred. The army of the triumvirs lay with Amphipolis in its rear, in the valley of the Nestus; that of the senatorians was entrenched upon two hills to the south-east; between the opposing camps lay Philippi. The attack came from the triumvirs. Octavianus, on the left, was opposed to Brutus; Cassius was opposed to Antonius. At the first onset Brutus drove back his assailant and actually stormed Octavianus' camp. Exactly the same success attended Antonius, and Cassius, believing the day to be altogether lost, put an end to his life. When the armies separated, the advantage, such as it was, was with the triumvirs.

Twenty days later the troops of Brutus forced him to join issue a second time upon the same spot. The battle was stubborn beyond precedent, but its issue was all the more decisive. Those of the senatorian legions who escaped from the field were either cut down by the pursuing cavalry of Antonius, besieged by Octavianus in their camp, or forced to surrender in detail. Brutus followed the example of his dead colleague, and slew himself. Only a small remnant got away to join Sextus Pompeius in Sicily (autumn, 42 B.C.).

CHAPTER XIII.

THE SECOND TRIUMVIRATE, 42—31 B.C.

§ 1. Second Partition of the Empire.—§ 2. The Perusine War.—
§ 3. Treaty of Brundisium . Treaty of Misenum —§ 4. Sicilian War :
Deposition of Lepidus.—§ 5. The Eastern Question : the Jews.—
§ 6. The Parthians —§ 7. Campaign of Crassus : Battle of Carthage.
—§ 8. Cicero in Cilicia : Ventidius in Syria.—§ 9. Antonius and the
Parthians.—§ 10. Relations of Octavianus and Antonius —§ 11. The
Quarrel : Antonius occupies Greece.—§ 12. The Battle of Actium :
Death of Antonius and Cleopatra.

§ 1. WITH the exception of the disorganised rabble which followed Sextus Pompeius, the entire forces of the Roman world were now in the hands of Octavianus and Antonius. Lepidus was indeed nominally their colleague, but their first proceeding after the victory was to intimate to him that he was not competent to command the provinces lately assigned to him. Some months later he was reinstated as governor of Africa, but he never regained his former power. His rivals quietly divided the world between them : Octavianus took Italy and the West, Antonius took Greece and the East.

They had next to satisfy the demands of the legions—more than forty—to all of whom had been promised lands and money. Antonius undertook to raise the money in Asia ; Octavianus dispossessed whole towns and districts in Italy to make room for legionary settlers. All ranks suffered alike, and suffered without compensation. The poet Vergil was a rare exception ; ousted from his patrimony at Andes

near Mantua (*Mantova*), he was befriended by Asinius Pollio, now governor of the Cisalpine, and by help of his good offices recovered his property. Three other poets—Horace, Tibullus, and Propertius—were less fortunate, and theirs was the fate of thousands. Octavianus succeeded indeed in satisfying his legions, but he raised up further discontent amongst the Italians whom he dispossessed.

§ 2. Meantime Antonius had passed into Asia, had levied heavy indemnities which he neglected to remit to Italy, and had met Cleopatra. His wife Fulvia, left behind in Rome, heard that her husband was the plaything of that middle-aged Oriental beauty, and she was ready for any plot which might bring him back. Her brother-in-law, L. Antonius, consul for 41 B.C., afforded her an opportunity: he was envious of Octavianus' position, and eager to attain to a power such as his brother's, but he professed only alarm that Octavianus was seeking to rid himself of M. Antonius as he had rid himself of Lepidus. Lucius stepped forward as an agitator. He found material enough upon which to work—restless legionaries, Italian and Roman landowners dispossessed and beggared, the city rabble again threatened with famine by reason of Sextus' sovereignty of the seas. True he had no party-cry, but it was a time when the restlessness of revolution was upon all men, and he might levy whole legions and none ask why. He had the assurance of support from half a dozen commanders of troops within or about the northern frontiers of Italy, including Pollio in the Cisalpine and Ventidius in Illyricum. At the close of 41 B.C. he openly took up arms at Praeneste (*Palestrina*), and a few days later was master of Rome.

It was not for long. Octavianus seems to have been taken quite by surprise; he had but four legions in arms, for Salvidienus had just set out with the remaining six for Spain. Nevertheless, he faced his enemy boldly, leaving the active conduct of the war to M. Vipsanius Agrippa. L. Antonius seems to have had small talent for command. Within a few weeks he was shut up in Perugia (*Perugia*), and, after a desperate and protracted resistance, there forced to surrender. His promised allies all failed him, leaving him to struggle alone through a siege which gave to his

attempted revolution the name of the Perusine war. Octavianus spared his prisoner's life—M. Antonius was already on the way to Italy, and would demand a heavy reckoning for any outrage offered to a brother—but he showed his appreciation of Fulvia's part in the affair by divorcing from himself her daughter Clodia and marrying Scribonia. Fulvia died in the early part of 40 B.C.

§ 3. After nearly two years' absence M. Antonius deemed it advisable to revisit Italy, doubtless hoping that his brother's unlucky *coup* might have a profitable issue, in which case he would be on the spot to take advantage of it. So far was he prepared for open quarrel with his colleagues that he came to terms with Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, the son of the man who had resisted Caesar at Corfinium, under whom the fleet of Cassius and Brutus still kept together in the Eastern Mediterranean, and with Sextus Pompeius. On landing at Brundisium, he found that Perusia had already fallen, and that Agrippa had brought up the legions recently employed against Lucius to act, if need were, against himself. But Octavianus was not desirous of war; his envoys, C. Cilnius Maecenas and L. Cocceius, with the shifting Asinius Pollio, contrived to arrange matters amicably. Antonius went back to his eastern government, under promise to re-establish the dignity of Rome against the Parthians along the Euphrates; the boundary of his command towards the west was to be Scodra (*Scutari*); Lepidus was to retain his African provinces; all the rest of the Roman world was to belong to Octavianus, saving that Italy itself was to be the joint property of himself and of Antonius; and Octavianus was to settle matters with Sextus Pompeius, whether by treaty or by arms. Such were the terms of the Treaty of Brundisium, 40 B.C. It was clinched by the marriage of Antonius to Octavia, the sister of Octavianus.

Scribonia, the second wife of Octavianus, was aunt to the wife of Sextus Pompeius. That outlaw was still as redoubtable as ever, and thus far there had been no time to deal with him. In the latter half of 40 B.C. he was more than ever in evidence, and the consequent corn famine at Rome led to serious riots. Octavianus was glad to find in

his new relationship a plea for overtures to Sextus. The father-in-law of Sextus, Scribonius Libo, acted as negotiator. At Misenum (*Punta di Miseno*), in 39 B.C., the two met and arranged the terms of alliance. Sextus was to be made a partner with Octavianus and Antonius, receiving as his province the islands of Sardinia and Corsica, Achæa and Sicily, for just so long a time as his colleagues should retain their commands; in return he was to cease to molest the shores of Italy, and to guarantee the corn-supply; free pardon and the restoration of their property was accorded to his followers, and to Sextus himself was paid over a large part of his father's estate. As at Brundisium, so at Misenum, matters were further secured by a matrimonial alliance: Sextus' child-daughter was betrothed to M. Marcellus, the infant son of Octavia by her first husband.

§ 4. Within a year the peace was forgotten. Sextus declined to evacuate those coast towns of Italy which he had occupied, and when remonstrated with, recommenced his old buccaneering warfare. Diplomacy having failed, Octavianus had recourse to force, but his success was long in coming. At the outset of the campaign his admiral Calvisius, bringing up a large fleet from Etruria, was defeated in the bay of Cumæ; while Octavianus in person with a second fleet approaching Sicily from the Upper Sea, was attacked at Scyllæum and narrowly escaped with his life (38 B.C.). Lepidus and Antonius had already been summoned to aid him in dealing with Sextus: the former had other objects in view, and lay idle; the latter did not arrive from the East until early in 37 B.C. In the meantime Octavianus had so far strengthened his hands, thanks mainly to the energy and genius of Agrippa, that he felt himself able to dispense with Antonius' services, the more so as the original five-year term of the triumvirate was now expired. The friction between the two had already reached an acute stage when the diplomatic talents of Maecenas and Cocceius again effected a readjustment. Maecenas conferred (38 B.C.) with Antonius at Athens, his journey thither having been immortalised by Horace, who accompanied him as far as Brundisium.* It was arranged that

* Hor., *Sat.* I. v.

the triumvirate should be renewed for five years more, and that Antonius should lend a fleet of a hundred and thirty sail for the Sicilian war, in exchange for four legions to aid him in his Parthian campaigns. This was the Treaty of Tarentum, so called from the scene of the meeting of the triumvirs.

In 36 B.C. Octavianus set himself finally to master Sextus. It was a difficult task, despite the reinforcements from Antonius and the co-operation of Lepidus, whose plans now led him to accede to Octavianus' request for aid, and to land in Sicily with a considerable land-force. A projected triple attack was frustrated by the wreck of Octavianus' squadron off Velia, but Statilius Taurus effected a landing at Tauromenium (*Taormina*). Q. Cornificius took command of the legions, while Octavianus placed his own fleet under Agrippa at Strongyle. A small success gained by Agrippa off Mylae was neutralised by the total destruction of the fleet under Octavianus and Taurus at Tauromenium. Once again the triumvir repaired his fleet, while Cornificius gallantly held his own, and Lepidus hurried up from the westward to combine with him and with Agrippa. Sextus was forced to fight his last battle off Naulochus, and there lost well-nigh the whole of his fleet. He fled to Lesbos, whence he endeavoured to foment fresh trouble amongst the client-states of Asia or to come to terms with Antonius. Foiled in both attempts, he lost his life at the hands of a petty officer of Antonius in 35 B.C.

The battle of Naulochus finally cleared the seas around Italy and recovered Sicily for Octavianus: it was the cause too of the downfall of Lepidus. With ambition greater than his abilities, Lepidus fancied himself qualified to fill the place vacated by the flight of Sextus; instead of assisting Agrippa to reduce Messana, the last stronghold of the Pompeians, he made terms with the defeated party. His hopes were short lived: his men, refusing to fight for him, went over to Octavianus in a body. Lepidus had no resource but to sue for pardon. From that day he ceased to be accounted amongst the triumvirs, but his only punishment was a forced retirement to Circeii, where he lived to enjoy his office of Chief Pontiff for four-and-twenty;

§ 5. For some five years after the settlement of the East by Pompeius (63 B.C.), the Roman governors of Syria found little difficulty in maintaining order along the frontier of the Euphrates. Aulus Gabinius, however, proconsul of Syria in 57 B.C., found war a lucrative method for recruiting his exhausted purse; he availed himself of various excuses to chastise the Arabs of the Nabathæan desert, and the Jews who were disturbed by the revolt under Alexander.

In 161 B.C., the Jews, conquered and outraged by Antiochus Epiphanes of Syria, were in open revolt under Mattathias the Maccabee. They appealed for aid to Rome. It was at a time when the Senate was in a condition of utter apathy, and entirely under the control of the moneyed class; it made an alliance with the Jews, but it was by their own efforts that that people threw off the yoke of Syria and became a conquering kingdom under the Maccabean or Asmonean princes. Presently troubles arose in the Jewish palace. Aristobulus (107 B.C.) set an example of despotism which was improved upon by his successors, until (about 70 B.C.) the rivalry of two brothers, Aristobulus and Hyrcanus, led to civil war. Hyrcanus, the high priest and the representative of the orthodox religious party of the Pharisees, was expelled by Aristobulus, the king and the heterodox partisan of the secularising Sadducees. He threw himself upon the protection of Aretas, prince of the Nabathæi. Aretas was besieging Aristobulus in Jerusalem when Pompeius interfered (63 B.C.), got rid of Aretas, deposed Aristobulus, and set up Hyrcanus and the orthodox party. Alexander was the son of Aristobulus and heir to his ambition: he raised civil war against the Roman nominee Hyrcanus on three successive occasions between the years 57-54 B.C. Gabinius was as successful a general as plunderer: he reduced Alexander, abolished the monarchy whether orthodox or otherwise, and divided Palestine into five provisional principalities.

§ 6. King Phraates of Parthia, the ally of Rome against Tigranes of Armenia, had been murdered by his sons Mithradates and Orodes, who forthwith fell to civil war. Orodes made himself master of the throne, and the fugitive Mithradates applied for aid to Gabinius; whereupon the

legions were ordered to cross the Euphrates. At this juncture Ptolemy Auletes, the expelled prince of Egypt, also invited Gabinius' aid. He had been compelled to leave his kingdom partly because he taxed his people beyond endurance, partly because he refused to comply with their demand that he should reassert the Egyptian sovereignty over Cyprus in defiance of the Senate; and he had in vain wasted time in appealing to Rome for his restoration.* Now an invasion of Egypt promised easier laurels than any attack on Parthia; it would certainly prove more lucrative, even if Ptolemy had not added a bribe of 10,000 talents to his appeals; and it was tempting thus to take up the settlement of a kingdom in which neither Caesar, nor Crassus, nor Pompeius, had been allowed to interfere. Gabinius abandoned his Parthian expedition, and without waiting or asking for the Senate's authority, entered Egypt and placed Auletes upon the throne of Alexandria (55 B.C.). He returned to Rome in the same year, a wealthy man with many enemies. His unauthorised interference in Egypt, his desertion of his own province, and his notorious corruption, furnished grounds enough for impeachment. Cicero led the first attack, but failed to secure a verdict in face of Pompeius' patronage of the accused. A few months later (54 B.C.) Gabinius was impeached a second time, and, although Cicero was now his advocate, he was sent into exile.

§ 7. Late in the same year M. Licinius Crassus, pro-consul, arrived in Syria to assume the command in Syria allotted to him by the *Lex Trebonia* (55 B.C.). He found an ally in Abgarus, client-prince of Osroene, crossed the Euphrates, and occupied a number of fortresses on its eastern banks. The winter months he employed in levying contributions throughout Syria and the neighbouring districts, notably from the temples of Hierapolis (or Bambyce, *Membrje*) and Jerusalem. In 53 B.C. he set his whole army in motion: he had small respect for his foes, and anticipated an easy march, even to the Parthian capital of Seleucia in Babylonia. Three routes were open to him: the safest course was to accept the invitation of Artabazes,

* See p 145.

king of Armenia, naturally an enemy of his too aggressive Parthian neighbours, and by traversing the fertile valleys of that kingdom to descend upon Seleucia from the north; the next best route was that proposed by his legate C. Cassius Longinus (afterwards one of the "Tyrannicides" or "Liberators"), who recommended him to follow the course of the Euphrates and provision his army by help of a flotilla; the third alternative was to strike at once across the Mesopotamian desert. This was a reckless plan, but Crassus chose it. Crossing the river on the north of Syria, he marched some distance beyond Edessa (*Orfah*). His own confidence was flattered by the treacherous encouragements of Abgarus, who professed to act as his guide. It was not until fording the upper waters of the Chaboras (*Chebar*) that he met his enemy, the Surena or Vizier of Orodes, awaiting him with the full host of the famous Parthian cavalry. No armour could withstand the force of their arrows, and the legionaries were compelled to stand for hours inactive beneath the missiles of foes whom they could not reach. Crassus had but a handful of horse, under his son Publius: to throw it amongst the thousands of the Parthians was mere madness, yet there was no other resource. Publius charged, and fell fighting with all his men; whereupon the Parthian lancers assaulted the legions and drove them back in confusion. Night ended the slaughter. On the next day the remnant reached Carrhae (*Haran*), but they could not remain in a town without supplies. The retreat was renewed, and Crassus might even yet have escaped into Armenia, but unluckily he allowed himself to be entrapped unarmed and almost unattended into a conference with the Surena, who hung upon his rear. He was cut down with all his staff. The remnant of his troops escaped under Cassius to Antioch, leaving 10,000 prisoners in Orodes' hands, and 20,000 dead upon the plains of Mesopotamia.

So ended the life of Crassus the triumvir. His death set face to face his two colleagues in the coalition of 60 B.C., and it was only when his place was vacant that men realised how his civilian and financial weight had served to trim the balance between two rivals whose interests lay in less

peaceful paths. The disaster at Carrhae was the prelude of the civil wars, but, at the moment, Crassus' death was doubtless felt rather in the commercial than political world of Rome.

§ 8. Following up his successes, Orodes in 52 B.C. despatched his son Pacorus to ravage the Roman provinces west of the Euphrates, where Cassius fought bravely against heavy odds. He had already driven off his assailants when Cicero arrived in Cilicia in 51 B.C., but a recurrence of the invasion was known to be imminent and for a moment it seemed that Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia would make common cause with the Parthians. Such an occurrence was prevented by the bold front displayed by Cassius and Cicero conjointly, though wretchedly supplied with troops: there was for the present no further Parthian inroad. Cicero found plenty to do in his province, and he did it in a fashion which astonished the natives; for once they enjoyed the presence of a governor who was no extortioner, and one who even interfered to prevent the extortions left as legacies by previous governors and others. He would not even avail himself of the supplies to which he was legally entitled. Some idea of the condition of the Asiatic provincials may be gathered from the facts that the pauper-prince of Cappadocia was unable to meet even the cost of the interest on a loan contracted with Cn. Pompeius by a payment of nearly 400 talents *per annum*, and this too was only one amongst several of his debts; while M. Brutus, the Liberator, being surety for moneys owing from the Salaminians of Cyprus to two private speculators in Rome, was, indirectly at least, a party to the starvation of five of their senators as a means to securing payment. Cicero found occupation for his troops in attacking some independent robber-tribes of the Amanus mountains (*Alma Dagh*) on the frontiers of Cilicia and Syria, for which he was thanked by the Senate.

The attitude of Parthia was still (50 B.C.) so threatening as to furnish the excuse for depriving Caesar of two of his legions, ostensibly for service in Syria, although they were never sent thither. For the next five years the arms of the legions were occupied with the civil wars, and it was the good fortune of Rome that during that period Parthia

distracted by internal troubles consequent on the attempts of Pacorus to depose his father. About 45 B.C., Q. Labienus, son of Caesar's faithless legate, and now an exile, fled to the Parthian court and busied himself with fomenting another Parthian war, while about the same time Caesar was massing his legions in Illyricum for a rumoured attack upon all the great kingdoms of the East. This design, if it was ever entertained, was stayed by his assassination: the legions were recalled into Italy, and shortly afterwards the liberators, by means of Labienus, endeavoured unsuccessfully to obtain the support of Parthia in the campaign which closed at Philippi (42 B.C.). At the close of that year P. Ventidius Bassus, proconsul, assumed the government of Syria, successfully resisting the inroad of Orodes and Labienus in 39 B.C., and gaining two further victories when the invasion was repeated in 38 B.C. Antonius was now ruler of the Roman East, but between the complications of his relations with Octavianus and Sextus Pompeius, and the blandishments of Cleopatra, he found no time to assume the aggressive campaigning to which he was pledged. About the year 37 B.C., a domestic revolution put another Phraates on the Parthian throne, and drove many of his rivals into the camp of Antonius; amongst them one Monaeses, who did his best to stir Antonius to action.

§ 9. In 36 B.C. Antonius at length set about fulfilling his portion of the articles of the Treaty of Tarentum. With the King of Armenia as his ally he pushed forward to Media Atropatene (*Azerbaijan*), a dependency and ally of Parthia, and laid siege to its capital city Praaspa. At once the Parthian cavalry flocked about his lines, cut off his supplies, and hampered every movement. Hopeless of taking the place, he was compelled to beat a retreat as best he could, narrowly escaping something worse than mere disgrace in presence of the rigours of the early Armenian winter. Moreover his Armenian allies had deserted him at the first signs of ill-success; and had it not happened that the victorious Medians and Parthians fell out over the division of their booty he would have been left without an ally beyond the Euphrates. As it was the Median Artavasdes revenged himself upon Parthia by offering his

services to Antonius, who professed to welcome the offer but schemed vengeance for his late rebuff. After wasting another year with Cleopatra, he suddenly reappeared in Armenia (34 B.C.), overran the whole country, and taking Artavasdes quite by surprise, captured that monarch's person. Satisfied with personal advantages, he once more returned to Alexandria, where he outraged Roman sensibilities by celebrating a mock triumph, and still more by openly acknowledging as his heirs the offspring of his union with Cleopatra. To Cleopatra he pretended to give the sovereignty of Coele-Syria and Cyprus, to her sons Alexander and Ptolemaeus respectively the empires beyond the Euphrates and the kingdoms of Syria with Cilicia and Phoenicia, and to her daughter, the younger Cleopatra, the principality of Cyrene. Worst of all, he publicly acknowledged another son of Cleopatra, whom she had caused to be named Caesarion after his alleged father, to be truly Caesar's son and heir, thereby tacitly declaring Octavianus to be no true heir to the inheritance which he had taken. It seemed that Antonius' head was turned, and the Roman nation, striving still to gloss over the failings of one of themselves, grew to look upon Cleopatra as a sorceress at whose door lay the guilt of his un-Roman sins. As for the Parthians they remained unassailed and as redoubtable as ever, and the standards won from Crassus at Carrhae still hung unreclaimed in their temples. But Antonius made no further movement against them: on the contrary, he even sought to find beyond the Euphrates supporters who should furnish him with oriental armies for the conflict which he felt to be impending with Octavianus. By conceding to the Median king a part of Armenia, and furnishing him with aid to resist Parthian aggressions, he obtained a supply of cavalry and the restoration of some captured standards.

§ 10. Octavianus meanwhile had largely strengthened his position in the West. Not only had the recent proscriptions and wars disposed of most of the remnant of the old nobility, but Octavianus' bearing was studiously calculated to conciliate all classes, and he found cordial support in his ministers Agrippa, Maecenas, and Messala. Moreover he won laurels in wars for the honour of the State; he

carried out a scheme of Julius in the reduction of the Ligurian Salassi and the Taurisci of the Western Alps, and after three years' hard fighting (35-33 B.C.) he added to the empire the province of Dalmatia, reaching from Illyricum (constituted a separate province by Julius) to the Sabis (*Sava*). In contrast with the debauchery and ill-success and sultanism of Antonius, he daily grew in favour as the true champion of Rome, and he craftily nursed the contempt and disgust with which the Italians regarded Antonius' intercourse with the Queen of Egypt. The belief gained ground that Antonius was bent upon making Cleopatra formally his consort, reducing the West to his sway, and transferring to Alexandria the empire of the world. The belief was a happy one for Octavianus: it enabled him, when the time came, to make war upon his rival under pretence of crushing the alien queen and saving Rome from oriental dominion.

Year by year the relations between the surviving triumvirs became more strained. Antonius felt that he was losing, and his jealousy made him eager to pick a quarrel, while Octavianus shrewdly bided his time, resolved to leave to his rival the odium of the first attack, and thereby to put him in the wrong. Antonius complained that Lepidus had been deposed arbitrarily, and that he had himself received no share of the spoils. Octavianus, in reply, said that the alleged vast conquests of Antonius in the East made any such share a mere nothing, and further remonstrated with him on the treacherous seizure of Artavasdes, on his un-Roman conduct in Alexandria, on his treatment of Octavia, and on his recognition of Caesarion as Julius' heir. Such recriminations were merely excuses: Antonius meant to have war, and he got it.

§ 11. The consuls for 32 B.C., Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus and C. Sossius, were both partisans of Antonius. They took upon themselves to attack Octavianus in the Senate, whereupon the latter, professing to be in fear of his life, came into the Curia with an escort of armed retainers, and replied with a vigorous denunciation of the consuls and their chief. The consuls at once fled to Antonius, who was

now collecting his forces in Greece. A few days later Cn. Plancus and M. Titius came over to Octavianus' side and divulged the contents of Antonius' will, to which they had acted as witnesses. The knowledge that Antonius had devised whole divisions of the empire to the children of his paramour, inflamed the people beyond restraint. They clamoured that war should be declared, and in the autumn Octavianus, as representative of the Roman State, took command of the legions now called out under plea of war against Cleopatra. Antonius thereupon divorced Octavia. His advisers would have had him send away Cleopatra, and thus rid himself of the person whose presence militated most actively against his cause, but this he refused to do: she furnished him with a fleet and 220,000 talents, but her fascinations alone would have made her welcome in her admirer's camp.

Antonius had intended an immediate descent upon Italy, and for this purpose he had concentrated his forces at Corcyra (*Corfu*); but hearing that Octavianus had already crossed to Epirus he remained in Greece, and when he at length discovered the falsity of the rumour the season for activity was past for that year. Octavianus was still in Rome, nor did he leave the city until January of 31 B.C. He was now consul for the third time with Messala as his colleague; and the term of his triumvirate having expired, he had laid down its extraordinary powers.

§ 12. Octavianus had 80,000 legionaries and 12,000 horse, with a fleet of some 250 Liburnian galleys, light vessels manned by crews bred and born to the sea. Antonius had 100,000 legionaries, cavalry as many as his rival, and auxiliaries from almost every eastern state of the empire to the number of at least as many thousands more; while his fleet counted 500 sail of the heaviest ships of war, vessels difficult to manœuvre and only moderately manned. He resolved to meet his antagonist first at sea, and his armament lay in readiness in the Gulf of Ambracia (*Arta*). Octavianus appointed Agrippa his admiral: by a piece of fortunate promptitude Agrippa transported the legions safely to Epirus, while Corcyra surrendered at the approach of Octavianus, who forthwith sailed northwards direct for

the enemy's roadstead. He joined his legions at the upper extremity of the northern promontory which closes in the Gulf of Arta. Here he entrenched himself to await results. The Antonian army was encamped at the southern extremity (Actium) of the same peninsula about the temple of Apollo which stood there. For some days no change occurred, but the ill-chosen site of the Antonians' camp told upon their health, and defection began to spread amongst the ranks of their oriental auxiliaries; while the squadrons of Agrippa and the cavalry of Statilius Taurus inflicted constant damage upon them. Amongst the first of the deserters was the consular Domitius: the client-princes of Pisidia, Galatia, and Paphlagonia followed suit. So ill did matters go that Antonius began to think of withdrawing to Egypt, for he could not, or would not, rid himself of Cleopatra. To cover the retreat of the legionaries and treasure-ships, the rest of the fleet was ordered to offer battle. The Caesareans joined issue at once. It was a struggle like that of the English with the Spaniards of the Armada: success went not to the huge floating batteries of Antonius, but to the nimble craft of Agrippa's flotilla. In the midst of the battle Cleopatra, with her sixty vessels, took to flight, and as if by concert Antonius in person followed suit. The fleet which he had deserted fought on desperately until the Caesareans brought up fire-ships and destroyed, sank, or captured the whole armament (September 2, 31 B.C.). A week later the Antonian legions under Canidius, learning of Antonius' desertion, went over in a body to the victor.

Leaving Agrippa to return to Rome and control affairs at home, Octavianus with a few picked legions marched on to Egypt, welcomed or accepted everywhere as the conqueror he was. Cleopatra awaited his arrival in Alexandria: her first impulse had been to abandon Egypt, but she had now resolved to face Octavianus and to seek to make of him such another conquest as she had made of Antonius. But her artifices were useless here: her conqueror showed no sign of pity, and Cleopatra could not endure to be paraded in a Roman triumph. She killed herself only a few hours after Antonius, upon a false report of her death, had likewise made an end of his life. Thus was Caesar's heir saved

the difficulty of dealing with his two last enemies. He clinched his new-found security by the execution of Caesarion, Cleopatra's son, whom Antonius had proclaimed to be born of Julius. One or two others of those of the Romans who had taken Antonius' side also paid for the error with their lives, but there was no extensive punishment of the vanquished. Octavianus could now feel himself safe. He had saved Rome, and Rome quietly acknowledged the debt. From the day of Actium dates the *de facto* existence of the Principate and the *de facto* recognition of Octavianus as first of the Emperors.

CHAPTER XIV.

SOCIETY AND LITERATURE AT ROME.

§ 1. The Republic and the Principate — § 2. Social Evils at Rome. — § 3. The Decay of the Farmers. — § 4. Religion. — § 5. Foreign Immigration. — § 6. Lucretius. — § 7. Varro — § 8. Alexandrinism. — § 9. Catullus. — § 10. Varius Rufus — § 11. Cornelius Gallus — § 12. Tibullus — § 13. Propertius. — §§ 14-17. Vergil. — § 18. Horace. — § 19. The Theatre. — § 20. History: Sallust: Cornelius Nepos: Caesar. — § 21. Cicero: Decay of Oratory. — § 22. Livy. — § 23. M. Vipsanius Agrippa: Maecenas: Valerius Messala. — § 24. Conclusion.

§ 1. THE struggle which culminated in the battle of Actium and the establishment of the Principate had commenced when Tiberius Gracchus entered upon his first tribunate in 133 B.C., one hundred and two years earlier: so long did the old order of things resist the repeated shocks of revolutionary attack. Even now there was no downfall of the whole fabric of the State, no sweeping away of the constitutional machinery of republican days: there were still to be Senate and equites and mob, consuls and praetors and aediles, and all the traditional elements of the State fabric: but these elements were to be reorganised and readjusted, their functions to be determined afresh and kept under control, perhaps to be silently annihilated and transferred elsewhere while there was still preserved the symbolism of the old *régime*. Rome was too conservative avowedly to part with any one feature of her past. The revolution of 31 B.C., in itself but the triumphant reassertion of the revolution of 49 B.C., marks no break in the continuity

of things at Rome, but only the public adoption of new ideas born eighteen years before.

But if the form of the State changed but little, the matter had vastly changed. It was an era of old forms, of new ideas, and of new men to realise these ideas. As the old patriciate had become a mere name, so the nobility which Sulla toiled to restore had now all but vanished. Decimated in the proscriptions of Marius and Cinna, taxed continually for fresh victims in war or in the party quarrels of the Forum, but a handful of the old optimates had survived the triumph of Julius, and even these owed their existence to his clemency. Sulla had endeavoured to rehabilitate their ranks by elevating to the Senate, or even to a so-called patriciate, the most honourable of the equites. Julius tried a similar plan, going still farther afield and finding new nobles even amongst his centurions and the provincials. But these new drafts did not amalgamate with the older stock: they only swallowed it up and hastened its extinction, and the proscriptions of 43 B.C., the wars of the triumvirs with Sex. Pompeius, the field of Philippi and the shores of Actium, completed the destruction of the old houses. Then Octavianus also created new notables and new patricians; and if any of the true stock remained, they were but incongruous survivals amongst so many "new men."

§ 2. Scarcely less potent a cause of the disappearance of the nobles lay in their own evil lives. There were good men here and there of course, men of honour in public and of virtue in private life, but as a whole the aristocracy, whether of blood or wealth, was hopelessly rotten. If public corruption and misgovernment furnished its enemies with unfailing excuses for proscriptions and confiscations and banishments, private immorality wrought its own revenge. Such as did not give way to positive debauchery abandoned themselves to a selfish indolence of which the one object was to live without regard for the fortunes of the State at home or abroad. Now was the time when men first came to rate a dinner at its cost, when a Lucullus spent millions upon a palace of marble, when even a Cicero could give thousands of pounds for a single table of citron

wood, while nine out of ten of Rome's three millions of inhabitants fought for an existence of beggary and misery and crime. Poverty and starvation were on all sides, while the wealth of the world was hoarded in the hands of a few hundreds of men who had little more consideration for their fellow-citizens than for their slaves. This was the social condition which loved a Catilina—the selfish luxury of a few above, the despair of thousands below, and nothing to bridge the gulf between—and this was one of the great evils which Julius had set himself to reform. Of the flagrant immorality of the time the less said the better: it may be read of in Cicero's speeches against Verres or on behalf of Cluentius. Here it is only needful to point out the complete downfall of all ideas of domestic virtue: it must be ill with a State when its leaders marry five or six times in the course of forty years as did Antonius and Pompeius, when their divorce is a matter of everyday occurrence, when wives and daughters become the props of makeshift political alliances, when courtesans become the makers of history, and when it is a woman's highest and rarest praise that she lived and died with but one husband. When public life is such we need not enquire too closely what is the character of a people's amusements, nor wonder that the old nobility died out from sheer exhaustion when the rearing of children had come to be regarded as an intolerable burden to be left to the antiquated and the philosopher.

§ 3. The peninsula at large was ruined alike in wealth and in morals. Every evil which had first roused the spirit of Gracchus was now present in yet worse degree; lands going out of cultivation altogether or converted into deserts of pasturage, or if cultivated at all, left to the loveless toil of slaves or the recklessness of discharged veterans; towns congested, as was Rome, with a multitude of disappropriated beggars: highways infested by cut-throats and brigands, whose numbers were constantly recruited by runaway slaves and escaped criminals; morality laughed at, justice sold, the only semblance of prosperity centring here and there about some rich man's villa. Magna Graecia, Samnium, Sabina, and much of Etruria, were but deserts. And the population? Killed off in war, sold into

slavery, drawn off to recruit the two-and-forty legions of the triumvirs, or drifted away to swell the penury and iniquity of Rome or Neapolis or Baiae. If Cicero could say that the Apennines about Ameria still sheltered some like Sextus Roscius, men of the olden stamp of honour, he had also to find in Apulian Larinum a picture of atrocities such as Rome itself could scarcely outdo.*

Take away the land from the people, and you take away their patriotism. Outside Rome no Italian cared for politics: the people were but the playthings of Roman party-leaders in time of peace, in time of war their tools. They lived too far away from Rome to be able to take any part in the comitia had they desired it, and no one took any steps to set them on an equality with the city mob. And in Rome itself for different reasons the mob was equally the instrument of political leaders, while the nobles and the rich preferred their luxurious ease to the toils and perils of the Forum, the Curia, the camp, or the provincial governor's tribunal. Few sought political life save as an avenue to riches; few, therefore, except the bankrupt, the unscrupulous, and the self-seeking. And this indifference became almost a necessity when the monarchy was established, for in so far as concerned the better class of the Emperor's subjects, political life was limited to place-hunting and patronage, while the mob had no aspirations beyond food-doles to keep it alive and games to keep it amused. Herein the new *régime* only put the seal of its acceptance upon what had long been old.

§ 4. At Rome State and Church, patriotism and religion, were inseparable: therefore *pari passu* with the decay of patriotism went that of religion in the sense of belief in any god or gods. Never at Rome a nobler thing than a state-witchcraft, the very outward forms of religion had long fallen into contempt: they were but part and parcel of the legacy of husks which the Republic was to hand on to the Principate, useful still as a political engine in time of need, as when a Sibylline leaf saved the Senate from sending Caesar and Pompeius to Egypt, or when augury could be called upon to annul an election. Belief in religion there

* See Cicero, *Pro Cluentio*.

was none. It was fashionable for the Roman of culture to laugh at the old religion, or at any rate to be at pains to show that it was wrong : so Cicero wrote "Of the nature of gods"; Lucretius lived and wrote to banish from men's minds the fear of heaven; Caesar defied all augury when it was against his wishes—"I will have better omens if I choose," he said, when warned not to fight at Munda; Antonius carried through an election despite thunder and augury. Indeed there was little, saving such boorish rituals as that of the Luperci, to keep the Roman religion alive even for amusement's sake. It was otherwise with a host of foreign rituals imported from Egypt and the East : the ceremonials of Isis and Osiris and Mithras and Cybele were coarse enough to please the popular fancy, and no effort could keep them out of Rome. But it was always the coarse and outward, not the possibly elevated and inward part of such creeds, which took root in Rome : the veil of Isis was borrowed only to screen old vices, and it was now that the temples of Rome became not houses of benighted prayer but dens of indecency.

If faith died, superstition took fresh root. Such as felt the need for any guidance turned either to necromancy and witchcraft or to philosophy. Astrology became a fashionable pursuit, and men and women of the highest rank consulted their favourite "mathematician" or "Chaldaean." P. Nigidius Figulus combined political satire with an astrology which he believed to be Pythagoreanism. Of course the customary festivals and sacrifices went on as before, and men still salved an evil conscience with the building of a temple, but it was not until Christianity came into collision with the ruins of the old faith that men had any suspicion of the strength of the foundations upon which those ruins, true to the character of their Roman building, were laid.

§ 5. That same tide which brought to Rome all the homeless of Italy, brought also the restless of every nation of the Roman world. Thousands came as slaves in the train of a victorious Pompeius or Caesar, to be distributed over Italy in the place of those free labourers whom they had displaced. Numbers earned manumission and went to

swell the ranks of the rabble which "sucked the blood of the treasury." Many were men of intellect and skill, who found openings for their various talents in the *familia* of a noble. After the slaves came crowds of others, free indeed, but mainly destitute. Painters and sculptors and engravers, workers in metal of every kind, physicians and surgeons, mountebanks and conjurors, artists with every kind of musical instrument, actors and singers, astrologers, and teachers of every known science from grammar to cookery. Amongst them there were men of real merit and culture, and even an actor might attain to wealth and dignity; but by far the larger number of these immigrants were men who had been better dispensed with, only that the native Italians were too dull-witted to find new vices for the Roman nobles, and Roman ethics forbade a citizen from practising any humble but honourable calling. The least nocuous of them all were the teachers of philosophy, expounding the systems of Chrysippus and the Stoics, of Epicurus, of the Old and New Academy, and of Diogenes the Cynic. The Romans played at being philosophers because it was Greek, but even in their play they preferred what was extreme: therefore the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle and their followers, the doctrines of the Academy, found small favour amongst them, while many confessed the creeds of Diogenes and Chrysippus, and many affected to be Epicureans. Stoicism, with its doctrines of fatalism and sternest self-suppression, offered a specious veil to men who sulked over their political impotence; Cynicism attracted such as sulked indeed, but still had the wit to see the vanity of the life they foreswore; the teaching of Epicurus served, while pure, to feed whatever intellectual vigour was left in Rome, and, when debased, served to palliate the self-indulgence of worse men than Lucullus. The life of Cato Uticensis is the immortal type of the Stoic turned politician. There is no such salient picture of the Epicurean or the Cynic as a would-be statesman: the pattern of the former is Lucretius, of the latter Varro.

§ 6. Of T. Lucretius Carus as a man we know nothing. The *gens Lucretia* was an ancient one, and we may suppose him to have belonged to it, in which case he is an example

of that rare thing, a native Roman poet. He found spiritual comfort in the creed of Epicurus, and he made it his mission to teach others what he believed. Therefore he wrote, in six books, his famous poem *De Rerum Natura*, "On the World," of which the moral, never lost sight of, is twofold: firstly, Have no fear of the gods; secondly, Have no fear of death. In fact the whole work is a poetical disproof of the miraculous, the divine, and the superstitious. It sets out in detail well nigh the entire system of Epicurean philosophy, and contrives in a most marvellous fashion to surround with poesy such forbidding subjects as the Theory of Atoms, the properties and accidents of matter, the logical position of time, and all the abstruse blend of mathematics and mysticism, ethics and logic, science and guesswork, of the ancient Greeks. The opening lines of the poem, an address to Venus, are unmatched, say the critics, in Latin literature; and throughout the work are scattered passages of exceeding power and beauty. Lucretius' language aided him greatly: he affected a quaint archaism which savoured of Ennius, the Latin Chaucer, probably as a protest against the Graecising style of the day. The poet was born 98-97 B.C., and died in 55 B.C., traditionally of madness induced by a love potion. Cicero is said to have edited the poem after the author's death, and he may have done so. It was dedicated to C. Memmius, praetor in the year 58 B.C., at that date a staunch optimiate and opponent of Julius Caesar. Why it was thus dedicated is not easily guessed, unless it was that Lucretius thought his friend sadly in need of instruction.

§ 7. At times Lucretius is markedly satirical in language, and herein approaches the Cynic M. Terentius Varro. This writer, whose learning earned for him the title of "most erudite of the Romans," served at sea in the Second Mithradatic war, again in Spain in the year of Ilberda and at Pharsalus, on the losing side. Caesar pardoned him and entrusted him with the collection and arrangement of the great public library which he wished to form, but he was proscribed in 43 B.C., when he lost all his property. Pardoned again by Octavianus, he died, 28 B.C., in his ninetieth year. He tells us that he wrote four hundred

and ninety books. There survive only his three books *De Re Rustica*, and the greater part of six out of twenty-four books, *De Lingua Latina*, together with fragments of his *Menippean Satires*, so called from Menippus the Cynic (flor. 60 B.C.), his professed model. These were veritable *saturae*, medleys of prose and verse—and Varro was an elegant verse-maker—dealing with all manner of society themes from Fame to Marriage, from Drinking to Philosophy. Indeed, fashionable foibles and philosophical fads are his chiefest butts, and he did not hesitate to parody Aeschylus for their ridicule. The *De Lingua Latina* contains a good deal of valuable information and much absurd philological guesswork—philology was much in vogue in this era—while the *De Re Rustica* is a work of real value; but the *Satires* made Varro famous rather than did any of his more learned works. “The last breath of the good spirit of the old burgess-times,” Mommsen calls them.

§ 8. Lucretius and Varro, with Cicero, of whom more hereafter, may be said to close the list of genuine Latin writers—that is, of the writers of pure Latin. The rising generation, even at the time of Lucretius’ death, was wholly devoted to Greek models and Greek ideas, and though a Catullus or a Vergil or a Horace was so much the more a poet as he could disguise his models in a Latin dress, yet none of them showed any great national individuality. Between the years 70-40 B.C. all the *litterati* of Rome set themselves to imitate the decadent Greeks of Alexandria. Founded in 332 B.C. by Alexander the Great, and peopled at his command by a colony of immigrant Greeks, Alexandria became a centre of Greek culture; but its literary school, setting itself to a pedantic study of the older and purer Greek literature, fell into the inevitable sin of artificiality, in so much that the term Alexandrinism came to mean a style of laboured elegance in which the language was congested and the beauty spoiled by the excess of affected learning which it was forced to carry. Some authors took for their muse such subjects as the natural history of serpents or plants, astronomy and its kindred science of astrology, medicine, or hunting, and forced into verse all kinds of solid or fanciful learning suited only to the lecture-

room or to the prose of a Xenophon. Others avowedly took some antique model and endeavoured, by laborious imitation, to eclipse it, as Apollonius Rhodius endeavoured to eclipse Homer. Most of all they strove to outdo the early lyricists and epigrammatists of Greece, Sappho and Alcaeus and their fellows. Being men of culture, and still men despite their scholarship, they succeeded now and again in throwing off something that was real poetry; but in the main their work was a failure: their love-songs were stilted and without fire, their language unnatural, their allusiveness perplexing. The best of them were Callimachus and Euphorion, who succeeded occasionally in being pretty and even poetical. These were the models of the mass of Roman verse-makers, and of the Greek professors who flocked to Rome. Not only was Rome the best market for such goods, for no one with any pretensions to culture or fashion but wrote verses every day of his life—verses to ask a friend to dinner or to accept an invitation, verses to ask a loan or send a birthday greeting; but Rome was the only market, for the courts of Alexandria and Pergamus were no longer the centres of literary patronage which once they had been: in place of a Gelo or an Archesilaus had come an Attalus or a Ptolemy, and now these gave place to a Lucullus or a Maecenas. Cicero, who himself affected Greek models, had no patience with the thousand and one “warblers of Euphorion” who filled the Rome of his day.

§ 9. Amongst them all stands Q. or C. Valerius Catullus as an exemplar of what good results may come of study when buoyed by genius. Born at Verona in 87 B.C., Catullus only survived Lucretius by one year, dying in 54 B.C. Most of his life was passed at Tibur or Rome, with occasional visits to his villa at Sirmium on Lake Benacus (*Garda*), and with the more unusual variety of a trip to Asia Minor, though he was not very well off and not in very good health. He had friends in plenty amongst the writers of the time, but what most drew him to Rome was his passion for Clodia, the notorious sister of Clodius, whom he addresses as Lesbia. The bulk of his poetry was written in alternate love or hate of this woman, but he also distinguished himself as a lampoonist by bitter attacks upon

Caesar, and still more bitter scorn of Caesar's satellite Mamurra, whom he styles Mentula. But there seems to have been no political bent in his likes or dislikes, merely the caprice of a hot-blooded Italian. Indeed, his nationality was so strong within him as to defy the paralysis which Alexandrinism induced in his less virile fellow-poets. Critics, ancient and modern, agree in extolling his few surviving poems as the most perfect of the Republican poetry of Rome. His model was mostly Callimachus, but he also imitated Sappho and Alcaeus: in elegy he was to be surpassed by Tibullus and Propertius and Ovid, in Sapphics by Horace; but in the use of his favourite metres the scazon and hendecasyllabic he had no master and few followers. He is often coarse, and frequently difficult; but amongst his verses are some which for beauty of thought and form are scarcely to be equalled in Latin.

The rest of the Alexandrines have perished, a fate which they doubtless deserved. Amongst them were Varro Atacinus, a Roman Gaul, who translated the *Argonautica* of Apollonius Rhodius, and wrote also love-poems and epics; Helvius Cinna, who wrote love-poems and an epic entitled *Smyrna*, which has won mention only for the immorality of its subject; C. Licinius Calvus, an orator as well as a poet, who vilified Pompeius as Catullus vilified Caesar; M. Furius Bibaculus, at whose turgidity Horace laughs, but who was nevertheless a poet of ability and a biting lampoonist; Valerius Cato, critic and poetaster. But at this date there was no counting all the would-be poets. Even Hortensius and Cicero wrote verses by the thousand.

§ 10. Taste changed when Alexandrinism had done its worst, and there sprang up a new school of poets, who reverted to a simpler style and successfully cultivated a natural tone, despite their untiring elaboration. This was the era of Vergil and Horace, of Tibullus and Propertius, Varius Rufus and Gallus. All of these lived and wrote to a time far beyond this period, but they must be mentioned here for completeness' sake.

L. Varius Rufus came, like so many of Rome's great writers, from Cisalpine Gaul. Born in 64 B.C., he was

already intimate with Maecenas when the latter attained to his position as chief counsellor of Augustus, and it was he who introduced to the statesman both Vergil and Horace. He was fortunate in establishing his reputation as the foremost poet of Rome before Vergil, a younger man, could wrest from him his laurels. He owed his fame to an epic on the death of Julius (*De Morte*), of which Vergil was not ashamed to avail himself, and which approached nearer than any other poem to the style and rhythm of the *Aeneid*, to judge from the small fragment preserved. When the *Aeneid* supplanted his work in this branch, he turned to tragedy, and his *Thyestes* remained famous as a masterpiece of Roman dramatic literature. He died in 9 A.D. Horace acknowledged his powers—"No one writes the martial epic as does ardent Varius" *—in the earlier days of their intimacy; and Vergil, then only a rising poet, owns that he "cannot yet sing aught worthy of Varius." †

In the same passage Vergil compares his early efforts to those of one Anser, jestingly remarking that he himself is "as a goose (*anser*) amidst swans." This poet was, therefore, one of the earlier time, transitional between the old and new régime; and from what Ovid says of him ‡ we may conclude that he represented the failing school of erotic poets, of whom Catullus was the chief. Even less is known of Varus, to whom Vergil addresses *Eclogue VI*. His *nomen* is supposed to have been Quintilius, and Vergil pays him a high compliment:—

"Nec Phoebo gratior ulla est
Quam sibi quae Vari praescripsit pagina nomen." §

Two other poetasters of Vergil's earlier days were Bavius and Maevius. || They need only be mentioned here as disparagers of that poet, and as having given its name to the "Baviad and Maeviad," a satire by William Gifford, written in the early part of this century.

§ 11. Another poet who lived into the earlier days of the empire was Cornelius Gallus, a native of Forum Julii

* *Sat. i. x.*, 51.

† *Eclogue ix.* 35. The poem is dated prior to 40 B.C., by Conington.

‡ "More wanton than Cinna," the author of the epic *Smyna*.

§ *Eclogue vi.* 11.

|| *Eclogue iii.* 91: "Qui Bavius non odit, amet tua carmina, Maevi."

(*Fréjus*), in Gaul, born 69 B.C. He was a man of considerable abilities, and Augustus, to whose notice he first introduced Vergil, appointed him Prefect of Egypt on the settlement of the Alexandrine war. He was the foremost of the poets of love of his day, and to his mistress, Cytheris, he addressed four books of elegies, all modelled on those of Alexandrine writers; and he made a complete translation of Euphorion. Nothing is left of his writings; but the tenth *Eclogue* of Vergil is a warm tribute to his friendship and abilities. Quintilian, the critic, calls him *durior*, so that his style was probably less graceful than that of Tibullus, and nearer to that of the elegies of Catullus and his compeers.

§ 12. Albius Tibullus was born about 53 B.C., and died in the same year as Vergil, 19 B.C. He was by birth a knight and a Roman, and forms a rare exception to the rule that Rome's greatest men of genius were born of provincial blood. Originally a man of some property, he lost almost all in the confiscations of 43 B.C., retaining only a small farm at Pedum in Latium, between which and Messala's town house he divided his time. He grew rich again, however, and probably recovered his lost possessions by the interest of Messala. His life seems to have been spent in two amours; the object of the first was Delia, and when she proved inconstant he betook himself for comfort to Nemesis. To each of these mistresses he addressed one book of *Elegies*; the third and fourth books, which complete his works so called, are of doubtful authenticity. Most critics agree that the third book is the work of an inferior poet, who addresses himself to a lady named Neaera. Like the names Delia and Nemesis, this name is probably fictitious, it being the custom to replace the real name by an imaginary one of the same metrical value and of Greek form. Several of the genuine poems are addressed to Messala, praising his munificence or his successes in war; and others are mere pictures of the pleasures of country life. His poetry is less burdened with mythological details, and is more spontaneous, than that of any other elegiac poet. "In no poet, not even in Burns, is simple, natural emotion more naturally expressed."*

* Cruttwell, *Hist. Roman Literature*, p. 801.

Quintilian adjudged him to be the prince of Latin elegiac poets.

§ 13. Contemporary with Tibullus was Sextus Propertius. Born in Umbria at some time between the years 58-49 B.C., he lost his patrimony in the confiscations and allotments which followed the battle of Philippi, and does not seem to have recovered it as did his rival. Possibly he did not care for the rural simplicity and contented retirement which it was the fashion of his fellow-poets to affect, and it is probable that he lived in Rome, whither he certainly came to study as an advocate. Fortunately for us, however, he speedily fell in with the lady whom he addresses as Cynthia, and gave expression to his feelings towards her in verse which attracted the notice of Maecenas. Yet he did not improve upon this introduction as did Horace and others. He was too fond of city life, with its dissipations and licence, to enter cordially into the spirit of Augustus' reforms or his crusade against the decline of morals. He approximates rather to Ovid than to Tibullus in the tone of his writings as well as in their style; and, as we shall see, Ovid's poetry marked a reaction in the direction of the now forbidden schools of Catullus and his fellows. Like them, he studied to imitate Callimachus and the Alexandrines, and as a result his poems are at times quite incomprehensible from their excess of erudition and mythological allusion. The majority of his elegies are addressed to Cynthia, whose real name was Hostia; but there are also descriptive poems, such as those narrating the myths of Hylas and of Hercules and Cacus, and one or two true elegies—"laments," that is—on the death of friends and other griefs. One or two fugitive pieces on poetical commonplaces such as the immortality of poets, addresses to Bacchus, Vertumnus, Jove, and a number of epistolary elegies to Maecenas and other friends or rivals, make up the four books which we possess. He was a warm admirer of Vergil; but, to judge from his silence, Horace disliked him. The date of his death is unknown; possibly it occurred about the year 15 B.C.

§ 14. Publius Vergilius Maro was a poet of a different stamp. Born at Andes, in the neighbourhood of Mantua, 70 B.C., he was already nearly thirty years of age when

deprived of his estate by confiscation, 43 B.C. He had to support him, however, the interest of Asinius Pollio, then governor of Cisalpine Gaul, and so recovered his property. The restoration was only temporary. In 41 B.C. came the second series of confiscations and allotments, and Vergil was again ousted, barely escaping with his life. He removed to Rome, where he had for some years in his early life attended the lectures of various professors of rhetoric and philosophy. He soon became acquainted with Maecenas, and the success which attended the publication of the *Eclogues* satisfied the patron as to the merits of his protégé. He encouraged the poet to continue his efforts, though in a more serious form, and his advice resulted in the composition of the *Georgics*. The liberality of Augustus and the patronage of Pollio and Maecenas were sufficient to recoup the poet's shattered fortunes, and the later years of his life were spent mostly in a villa which he acquired near Naples. He died at Brundisium, on his return from a tour in Greece, 19 B.C., while still engaged on his great epic, the *Aeneid*, and was buried at his favourite villa. Throughout his later years he enjoyed the very closest intimacy with his patron, and was one of Maecenas' companions, together with Varius and Horace, when that minister journeyed to Brundisium in 38 B.C. Like Tibullus, he preferred the life of the country to that of the town :

" Molle atque facetum

Vergilio annuerunt gaudentes rure Camenae : "†

and in this respect he differed from Propertius and Ovid.

§ 15. In the *Eclogues*, which were published prior/ to 35 B.C., the genius of Vergil appears in its native form : politics had no interest for him, nor did he as yet care to grapple with the sustained task of epic poetry. He loved the country, and he found virgin field for his talents in transplanting to Latin soil the pastoral poetry first written by Theocritus. This writer, a native of Syracuse, flourished at the beginning of the third century B.C., and resided long enough at Alexandria to become one of the Alexandrine school of poets. Nevertheless, his subject was original,

* This journey is the subject of Horace, *Sat.* i. 5. See p. 108.

† Hor., *Sat.* i. 10, 44.

however much he yielded to prevalent fashion in its treatment. He wrote *Idylls*, small *genre* pictures of the life of Sicilian peasantry, shepherds, fishermen, and housewives; and his example was followed by Bion and Moschus. But until Vergil's time no Italian poet had ventured to trespass on this ground, a fact which renders Vergil's success all the more surprising. In many cases he merely translates from his originals; usually he adopts the *dramatis personae*—the plot, if one may say so—and fills in the bare outline at his own discretion. But just as Theocritus occasionally appears as a panegyrist, so Vergil in the fourth and tenth *Eclogues* becomes personal; the poem deals with living persons, while the setting still remains bucolic. The fourth *Eclogue* has acquired fame, not more from its beauty than from a theory that it expresses a prophetic anticipation of the birth of a Messiah. It was written, as a matter of fact, in honour of the consulship of Pollio; but who was the child whose birth is hailed is, and must always be, a mystery. The tenth *Eclogue* has already been mentioned as addressed to Gallus.

§ 16. It ~~was the~~^{was the} advice of Maecenas that prompted Vergil to take up a greater task in the *Georgics*. He is said to have already dreamed of putting into an epic the history of Rome, as Ennius and others had done before him, but the magnitude and loftiness of the task deterred him. Erotic poetry and society-verse were not congenial to his taste, and politics had no attraction for him, except as material for the exercise of those Epicurean views of philosophy which he had learnt from Siron. Still, he entered fully into that desire for peace which was prevalent in the minds of all, from Augustus downwards; and he found himself able to contribute to that desire by the production of a work idealising husbandry. Ceaseless wars had completed the depopulation of Italy which the Gracchi had long ago noted with concern. The old race of yeomen was gone, the fields were untilled, bands of slaves performed what agricultural duties still survived, and the "glory of labour as man's mission" was no more. The restoration of Italy depended on the restoration of agriculture to its place of honour, and for this reason Maecenas persuaded his friend to write a work which for beauty equalled the *Eclogues*, but far surpassed them in

scope and seriousness of purpose. The *Georgics*—that is, “Matters of Husbandry”—comprise four books dealing with crops, trees, cattle and horses, and bees respectively. They form what is called a didactic poem, a poem conveying systematic instruction in their subject under the cloak of verse. The father of such poetry was Hesiod of Ascra, in the eighth century B.C., whose poem the “Works and Days” was at once the model, and in a large measure the source, of Vergil’s work:

“Ascræumque cano Romana per oppida carmen.”

He had been followed by Aratus the astronomer, by Nicanor the physician, and a host of other Greeks of Alexandria; while at Rome the great work of Lucretius, which sets forth in six books the entire system of Epicurean philosophy, was the first of a long series of less famous didactic poems. Vergil had studied Lucretius deeply, and he owed much to him as well as to Aratus. Besides Hesiod’s book, he found prose authorities in the elder Cato and Varro; and while the *Georgics* are poetry of the most captivating kind, they contained so much sound instruction as to win a front place in the ranks of writings on agriculture. A subject at first sight unattractive became, by free use of digressions, by sweetness of rhythm and language, and by that love of nature which rings through every line, a book of which it is difficult to tire. So uniformly excellent are they that quotation is scarcely admissible; but perhaps the finest passages are that at the close of Book I. describing the omens and horrors which followed Julius’ death, the long passage in Book II. extolling the old-fashioned simplicity of the Ausonian farmers and decrying pomp and avarice, and the description of the murrain in Book III., largely borrowed from Lucretius’ account of the plague at Athens. Book IV. closes with the legends of Aristæus and Orpheus, a somewhat incongruous subject which is said to have been substituted for a peroration in honour of Gallus. As Gallus died 23 B.C., and the *Georgics* were published 29 B.C., the change must then have been made in a second edition. The work is dedicated to Maecenas, and seven years were spent in the elaboration of its two thousand lines or so.

§ 17. In the *Aeneid* Vergil at length realised his early dreams of writing an epic. Augustus is said to have endeavoured to persuade the poet to write the history of his wars, but this Vergil declined to do, as did Horace also. Mere history in verse is a dangerous subject to deal with, and hard realities were no matter for the genius either of the lover of nature or of the society-poet. Still, there was in the *Georgics* proof that Vergil possessed in a wonderful degree those feelings of patriotism, religious enthusiasm, and moral purity, which the emperor was anxious to make universal. Such talents were too valuable to be lost; and they were utilised in the production of a magnificent poem glorifying the beginnings of Rome, and establishing the connection claimed by the Julian house with Aeneas and, through him, with the gods. The poem has been called the richest source of our knowledge of Roman religion and moral feeling. In it the creed of Rome appears freed in great part from the overgrowth of Greek mythology. It is a Roman poem in the fullest sense, for its subjects and its thoughts are alike those of the *gens togata*. There is of course much that is Greek in the details of the story, and the form is entirely Greek, being borrowed direct from Homer. Nevertheless it is consistently Italian, and if anything could rouse to good purpose the Roman's pride of race, the *Aeneid* would have accomplished that result.

The work was commenced in 29 B.C., and was not finally completed in 19 B.C. when its author died. Had he lived, he would have spent three years more on its elaboration, yet there are few points in which any improvement can well be sought for. The metre is hexameter, as in all Vergil's great works; and so great a master of this metre is he, that it serves him alike for every scene, and never grows monotonous. It is the metre in which 'the strong-winged music of Homer' was written; and after passing with growing elegance through the hands of Ennius, Lucilius, and Lucretius, it reached in Vergil a perfection which was never surpassed in Latin poetry.

The *Culex* (Gnat) and *Moretum* (Salad), and the *Ciris*, relating the legend of Scylla, are shorter poems attributed with more or less likelihood to the early days of Vergil,

when still living on his farm near Mantua. There are also five brief pieces in elegiac metre, of which one, the *Copa* (Hostess), is a lively descriptive piece, and one an elegy in honour of Messala's victories. Finally, there is a piece of twenty-five iambs, parodying Catullus' famous fourth poem (*Dedicatio Phaseli*).

§ 18. Very different was the style of Quintus Horatius Flaccus. Born in 65 B.C. at Venusia, on the borders of Apulia and Lucania, he was the son of a *coactor*, a collector of taxes or auction bids, lately emancipated by some master belonging to the *gens Horatia*. Though of so humble a rank, the father was able to send his son to Rome to be educated with the sons of senators and knights under the ferule of Orbilius Pupillus, when he saw that the country school at Venusia was scarcely good enough. As usual with young Romans, Horace went to Athens to complete his education, and while there heard of the assassination of Caesar. He accepted the post of tribune in the army of Brutus, and was present at the defeat of Philippi, where he left his shield behind him, like Alcaeus of old, and returned to Italy under pardon, only to find his father dead and his estate confiscated. Thus left without friends or means, he was glad to accept the post of quaestor's clerk, and between the hours of business he vented his disgust in the *Satires*, his first literary effort. He became acquainted with Vergil, who introduced him to Maecenas, and though the latter was somewhat slow to show any favour to the poet, he received him at length into his innermost circle, and already, in 38 B.C., Horace was sufficiently intimate to be one of the party which travelled to Brundisium. The reason for such hesitation on Maecenas' part was the independent character of Horace, who persisted in maintaining his own views about politics—views very unlike the enthusiasm with which Vergil regarded Augustus' rule. However, his Epicurean dogmas—for he was at heart an Epicurean, although he dabbled a little in all schools of philosophy—would not allow Horace to hold very serious views about anything but himself; and finding himself comfortable, especially when, about 31 B.C., Maecenas gave him an estate near Tibur, he accepted the Emperor's overtures for friend

ship and assumed an attitude of tolerance at once honest and amusing. It was many years, however, before he published any verses laudatory of the Emperor. The loss of Vergil and Tibullus drew Horace closer to his patron, and he jestingly vowed that he could not live without Maecenas. The vow came strangely true, for Maecenas died in 8 B.C., and within a few weeks Horace followed him to the grave. He had never been strong, and was more or less a victim to dyspepsia. All these particulars of his life, and much more of minor importance, we gather from his own writings. Horace is in sharp contrast with Vergil and most other Roman poets, in the frequency of his allusions to his own life and personal interests. We can reconstruct the ordinary course of Horace's days from his *Odes* and *Satires*: of other Latin poets at home we know virtually nothing.

The earliest works of Horace were the *Satires*, which were published about the years 34 and 29 B.C. The two books comprise in all eighteen poems on various social and literary subjects. Horace was a humorist, and saw life through the medium of an irrepressible good-temper. Hence his *Satires* seldom rise to the dignity of anything beyond mere "talk," as their Latin title (*Sermones*) implies; and hence the criticism of Dryden that Horace ambles while Juvenal gallops. In the modern sense the Horatian satire is not satire at all. It consists simply of scenes from everyday life strung together with no definite plan, and made the vehicle for a good deal of good-natured and solid advice. Two of them are devoted to literary criticism, and especially to Lucilius (148-102 B.C.), for whom Horace, while fully allowing his merits, professes to entertain a cordial aversion as "muddy" and uncouth. Lucilius was the great master of satire before Horace's time, and he used his verse to lash rather than to advise; while Varro's Menippean satires were as often composed in prose as in verse. In plain fact, this style of writing had no fixity of rules. It was claimed as purely Roman by the Romans, but rather as a mode of thought than a style of composition. It always remained more prosaic than poetical until Juvenal, at the close of the first century A.D. fitted to it the full strength of the hexa-

meter. Its name (connected with the word *satur*, full) is suggestive of the variety of its scope—life in all its manifold forms. To turn it to the criticism of literature was a purely Horatian innovation. Other subjects with which Horace deals are discontent, lax morals, pedantry, the bore (supposed by some to hint at Propertius), his own critics and detractors, a dinner with a society butt, and his journey with Maecenas and Vergil to Brundisium.

The other writings of Horace—his *Epodes* (30 B.C.), *Odes* (23-14 B.C.), *Epistles*, etc., belong to the history of literature under the empire. It need only be said here that throughout his writings Horace remains unique. He neither imitated Latin writers, Catullus perhaps excepted, nor had any imitators in that language.

§ 19. One notable gap there is in the literature of this last century B.C.—it produced no dramatists such as Terence or Accius. Tragedy and high-class comedy were always exotics in Rome, and even in Terence's day the dramatist could complain that he got no audience when there was any rival attraction running, especially a show of gladiators. And at this date gladiatorial shows were yearly increasing in frequency and in the number of the combatants. So long as they could see men fighting with men, beasts with beasts, or each with the other, few Romans cared for the less realistic tragedies of the stage; while as for comedy, it had to be gross and indecent indeed to countervail the delights of the arena. So tragedy and comedy became archaisms, only revived occasionally for lack of more exciting entertainments; and to pander to the people's taste there was invented the mime. There was not room in Rome for more than one tragic actor, Aesopus, or more than one comedian, Q. Roscius, and this perhaps is partly the reason why these two became so famous in their respective branches. But there were mimes in plenty, male and female. In his original character the *minimus* was mute: his art consisted, like that of the modern French ballet-actor, in substituting gesture for language, and so long as he was sufficiently coarse and senseless he was sure to please. The old national Fescennines and Atellanes had dwindled away; the former to be a mere adjunct of

marriage festivities, the latter to extinction ; and the mime took the place which they had left vacant, first as a sort of harlequinade serving for an *entr' acte* in more pretentious dramas, later as a developed farce with regular characters and dialogue. Dancing was an essential, and it was often of the most indecent sort ; in fact, it was not until Julius Caesar took this branch of popular amusement under his patronage that it attained to something of the dignity of an art. The eques D. Laberius and the Syrian freedman Publilius Syrus wrote mimes which were popular enough, though we may believe that they dispensed with most of the merely sensual part of the entertainment, and we know that they made the dialogue the vehicle of much pungent satire upon politics and persons, much proverbial philosophy and urbane wit. Laberius, who was born in 106 B.C., contrived to offend Caesar, who retorted by a polite request that he should act one of his own pieces. To do so was at that date an unheard-of degradation even for an eques, albeit within a century senators lowered themselves to worse. Laberius was sixty years of age, and he did not long survive the disgrace. He died in 43 B.C., and there still remain the verses in which, on the occasion of his shame, he spoke out his mind against the dictator.

§ 20. There was little of true historical writing in this era, though many authors strung together fables and facts under the name of history. Cornelius Sisenna wrote an account of the Marsic wars, and the subsequent quarrels of the Marians and Sullans, but it was melodramatic and unpolished we are told. Licinius Macer and Q. Claudius Quadrigarius composed *Annales* of Rome, but the former was a prejudiced partisan and withal a forger, while the latter, if more conscientious, is equally lost to us. Q. Valerius Antias was a romancer, pure and simple, and Livy is at pains to prove it. These all flourished in the early years of our period. After them came historians more worthy of the name—Varro, whose historical works are lost, Cæsar, Cornelius Nepos, and Sallust.

C. Sallustius Crispus, born 86 B.C. at Amiternum, was expelled the Senate in 50 B.C., rehabilitated by Julius

Caesar and appointed governor of Numidia after Thapsus, and spent the rest of his days in quiet enjoyment of the wealth which he had there amassed. He was something more than a mere recorder of events: he tried to infuse life into the characters about whom he wrote, and he succeeded, although his moralising at times becomes wearisome. He is said to have written a continuous *History* of the years 78-63 B.C., but, with the exception of a few fragments, all that remains to us of his works is his sketches of *Catilina* and *Jugurtha*. The former details the conspiracy of 63 B.C., the latter the African war of 112-105 B.C. Their style is pleasing enough, but unfortunately not equally exact, and he cannot be called a conscientious historian, even had he not been so thoroughgoing a Caesarean. He affected an archaic tone, and made Thucydides his model. He died in 34 B.C.

Of Cornelius Nepos little is known save that he died in 24 B.C. and was a friend of Cicero. He wrote a series of biographical sketches intended to stimulate the emulation of a degenerate age. A considerable number survive, but while the language is refined and pleasing, the matter is often involved, not to say false. The Romans found it hard to be critics and stylists in one.

The palm for simple narrative belongs to Julius Caesar who found time, probably in 51 B.C., to put together the *Commentarii de Bello Gallico*, which is well-nigh our sole authority for the events of his career in Gaul. We could not have a better, so far as it goes; its accuracy has never been questioned and its only fault is the unavoidable one that it is the notebook of a soldier and a statesman rather than the work of a man of leisure. Similar is the *Commentarii de Bello Civili*; but the further accounts—*De Bello Alexandrino*, *De Bello Hispanico*, and *De Bello Africo*,—which are sometimes included with Caesar's works, were certainly not from Caesar's pen. It is not known who compiled them: some say A. Hirtius, the consul of 43 B.C.; others Caesar's friend, C. Matius, and others again leave it an open question. But if Caesar did not write merely for writing's sake, he yet found time to pen various digressions which are of the most valuable

of his writings: such are his brief sketches of the social state, manners, topography, and fauna, of Gaul, Britain, and Germany; amongst which comes the passage which is almost our sole authority for the cult of Druidism. Indeed, Caesar's was a scientific mind, always seeking new information—a mind that would probably have done justice to any deeper study had history but given him leisure. He is known to have written a work on philology or grammar,—a favourite subject with the writers of the time—but this is lost; and of course he added his small contribution to the poetry of his day in the shape of *Laudes Herculis*, a tragedy styled *Oedipus*, and a descriptive poem (*Iter*) upon one of his journeys to Spain, perhaps not altogether unlike that which stands fifth in the first book of Horace's *Satires*. These, however, were the effusions of his youth.

§ 21. To speak of Cicero as a *littérateur* is a difficult matter, so voluminous and so varied a writer was he. Scarcely any branch of literature was untouched by him: in his youth he wrote verses, notably a translation of the astronomical poem of Aratus of Alexandria. It has been traditional since his own day to laugh at his verses—they can hardly be called poetry—and yet Lucretius studied this *Aratea* and borrowed from it. Even more famous in ridicule was his self-panegyric, *De Consulatu Suo*. Unable to find a public to appreciate his own poems, Cicero never ceased importuning his more gifted friends, such as Archias, to immortalise him in verse. He wrote tragedies, too, but not for publication, and he has left us here and there translations of passages of Homer and the Greek tragedians.

These *Juvenilia* were, however, laid aside when he at length took his place at the bar as a pleader. His first extant oration, *Pro Quinctio*, is not very happy; his next, *Pro Sex. Roscio*, not only marks the beginning of his oratorical greatness, but moreover, albeit his first speech *in causa publica*, it made his fortune. It was an attack upon Chrysogonus, one of the most formidable of Sulla's creatures; and though it is probable that Sulla's resentment compelled the orator to quit Rome for a while, it was the best

of advertisements. When, eleven years later, he attacked Verres, he found himself at once the acknowledged superior of the famous Q. Hortensius, long the ruler of the Roman bar, and also a statesman. Thenceforward his oratory found equal play in the Senate, on the Rostra, and in the courts; and his eloquence culminated in those *Philippics* which cost him his life. His ambition was to be called the Roman Demosthenes, and, like Demosthenes, he paid the extreme price for his success. There were times when the course of politics compelled him to seek retirement, but he was not therefore idle. It was in these intervals that he wrote his manifold treatises on law, politics, religion, ethics, literature, and philosophy. He was of the school of the Academy, a distant disciple of Plato and Aristotle, and he borrowed from Plato the dialogue as a form in which to enunciate his own and rival views; as in the treatises on *Friendship* and *Old Age*, in the *Tusculan Disputations*, and in the *De Oratore*. Of the matter, or even the name of all his works, there is no room to speak here; suffice it to say that in his writings may be found Latinised, or at least criticised, the learning of almost all ancient Greece. He was indeed the creator of the prose style, and moreover the first to fix the literary form of the Latin language, pruning it of the by-forms and colloquialisms and of the many inflectional uncertainties with which it abounded.

It remains only to mention his *Epistles*, a title which includes letters written to, as well as letters written by, the orator. Chief amongst his correspondents were the eques T. Pomponius Atticus, his brother Q. Cicero, and M. Brutus; but there were few men of political or intellectual note of his day with whom he had no correspondence. These letters are the mirror of Cicero's mind and life. It is to them that we owe such a knowledge of Cicero as we possess of no other person in antiquity; and it is to these, too, that we are indebted for an insight into the play of politics at Rome between the years 63-43 B.C. such as we never attain to elsewhere. If all the writings of Cicero were to disappear, none of them all would be so irreparable a loss as his *Letters*.

With Cicero fell Roman oratory. Under the autocracy

of the Principate there was no further scope for such rhetoric as could sway the masses in the comitia or the Fathers in the Curia; and, inasmuch as freedom was the lifeblood of ancient eloquence, with the liberty of action and thought there died also the art of public speaking. In its place there grew up the declamatory style, in its way as much a child of pedantry as was the Alexandrine poetry: a rhetoric which laboured to interest an audience of fashionable critics in the Choice of Hercules or psychological studies of Hannibal; a rhetoric to be tested not by its effects upon a decision of the sovereign people, of the "Assembly of Kings," or of a panel of equites, but by its studied facility in every trick and figure known to the old-time masters of speech. Under the Republic every Roman had fought his way to eminence through "the Forum's wordy wars"; under the Empire, every Roman of culture toiled over declamatory exercises wherewith to bore a circle of friends in his drawing-room; and hence it came that every style of composition reflected the tone of an Orbilius' classes in elocution. We may trace the beginnings of this feature in the one historian after Sallust and Nepos with whom we have any concern in this period—namely, Livy.

§ 22. T. Livius Patavinus was of good birth, to judge from his aristocratical tone and predilections, and his birth-place of Patavium (*Padua*) was one of the most flourishing and populous towns of Italy, the capital of the Veneti. The exact year of his birth is unknown, but it was probably about 59-57 B.C. Livy came to Rome to be educated, and probably went through the usual course of rhetorical training; such training, at any rate, shows itself in much of his writings. He was, as an aristocrat, of course a republican at heart; but he lived apart from politics and retained the friendship of Augustus, if to no very intimate extent. In his preface he tells us that he has two reasons for essaying the gigantic task of writing a continuous history of Rome: the first is the hope of producing some new information; the second that of forgetting the troubles of his country, meaning thereby the civil wars. He must have begun the work very soon after the battle of Actium. It was planned to reach to 150 books, but was probably not completed.

We have thirty books intact, and portions of five others, together with an epitome of the entire work as far as the one hundred and forty-second book. The remaining eight were probably never written. Livy's work is the best model of Latin historical narrative which we possess, and its vivid style, approaching the poetical, gives it an interest which few such works can boast. He was not, however, a critic; and such material as he had he used more with an eye to effect than probability. He made large use of earlier writers, but he paid little attention to archæological evidence, and, like his predecessors, relied largely on legendary sources. He died in 17 A.D., full of years and honour; for we read that a Spaniard came all the way to Rome to see him, and, having seen him, went home again at once.

§ 23. This chapter may conclude with some short notice of three men who most aided Octavianus in his rise to the Principate—Agrippa, Maecenas, and Messala.

M. Vipsanius Agrippa was the embodiment of Octavianus' executive. Born in the same year as his patron, he was with him at Apollonia when Caesar fell, and was one of the very few who urged the heir to strike boldly for his heritage. When Octavianus had at length secured his position in the triumvirate, Agrippa came forward as his man of war. He figured in the Perusine war of 41-40 B.C., and in 39-38 B.C. was actively busied in the West, where the Aquitani and the German tribes were again asfir. Agrippa not only reduced Aquitania, but, like Julius, crossed the Rhine and chastised the Suebi, leaving as a monument of his exploit the entire tribe of the Ubii, whom he deported from Germany and settled upon the Gallic bank of the Rhine, in the neighbourhood of the modern Cologne. As consul in 37 B.C. he conducted the operations against Sex. Pompeius, and constructed the famous Julian Harbour by uniting Lakes Avernus and Lucrinus with one another and with the sea. He campaigned successfully in Dalmatia, 34 B.C., and was admiral of the fleet which conquered at Actium. Yet though Octavianus owed perhaps all his success to Agrippa, the latter remained always a notable example of the faithful servant, never failing his master in time of need, and never seeking any reward but the consciousness of duty done. He

threw himself heart and soul into Octavianus' ideas, notably in encouraging the erection of public buildings, erecting, at his own cost, a *cursus* or exercise ground surrounded by colonades and porticoes in the Campus Martius, the Julian Aqueduct, and magnificent public baths. In reward for his services he received in marriage the emperor's daughter Julia, by whom he became the ancestor of more than one later emperor. He died in 12 B.C.

C. Cilnius Maecenas, a descendant of the old royal line of the Etruscan Cilnii of Arretium, was to Octavianus in council what Agrippa was in the field. He first came into public notice in 40 B.C., and throughout the anxious years of jealousy between Antonius and Octavianus his diplomacy was ceaselessly exercised to maintain peace between the two, as when he negotiated the Treaty of Brundisium. He acted as his master's regent in Italy during the Actian war, and for ten years more he occupied the first place in the Emperor's cabinet. After that date (21 B.C.) he retired, and spent the rest of his life amongst the literary society which he loved, and of which he aspired to be himself a member. He was a ripe scholar, but a poor author and poet; and while none doubted his genius as a statesman, his effeminacy passed into a proverb. It was from him that Augustus learnt that clemency and moderation, that regard for tradition and established forms, whereby the Principate was able without violence or bloodshed to supplant the old republican constitution. Maecenas conferred upon the world a yet greater benefit in the patronage which he extended to Vergil, Horace, and Propertius.

M. Valerius Messala Corvinus was included in the list of the proscribed, 43 B.C., on the charge of complicity in the murder of Julius. Escaping to Cassius in Asia, he led the troops who drove back Octavianus' wing at Philippi, and was within an ace of taking the triumvir prisoner. After the battle he made his peace with Antonius, and was loyal to him until Cleopatra obtained too great an ascendancy over his new leader's mind. He then (36 B.C.) joined Octavianus and did good service both in Sicily and at Actium. In the year of the latter battle he became consul suffect in place of Antonius, whom the Senate had

declared deposed. He lived with honour and success far into the reign of the first emperor, and was almost as distinguished a patron of literature as was Maecenas. Amongst his circle was Tibullus, and he was a close friend of Horace. He was a successful orator, a writer of verses and history, and a diligent student of grammar and phonetics.

§ 24. When the court poets sang of the blessings of that new era which dated from the day of Actium, they spoke simple truth. There was of course still much that was bad, and there were still to be days when the Forum ran with blood and the Capitol itself went up in flames, and the war-god burst his hundred brazen bonds and shook the length and breadth of the empire. But if the progress of the State towards better things was necessarily slow, it was not the less real. For a hundred years the world had peace, commerce thrived, towns grew and multiplied, the provinces repaired the losses suffered under a Verres or a Dolabella, and even Rome itself lay quiet. The jubilant prophecy of Vergil's Fourth Eclogue had come to pass—

Magnus ab integro saeculorum nascitur ordo.
Iam redit et Virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna;
Iam nova progenies caelo demittitur alto.

* * * * *

Aspice, venturo laetantur ut omnia saeclo!



TEST QUESTIONS
ON
ROMAN HISTORY, 78-31 B.C.

1. By what means did the legislation of Sulla seek to put the Senate in secure possession of the government? How did his legislation determine the aims of the democratic party?

2. Sketch the course of the attempted revolution of Lepidus, and account for its failure.

3. Trace the course of the opposition to the constitution of Sulla from 78 B.C. to 71 B.C.

4. In what sense did Sertorius represent the democratic party? Give an outline of the Sertorian war.

5. Trace briefly the growth of slavery among the Romans, and estimate its effect on their history.

6. The war with Spartacus.

7. What motives induced Pompeius and Crassus severally to ally themselves with the democrats in 70 B.C.?

8. Trace the various steps in the revival of the power of the democrats from the death of Sulla to the year 70 B.C. inclusive.

9. Describe the condition of the various states of the East in 78 B.C., and explain the causes of the Third Mithradatic war.

10. Sketch the career of L. Lucullus in Asia. To what causes did he owe his initial success and ultimate failure?

11. Where, and for what celebrated, are Artaxata, Cyzicus, Sinope, Cabira, Chalcedon, Nisibis, Panticapaeum?

12. State and explain the laws which were passed in the first consulship of Pompeius and Crassus.

13. Give the date and purport of the *Lex Gabinia* and

the *Lex Manilia*. What motives led Cicero to support the latter?

14. Briefly trace the history of the various expeditions against the pirates down to the year 66 B.C. Account for the success of Pompeius in dealing with them.

15. What do you know of Antonius Creticus, Licinius Macer, M. Perpenna, and Appius Clodius?

16. Relate briefly, with dates, the campaigns of Pompeius in Asia.

17. For what reasons did the democratic party support the mission of Pompeius to the East in place of Lucullus?

18. Give some account of the settlement of Asia by Pompeius, 63 B.C., with special reference to his extension of the Roman dominions and the safeguarding of the frontier.

19. Briefly relate what is actually known as to the conspiracies of Catilina.

20. Discuss the allegation that Caesar and Crassus were parties to the conspiracy of Catilina.

21. What reasons can be adduced for supposing the conspiracy of Catilina to have been supported by the democrats, or the contrary?

22. Discuss the legality of Cicero's action in regard to the execution of the Catilinarians.

23. Under what circumstances was Cicero banished, and how was his recall effected?

24. What was the purport and the ulterior object of the Agrarian Bill of Rullus?

25. What was the First Triumvirate? By what motives were the three members actuated in forming the alliance?

26. Estimate Caesar's position in 59 B.C., and his object in seeking a military appointment in Northern Italy.

27. Give some account of (a) the migration of the Helvetii, or (b) Ariovistus.

28. Briefly outline the actions of Caesar in Gaul during the years 58-56 B.C. inclusive.

29. The invasions of Britain by Julius Caesar, their causes and results.

30. Narrate succinctly the chief events of the struggle of Caesar with Vercingetorix.

31. What was the Conference of Luca? What led to it, and what resulted therefrom?

32. What do you know of Divitiacus, Cassivellaunus, Portus Itius, Bibracte, Samarobriua, Gergovia, Alesia, and Uxellodunum?

33. Give the dates and provisions of the *Leges Licinia Pompeia*, *Trebonia*, *Vatinia*, and the *lex Iulia Agraria*.

34. How may we explain the altered position of Pompeius in regard to Caesar and to the Senate in 52 B.C.?

35. State briefly what you know of Metellus Pius, Cethegus, C. Manlius, Bibulus.

36. Show how it was essential to Caesar that the question of superseding him, when governor of the Gauls, should not be discussed before 50 B.C.

37. What were the provisions of the *Lex Pompeia de Iure Magistratum*? How did this threaten the interests of Caesar?

38. Estimate the comparative strength of the opposing parties at the moment of the outbreak of the Civil war.

39. Discuss and compare the shares which Pompeius, Caesar, and the Senate, severally took in provoking the Civil war.

40. Explain carefully the several questions of constitutional usage which arose in the quarrel between Caesar and the Senate.

41. Account for the decisive success of Caesar's attack upon Italy, 49 B.C.

42. Give a brief outline of the events of the campaign which ended at Pharsalus.

43. What events are associated with the names of Corfinium, Ziela, Dyrrhachium, Thapsus, Ilerda, and Massilia in relation to the Civil war? Give the modern name and describe the position of each.

44. Sketch, with dates, the chief events of the campaigns of Julius against the Pompeians subsequent to the battle of Pharsalus.

45. A brief account of the Alexandrine and Asiatic wars of Caesar.

46. Mention the leading items in the legislation of Caesar as regards government and administration.

47. Write a life of Cato Uticensis, with special reference to his political position.

48. *Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum.* To what does this refer? State what you know of Curio's subsequent career.

49. Give some account of the conspiracy against Caesar, and account for his unpopularity.

50. What reasons may be found for the fact that the Senate failed to recover its authority after the fall of Caesar?

51. Who was C. Octavius? Trace the course of his relations with the Senate down to the formation of the Second Triumvirate.

52. How did the formation of the Second Triumvirate affect the position of the Liberators, the Senate, and Cicero?

53. Write a short biography of Cicero, laying particular emphasis on his political attitude at various dates in his career.

54. What do you know of the subject of the *Philippics* of Cicero, and the circumstances under which they were composed?

55. Write a life of Cn. Pompeius, and estimate his character.

56. Sketch, with dates, the career of M. Crassus.

57. Give the dates and results of the following battles:—the Mulvian Bridge, Pistoria, Tigranocerta, the Sambre, Mutina, Carrhae.

58. Give an outline of the career of Sextus Pompeius.

59. What were the terms and dates of the treaties of Brundisium and Misenum?

60. The Perusine war, its cause and course.

61. Trace succinctly the relations of Rome with Parthia from the time of Lucullus to the battle of Actium.

62. What do you know of Domitius Ahenobarbus, Metellus Scipio, P. Sittius, Juba, T. Labicinus, M. Petreius?

63. What were the main grounds of quarrel between Octavianus and Antonius in 32 B.C.?

64. Write a short account of the campaign which ended with the deaths of Antonius and Cleopatra.

65 Construct a genealogical table to show the relationship of Julius Caesar, Octavianus, Octavia, M. Antonius, and M. Vipsanius Agrippa.

66. Enumerate the provinces of the Roman Empire at the time of Octavianus' victory at Actium.

67. What additions were made to the Roman Empire between the years 78-42 B.C.?

68 Mention any occasions, during this period, on which Egypt played an important part in political questions at Rome.

69. Account for the readiness with which the Romans allowed Octavianus to acquire despotic power.

70. Show that the position of Octavianus, at the close of 31 B.C., was only the logical outcome of the constitutional facts of the whole of this period.

71. Enumerate the chief provisions of the legislation of Sulla, and show how and when each was abolished.

72. Mention the steps taken during this period towards the extension of the Roman franchise amongst the provincials.

73. What do you know of P. Sestius, Roscius of Ameria, Annii Milo, P. Clodius, Aulus Gabinus, and C. Antonius Hybrida, especially in relation to Cicero?

74. Where are Naulochus, Tauromenium, Mylae, Lesbos, and Corecra? What is the modern name of each, and for what are they notable in the history of this period?

75. In what connection are the following mentioned during this period:—Osca, Mutina, Trapezus, Lampacus, Calagurris, the Mulvian Bridge?

76. Write brief notes of the lives of M. Agrippa, Statilius Taurus, Ventidius Bassus, Valerius Messala.

77. What is meant by the literary circle of Maecenas? Mention the more notable members of that circle.

78. Explain the following quotations:—

(a) Cum cecidit fato consul uterque pari.

(b) "Scio me asinum germanum fuisse" (Cicero in 56 B.C.).

(c) Pompeius, idem auctor legum et subversor.

79. What materials have we for the history of this period in the shape of contemporary writings?

80. Describe the characteristic features of the Ciceronian age of literature.

81. Estimate the effect which the fall of the republic had on literature.

82. Give some account of the literary importance of Lucretius, Varro, Sallust, and Catullus.

83. Write a note on Alexandrinism at Rome.

84. Write a note on the life of the following, showing their position in history, and giving an estimate of their character :—Q. Lutatius Catulus, M. Junius Brutus, C. Cassius Longinus.

85. From what point of time may we date the gradual revolution which terminated in the establishment of monarchy at Rome? Describe the several steps in this process.

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